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*************************************************************************
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

*************************************************************************
JON GREGORY,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
-vsRICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants / Respondents.
__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.: 46818-2019
District Court No.: CV-2017-1651

CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL

******************************************************************
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham.
HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

******************************************************************
Counsel for Appellant:

David N. Parmenter, Esq., 53 South Shilling, Blackfoot, ID
83221; iCourt Email - parlaw@gmail.com

Counsel for Respondents:

Jared M. Harris, Esq., 266 West Bridge St., Blackfoot, ID
83221; iCourt Email - efiling@bakerharrislaw.com

***********************************************************************
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BINGHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
Jonathon Clyde Gregory
vs.
Richard R Stallings, Eileen Stallings

§
§
§
§
§

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Appellate Case Number:

Bingham County District Court
Simpson, Darren B.
09/06/2017
46818-2019

CASE INFORMATION
Bonds
Transcript Bond
3/7/2019
Counts: 1

#Estimated Transcript on Appeal
Posted

AA- All Initial District Court
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and Hl)

$200.00

Case 02/27/2019 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2017-1651
Bingham County District Court
09/07/2017
Simpson, Darren B.

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys
Plaintiff

Gregory, Jonathon Clyde

Parmenter, David Newell

Retained
208-785-5618(W)
Defendant

Harris, Jared M.

Stallings, Eileen

Retained
208-785-231 0(W)
Stallings, Richard R

Harris, Jared M.

Retained
208-785-231 0(W)
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

DATE

09/06/2017

Appearance through Attorney (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B. )
Plaintiff: Gregory, Jonathon Clyde Appearance Through Attorney Nathan Rivera

09/06/2017

Summons Issued

09/06/2017

New Case Filed Other Claims

09/06/2017

INDEX

1!j Complaint Filed

09/06/2017

Appeal Cover/Title Page

09/06/2017

Case Summary

09/07/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in categories E,
F and H(l) Paid by: Parmenter Rivera, LLP Receipt number: 0012301 Dated: 9/ 7/2017
Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Gregory, Jonathon Clyde (plaintiff)

09/07/2017

Civil Case Information Sheet
- Plaintiff
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BINGHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
02/20/2018

Return of Service
- Substitute

03/02/2018

Appearance through Attorney (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B. )
Defendant: Stallings, Richard R. Appearance Through Attorney Jared M Harris

03/02/2018

Appearance through Attorney (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B. )
Defendant: Stallings, Eileen Appearance Through Attorney Jared M Harris

03/02/2018

1!:i Answer

03/06/2018

Initial Appearance
by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Baker & Harris Receipt number:
0002930 Dated: 3/6/2018 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For:

03/06/2018

Civil Case Information Sheet

03/06/2018

Notice
ofAlternative Judges Pursuant to IRCP 40(d)(l)(G)

03/06/2018

Hearing Scheduled
(Telephonic Status Conference 04/23/2018 10:00 AM)

03/06/2018

Notice of Hearing

03/07/2018

Notice of Service

03/09/2018

Miscellaneous
Note ofIssue and Request for Trial Setting

03/19/2018

Response
to Note ofIssue and Request for Trial Setting

04/23/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Woodland, William H. )
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference scheduled on 04/23/2018 10:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held; Courtroom No. 1
Court Reporter: Mary Ann Elliott
Number of transcript pages for this hearing estimated: less than 5 0

04/23/2018

Telephone Conference (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)
David Parmenter - (208) 785-5618
Jared M Harris - (208) 785-2310 Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference scheduled
on 04/23/2018 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held; Courtroom No. 1
Court Reporter: Mary Ann Elliott
Number of transcript pages for this hearing estimated: less than 5 0

04/23/2018

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference
Hearing date: 4/23/2018
Time: 10:03 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Mary Ann Elliott
Minutes Clerk: Brandee Cammack
Tape Number: Digital
Plaintiffs Attorney - David Parmenter
Defendant's Attorney -Jared Harris
Courtroom No. 1

04/23/2018

Hearing Scheduled
(Telephonic Status Conference 07/30/2018 09:00 AM)
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BINGHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
04/23/2018

Hearing Scheduled
(Pretrial 10/15/2018 10:00AM)

04/23/2018

Hearing Scheduled
(Jury Trial 11/14/2018 09:00 AM) Three days

04/23/2018

Notice of Hearing

04/23/2018

Scheduling Order
-Jury Trial

05/15/2018

Miscellaneous
Nomination of Mediator

07/05/2018

1!j Motion for Summary Judgment

07/05/2018

tj Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment

07/05/2018

1!j Affidavit
ofRichard Stallings in support of Motion for Summary Judgment

07/05/2018

Notice of Hearing

07/06/2018

Hearing Scheduled
(Motion for Summary Judgment 08/06/2018 09: 30 AM) Defendants' Motion

07/19/2018

1!j Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

07/19/2018

1!j Motion
to Extend Time for filing responsive Affidavits and Briefing in response to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Continue August 6, 2018 hearing

07/19/2018

1!j Affidavit
ofJon Gregory

07/19/2018

1!j Affidavit
of Garrett Sandow

07/23/2018

Notice of Hearing

07/24/2018

Motion to Shorten Time

07/24/2018

Notice
of Compliance

07/26/2018

Notice of Hearing

07/30/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B. )
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference scheduled on 07/30/2018 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held; Courtroom No. 1
Court Reporter: None
Number of transcript pages for this hearing estimated: less than 5 0

07/30/2018

Telephone Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)

+ Plaintiffs Motion to Extend Time and Motion to Cont.
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BINGHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
David Parmenter - (208) 785-5618
Jared M. Harris - (208) 785-2310 Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference scheduled
on 07/30/2018 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held; Courtroom No. 1
Court Reporter: None
Number of transcript pages for this hearing estimated: less than 5 0
07/30/2018

Continued
(Motion for Summary Judgment 08/21/2018 09:00 AM) Defendants' Motion

07/31/2018

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Telephonic Status Conference
Hearing date: 7/30/2018
Time: 9:04 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Brandee Cammack
Tape Number:

07/31/2018

Notice of Hearing

07/31/2018

Order
Shortening Time

08/14/2018

1!j Objection
to the Affidavits of Garrett Sandow and Jon Gregory

08/14/2018

1!:i Reply
brief in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

08/14/2018

1!j Affidavit
ofJared M Harris in Support of Reply Brief in Support of Defendatns' Motion for Summary
Judgment

08/21/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B. )
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 08/21/2018 09:00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held; Courtroom No. 1
Court Reporter: None, Admin Notice Given
Number of transcript pages for this hearing estimated: less than 5 0

08/21/2018

Motion for Summary Judgment (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)
Defendants' Motion Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on
08/21/2018 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held; Courtroom No. 1
Court Reporter: None, Admin Notice Given
Number of transcript pages for this hearing estimated: less than 5 0

08/21/2018

1!j Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 8/21/2018
Time: 9:00 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Brandee Cammack
Tape Number:

08/21/2018
10/10/2018

Case Taken Under Advisement

t:J Pretrial Memorandum

10/10/2018
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BINGHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
t:! Motion
to Extend Discovery Cutoffs
10/10/2018

1!j Affidavit
ofJared M Harris in support ofMotion to Extend Discovery Cutoffs

10/15/2018

Pre Trial (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B. ;Location: Courtroom 1)

10/15/2018

1!:i order
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

10/15/2018

1!j Judgment

10/16/2018

Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)
Comment()
Party (Stallings, Richard R; Stallings, Eileen; Gregory, Jonathon Clyde)

10/16/2018

Civil Disposition Entered

10/22/2018

t:! Motion
for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs

10/22/2018

1!j Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees

10/23/2018

1!j Court Minutes
- Pre trial

10/29/2018

1!j Affidavit
ofJon Gregory in Support of Motion for Reconsideration

10/29/2018

1!J Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Reconsideration

10/29/2018

~ Motion for Reconsideration
- Plaintiff

11/05/2018

1!j Objection
to Attorneys Fees and Costs

11/07/2018
11/14/2018

1!:I Notice of Hearing

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)
Vacated
Three days

11/16/2018

~

11/16/2018

1!j Affidavit

Objection
and Response to Motion to Reconsider

in Support of Objection and Response to Motion to Reconsider
11/16/2018

t:! Motion

PAGE 5 OF 8

Page 6

Printed on 04/11/2019 at 2:43 PM

BINGHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
to Strike
11/16/2018

1!j Objection
to Affidavit ofJon Gregory

11/26/2018

1!:i Amended
Notice ofHearing

11/30/2018

1!:! Notice
to Vacate Hearing

12/03/2018

12/12/2018

CANCELED Motion for Reconsideration (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)
Vacated
11/26/2018
Continued to 12/03/2018 - Cont-Illness or family emergency- Gregory,
Jonathon Clyde

1!j Stipulation
to Submit on Briefing

12/14/2018

~

Order

to Submit on Briefing and Notice Vacating Hearing

12/17/2018

1!j CANCELED

Motion for Reconsideration (9:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren

B.)

Vacated
12/17/2018

Case Taken Under Advisement

Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider I Defendants' Motion to Strike
01/18/2019

1!:i order
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration

01/25/2019

1!:I Motion
for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs - Amended

01/25/2019

1!j Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
-Amended

02/21/2019

Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Simpson, Darren B.)
Comment()
Party (Stallings, Richard R; Stallings, Eileen; Gregory, Jonathon Clyde)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Stallings, Richard R; Stallings, Eileen
Against: Gregory, Jonathon Clyde
Entered Date: 02/21/2019
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 02/21/2019
Monetary Award:
Amount: $18,536.00

02/27/2019

t:l order
Granting Amended Motion for Award ofAttorney's Fees and Costs

02/27/2019

1!:I Judgment
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BINGHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
02/27/2019

Civil Disposition Entered

02/27/2019

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court

02/27/2019

t:! Notice of Appeal

02/27/2019

t!j objection
to Amended Motion for Award ofAttorneys Fees and Costs & Motion for Enlargement of Time

02/27/2019

tj Affidavit
Jennifer Godinez

03/01/2019

~ Affidavit
Regarding Computation of Interest

03/01/2019

~ Writ Issued
Bingham Co. I $18,584.22

03/29/2019

1!:J Notice
ofBalance Due for Clerk's Record on Appeal

04/03/2019

~

04/09/2019

04/09/2019

1:

Notice
ofBalance Due for Clerk's Record on Appeal - Amended
Transcript Lodged
I Motion for Summary Judgment 8-21-18

~ Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged
I Reporter Jack Fuller I Motion for Summary Judgment 8-21-18

04/11/2019

Exhibit List/Log
- Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits on Appeal

04/11/2019

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Stallings, Eileen
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 4/11/2019

136.00
136.00
0.00

Defendant Stallings, Richard R
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 4/11/2019

0.00
0.00
0.00

Plaintiff Gregory, Jonathon Clyde
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 4/11/2019

645.00
645.00
0.00

Payor of Cash Bond Parmenter Rivera, LLP
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 4/11/2019

200.00
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-1651
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•

•

.

DAVID N. PARMENTER, ISB # 2441
NATHA N D. RIVERA, ISB # 8339
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, ID 83221
(208)785-5618
(208)785-4858 (fax)
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT Y OF BINGHAM
DISTRICT COURT

JON GREGORY, an individual,
Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
and EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV-2017- /

le SI

VERIFIED COMPLAINT
FILING FEE:$ 221.00

___ ___ ___ ___ ___

NOTICE: This Case ls_a.s~l_gned to
·impson D1stnct Judge
· '
Darren B• S

COMES NOW Plaintiff, JON GREGORY, through counsel NATHAN D. RIVERA, and
as follows:
alleges and complains against the Defendants, RICHARD AND EILEEN STALLINGS,

PARTIES
1.

Plaintif f is a resident of Blackfoot, Bingham County, State ofldaho .

2.

Defendants are residents of Blackfoot, Bingham County, State ofldaho .

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

1

Page 10

•
3.

•
JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is proper in District Court in that the amount of damages exceeds

$10,000.00.

FACTS
4.

Plaintiff became interested in a break or parcel of property owned by Mary Ann Beck

of Rexburg, Idaho, which he wanted to purchase for development of student housing and/or similar
commercial development.
5.

Plaintiff purchased 2 of the 4 acres by paying cash of$205,000.00, but needed to

acquire the other 2 acres to complete the plan development.
6.

Defendant Richard Stallings contacted the Plaintiff, and advised that he had an

interest in purchasing the other 2 acres, and going in as partners on the development.
7.

Defendants thereafter obtained a bank loan in order to finance their share of

necessary $200,000.00 for the other 2 acres.
8.

A third party, Summit Development also known as Pioneer Point LLC (Heath

Johnston) became involved as the developers for the project. It was to develop the property, put in
road, parking lots, sewer, water, and begin with at least two buildings on the property.
9.

Plaintiffs 2 acres were subordinated to a Bank of Commerce Loan obtained by

Defendants, so that the Defendants could obtain their financing for the purchase of the property.
Defendants actually borrowed $289,000.00, the difference above $200,000.00 which they requested
for other matters or investments.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

2

Page 11

10.

•

•

Somewhat thereafter, Century Mortgage Company, also had Defendants execute a

Construction Loan Agreement and Assignment of Trust, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
11.

Further, Defendants executed a Promissory Note around the same time, a copy of

which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
12.

The Construction Loan Agreement and Assignment of Trust was financed by

Century Mortgage Company, who had acquired several individual investors to finance the mortgage,
and who were also parties of interest through their investments.
13.

The Plaintiff also owned an adjacent but separate property known as G's Dairy

Delights, LLC, which he leased to an individual who operated that business.
14.

Around 2007, the market in residential and commercial values crashed and fell,

causing considerable economic turmoil in the United States, and as it related to the property in
question.
15.

Century Mortgage advised the Plaintiff that they could not provide him a draw for

construction work, and essentially went out of business. Summit had done some initial work, and
had provided some initial development. However, they were unable to complete the project.
16.

Plaintiff immediately began working on trying to sell the property and to try and

recoup the investments that he, Defendants, and the other investors for the mortgage had put into the
property.
17.

During the process, in order to keep project viable, The Plaintiff further sold his

property known as G's Dairy Delights, LLC, and took the proceeds from that sale and invested them

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

3

Page 12

•

•

in the Marian Beck property and project. Those funds were approximately $292,629.43. See attached
Exhibit C.
18.

The Plaintiff also began working on efforts to sell the Mary Ann Beck property and

project, in order to recoup their losses, given the economic crash.
19.

The Plaintiff was able to locate a buyer, Rockwell Court Limited Partnership, who is

willing to purchase the property for the sum of $1,086,000.00. With that sale, all of the mortgage
investors were paid back their initial investments. See attached Exhibit D.
20.

The balance of the proceeds from the sale of the property was to be divided between

the original investors, the Plaintiff and Defendants.
21.

The parties had originally agreed to divide the anticipated balance of the proceeds of

$433,000.00 by 2, each of them receiving $216,758.86.
22.

Thereafter, despite Plaintiffs greater investment in supplying the additional

$292,000.00 from the sale of G's Dairy Delights, LLC, and having paid as well additional interest
payments, Defendants sent a statement to Plaintiff, from the sale of the proceeds of $300,000.00,
paying to Plaintiff the sum of $155,482.28, and to the Defendants, the sum of $144,517.72.
23.

Even though the Plaintiff had by far the greater investment, needed the money at the

time, and was willing to acquiesce to that proposal and offer.
24.

Thereafter, despite his previous statement, and the fact that they were partners in the

project, Defendants thereafter advised the Plaintiff that they were keeping all proceeds from the sale
with Rockwell Court Limited Partnership, and that the Plaintiff should receive nothing.
25.

Defendant thereafter kept and retained all of the proceeds from the sale of property

with Rockwell Court Limited partnership, and paid nothing to Plaintiff.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

4
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•

COUNT I-BREACH OF CONTRACT.
26.

•

Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth herein above in paragraphs 1 through 25

of this complaint as if the same were herein set forth in full.
27.

Plaintiff entered into an express agreement with Defendants whereby Plaintiff agreed

to pay for one half of the land necessary to develop and to otherwise achieve improvement of the
Subject Property.
28.

Plaintiff performed all obligations required of it under the Contract, and more in the

investment and development of the subject property, and actually invested more than double the
financial resources provided by Defendants.
29.

Plaintiff kept Defendants informed of the progress of the Subject Property, and

ultimately its sale.
30.

Defendants breached the Contract by , inter alia, failing and refusing to pay or

reimburse Plaintiff for his contributions and investments, both of time and money.
31.

As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing breach of contract, Plaintiff has

been damaged in the amount to be proven at trial, but not less than for the sum of $492,000.00,
together with accruing interest for pre and post judgment pursuant to J.C. 28-22-104.
32.

Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of an attorney to bring this action and

is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to, inter alia, Idaho
Code§§ 12-120(1)(3), 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54(e).

COUNT II- BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT.
33.

Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth herein above in paragraphs 1 through 25

of this complaint as if the same were herein set forth in full.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

5
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34.

•

•

Plaintiff entered into an implied agreement with Defendants whereby Plaintiff agreed

to pay for one half of the land necessary to develop and to otherwise achieve improvement of the
Subject Property.
3 5.

Plaintiff performed all obligations required of it under the Implied Contract, and

more in the investment and development of the subject property, and actually invested more than
double the financial resources provided by Defendants.
36.

Plaintiff kept Defendants informed of the progress of the Subject Property, and

ultimately its sale.
37.

Defendants breached the Contract by, inter alia, failing and refusing to pay or

reimburse Plaintiff for his contributions and investments, both of time and money.
38.

As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing breach of contract, Plaintiff has

been damaged in the amount to be proven at trial, but not less than for the sum of $492,000.00,
together with accruing interest for pre and post judgment pursuant to LC. 28-22-104.
39.

Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of an attorney to bring this action and

is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to, inter alia, Idaho
Code§§ 12-120(1)(3), 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e).
COUNT III- QUANTUM MERUIT/QUASI CONTRACT.
40.

Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth herein above in paragraphs 1 through 25

of this complaint as if the same were herein set forth in full.
41.

Plaintiff furnished financial/ resources in excess of $500,000.00 as well as services

and labor to develop and make improvements on the Subject Property at the request of Defendants
and to the mutual benefit of both parties.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

6
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42.

•

•

The sum of $492,000.00, together with accruing interest for pre and post judgment

pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104 was and is the reasonable value of the investment and expenses
furnished by Plaintiff at the request of Defendants for which the benefit has been realized by
Defendants but payment has not been received.
43.

As such, there remains due, owing and unpaid from Defendants the sum of

$492,000.00, together with accruing interest for pre and post judgment pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104.
44.

Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of an attorney to bring this action and

is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to, inter alia, the
Contract, Idaho Code§§ 12-120(1)(3), 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the Defendants as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff be granted judgment in its favor on each of the Counts of its

Complaint.
2.

That Plaintiff be entitled to a money judgment against Defendants in the amount of

$492,000.00, together with accruing interest for pre and post judgment pursuant to I.C. § 28-22104 or the maximum rate otherwise allowed by law together with an award of attorney fees and
costs pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-120(1)(3), 12-121, and LR.C.P. 54(e);
3.

That, in the event this action is uncontested, that Plaintiff be granted an award of

attorney fees and costs in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000.00) as reasonable
attorney fees in such other amount as the court may determine as just in the event the matter is
contested.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

7
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4.

•

•

That Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief as the Court may deem just

and equitable.

/:-4'

DATED this _"-1_ day of September, 2017

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

8
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•

•
Verification

State of Idaho
County of Bingham

)
:ss.
)

JON GREGORY, being first sworn, states:
I am the Plaintiff in this case. I have read the foregoing Complaint and believe the facts
and statements set out therein to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and
belief.

a:
My Commission Expires:

VERIFIED COMPLAINT-

9
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•

•

EXHIBIT A

Page 19

•

•

CENTURY MORTGAGE COMPANY
45 NORTH 300 EAST
ST. GEORGE 1 UTAH 847'70

CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT

.AND

ASSIGNMENT OF TRUST ACCOUNT

THIS AGREEMENT, is made on December 10, 2008 by and between the undersigned Pioneer Point
LLC (Heath Johnston)and Richard and Eileen Stallings (borrower) and Century Mortgage, as
agent for. investors The Leland Alvin Laub Trost 6.78% interest; The Ludlow Trust 13.54% interest; Tiffany Meredith .63%
interest Laurine Meredith 6.35% interest: Ray Schmutz Family Trust 1.16% interest: David & Olive Esplin 2.12% interest; Howard
Bingham or Dale Bingham 2.12%; Peacock Revocable Trust 8.57% interest Dona Randall 3.17% interest: Richard I Burch 10.58%
interest; Ray Schmutz Family Partnership 6:56% interest; Ronald A Ludlow 2.54% interest; Earle Revocable Trust 1.27% interest;
Cleon & Joyce Davies 3.50% interest; Charles & Lorena Lambert 14.18% interest; Donald J Larkin Living Trust 6.35% interest; Alan
& Dayle Baird 10.58% interest inconsideration of the granting of a loan by lenders and as part of
said loan transaction, which loan is evidence by Note of the undersigned for $945,000.00
at 12%.interest dated December 10, 2008.

Attached hereto and by this reference made part thereof, in favor of the Lenders, and
secured by· a first Trust Deed on real property located in Washington County, State o:f
Utah, and described as:
Property Description: First Trust Deed . on• Parce·1 1. Rexburg, Idaho development with
student hous'ing and Parcel 3 Lot 2 Pioneer Village.
2nd Trust Deed position Parcel 2
Rexburg, ID.

The purpose of said loan is to finance a part of the cost of construction of certain
improvements upon the described premises in accordance with plans and specifications that
have been or will be.deposited by Borrower with the Lenders.
The parties desire to set
forth the terms and conditions of this transaction, the agreement of the Parties, and the
rights and remedies of the Lenders, in connection with the disbursement of the proceeds
and construction of the improvements.
IT IS, THEREFORE, AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Upon the recordation of the Trust Deed, the
net proceeds of the loan will be available · to be disbursed by the Lenders to the
undersigned Borrower or others as hereinafter provided which shall be conclusively deemed
full consideration for the Note and that such consideration has fully passed and been paid
to the Borrower.
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, each of the undersigned
Borrower
irrevocably aooi~ii.o to the lenders, as security for the obligation secured
by the Deed of Trust, all rights, title and interest of the Borrower in the undisbursed
balance.
Each of the undersigned Borrowers acknowledges that lie has no " right to the
moneys in the Undisbursed Account other than to have the same used by the ):,enders in
accordance with this Agreement, which, upon acceptance by Lenders hereon, Lenders agrees
to do.
Borrower, jointly and severally, further agrees as follows:
1.

To commence actual construction work of the improvements to be constructed on the
property within forty-five (45) calendar days from the date of this Agreement, and
to complete the same, including all necessary utility connections, promptly and in
any event within seven (7) calendar months from the date of this Agreement and in
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2.

accordance with t h e . n s and specifications submitt.by Borrower to and approved
'by Lender, and in accordance with the requirements of all s·tate and local
authorities, laws and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration, Veterans
Administration, or other public authority having a futu~e interest in the long term
financing of said improvements in the finished Home.
To furnish to Lender, before any funds are.disbursed from the account, a policy of
title insurance satisfactory to Lender, insuring that the Trust Deed is a first lien
on the property. Should any work of any character be commenced on, or any materials
delivered upon or to, the real property or in connection with said improvements
prior .to the time the. Lender approves the .title and records the Trust Deed, the
Lender, at his sole option, may apply so much of the fund in the Trust Account as
may be_required to satisfy in full all indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed and to
pay all expenses incurred in connection with the transaction and to be relieved from
any and all obligation to proceed with the loan.

3.

To make all payments ·of principal and interest in accordance with the terms of the
Note and Trust Deed.
Interest during construction shall be computed on the full
amount· of the loan from the date of the note and such interest will be payable
monthly by the Borrower with funds that have been set aside as a reserve for such
purpose, unless the lender shall otherwise agree in writing.
In such case, if such
interest payments are not made when due. and payable, the Lender is authorized, at
its election, to pay the same or itself from proceeds of the loan or has the option
to call ·the note due for non-payment of interest.

4.

To use such funds from the net proceeds of the loan for the purposes in and for the
construction of said improvements which. funds are hereby assigned to the Lender for
such purpose.
To deposit in the Trust Account upon demand of Lender, such further
·sums estimated by Lender as being necessary to cover all items provided or
contemplated to be paid or expended under this Agreement.

5.

That·no materials, equipment, fixtures or any other part of the improvements shall
be purchased or installed under conditional sales agreement or other arrangements
wherein the right is res·erved or accrues to anyone to remove or repossess any ·such
item or to consider them as personal property.

6.

That subject to the provisions of this Agreement,_ the loan is to be dispursed by the
Lender to provide funds for construction of the contempiated improvements and may be
paid to any of the undersigned, or, at the option of the Lender, may.be paid to
contractors, material men and laborers, or any of them, and if any of the
undersigned are to receive a disbursement, they must furnish a signed waiver from
subcontractor who performed the work.

7.

That before requesting any payments or advances, the Borrower agrees to furnish the
Lender, if requested, lien waivers or lien subordination receipts in form and
substances satisfactory to the Lender, covering work done or materials furnished for
the-improvements.
Said documents shall show the expenditure of an amount equal to
the .amount .proposed .to b.e disbursed from the Account . . The Borrower agrees. thi;'tt al.l.
funds disbursed to any of the undersigned will be immediately used to pay bills and
charges for the labor and materials and not to use the money for any other purposes.
Borrower further agrees to keep records satisfactory to and open to the inspection
of the Lender showing that funds advanced by the Lender are used only in said
construction as herein specified.
Any written order, receipt or other document
signed by any of the undersigned shall be binding upon all of the undersigned and
the Lender shall be fully protected in acting thereupon.

8.

Not to alter in any way the construction of the improvement as shown on the plans
and specifications herein referred to.
Provided however, that in the event extras
or additions not called for in said plans and specifications are contemplated,
2
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Borrower agrees tha.efore any such changes, extr.or additions are ordered .or
placed into effect, he will immediately notify the Lender in writing of. such
contemplated changes.
If Lender does not approve such changes Borrower hereby
agrees to immediately deposit to the Trust Account, a sum of money requested to
cover the. cost of said alterations, additions or extras.
9.

To pay all loan expenses.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such
expenses shall include all recording charges, title insurance charges, cost of
surveys, cash deposits required to be made with
title insurance company issuing
the title insurance policy, and cost of premiums of surety company bonds required.by
said title insurance company in connection with the insurance of preliminary reports
of title, and title insurance policy or removal of title exceptions there from, fees
of outside appraisers, if any, Lender's service fee, and cost of recordation·.
Lender may also set aside reasonable reserve for estimated future loan, expenses and
for intere.st, insurance, and taxes to accrue during the period of construction,
offsite improvements, and initial tax and insurance deposits to be set aside under
the terms of the Deed of Trust and for other contingencies.

10.

That anything in this Agreement contained to the contrary notwithstanding, it is
expressly understood and agreed that the loan hereunder · shall at all times be in
balance.
The loan shall be deemed to be in balance only when the un-disbursed
proceeds of the loan, after ~revisions for all reserves ·authorized by this
Agreement, shall equal or exceed the amount necessary, based upon Lender's
estimation of construction costs and loan expen~es, to pay for all work done or to
be done for completion of the construction of the improvements including the
installat•ion· of fixtures and equipment.
If for any. reason, the loan should at. any
time after commencement of disbursements of the proceeds become out of balance,
Borrower will, within five (5) days after written request by Lender, deposit with
the Lender an amount of cash sufficient to correct the deficiency, which deposits
shall first be exhausted before any further disbursements of the proceeds of the
Loan shall be made.

ll.

That lender shall not be obligated to make advances except during the progress of
construction, said advance-s to be made on the basis of Lender's estimate of the
value of the work and improvements in place of the cost of completion of
construction, and of the amount of reserves required to be retained by Lender for
its protection.
Lender may retain, in addition to • all reserves, an amount
sufficient, in Lender's sole judgment, to insure that there will be proper retainage
from contractors, subcontractors, and·material man to assure their performance of
their contractors and to cover the contingency of insufficiency of cost estimated or
of additional expenses being incurred in relation to contracts or subcontractors.
In any event, Lender may provide a reserve for contingencies of ten (10) percent of
the estimated cost of construction.

12.

That lender shall have no responsibility, beyond the exercise of good faith, for the
character or value of any work for which payments may be made or for any claims for
mechanic's liens or for extras that_ may be.. asserted by_ and claimed
CQnnec_tion
with any of the work performed or to be performed. Lenders may, in its discretion,
make payments for labor and materials directly to any contractor or subcontractors
without prior approval by Borrower, and shall be held harmless by Borrower for any
payments so made by Lender in good faith.

13.

That the Lender shall have the right to inspect said property at any reasonable
time, but such inspection is for its protection only.
It is agreed that the
undersigned Borrower has or will, at its own responsibility, select all architects,
builders, contractors, subcontractors, material man, laborers, materials, equipment,
and appliances, and that Lender has no responsibility therefore.

3
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14.

That in the event a.liens or claims of lien. are . e r t e d or filed against the
property, the Lender, after five (5) days notice to the undersigned of its intention
so to do, may pay any or all of such liens or claims, -or purchase assignments
thereof, or may contest the validity of any o·f them, paying all costs and expenses
of contesting the same, including reasonable attorney's fees and all payments to be
made.out of the Trust Account, then such additional amounts may be expended by the
Lender at its option·, and all funds paid or expanded by the Lender, together with
interest tp.ereon at the rate of sixteen percent (16%) .per annum from the date of
advance, shall be secured by the Trust Deed and shall be due and payable without
notice·on demand.

15.

That should any of the ~dersigned Borrowers default in the performance of any
agreement hereunder; or should work cease on the improvements, especially including
stoppage by the Lender under the terms of this Agreement, or for any reason
.whatsoever, for fifteen (15) calendar days; or if the improvements shall be damaged
or destroyed by fire or other: casualty; or in the case of death of any o:i: the
undersigned; or if a petition in bankruptcy or under any debtor's relief law shall
be filed by or against any of the undersigned; or if any of the premises covered by
the· Trust Deed· without the written consent of the Lender, or if any of the
undersigned makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or the filing of a lis
pendens naming any of the undersigned or any action affecting the title of the real
property described in the Trust Deed, or if any of the undersigned have judgments
entered against them, or should any lien be asserted, filed, or recorded against the
_property; or should the Lender, in its sole discretion ·decide that the funds in the
Trust Account are insufficient to complete the construction of said improvements and
pay all charges and bills for labor and materials used in ·connection therewith; or
if it _would be imprudent to disburse funds from said Trust Account or any part
thereof, or should any condition or circumstance arise or exist at any . time by
reason of any governmental order, decree or . regulation, shortage of material or
labor, or for any reason whatsoever which-would prevent or preclude· the construction
and completion of the improvement in compliance with the plans and specifications
therefore in an orderly and expeditious manner without delay, or in the event of any
other default of any nature or kind not specified herein, then in any of such
events, at its option, the Lender may, without notice:

(a)

Declare all indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed immediately due and payable and
thereupon the Lender shall be released from all obligations to the undersigned under
this Agreement; such application shall not operate to waive or cure any default
existing under the Note or Trust Deed, nor to invalidate any notice of Default or
any act done pursuant to such notice and shall not prejudice any rights of the
Lender under the Trust Deed or Note; or,

(b)

Lender may take possession of the premises and let contracts for or proceed with the
finishing of the improvements, and to commence or appear in any action or
proceedings to enforce any contracts made by the undersigned in connection with or
for the construction of the building as aforesaid, as the agent of the undersigned,
_and .al.l ___ sums _paid .. or __ expended _by_ .the __L_ender , under J:._he _ te;rm.s ..o.f _th.i,.~ _Ag_r~emeP.t. in,
excess of the Trust Deed amount shall be considered and be an additional loan to the
undersigned and the repayment thereof, together with interest thereon at the rate of
sixteen percent (16%) per annum and shall be secured by the Trust Deed and shall be
due and payable without notice on demand.

16.

That the undersigned do hereby irrevocably appoint and
agent to execute and file or record any Notice which the
advisable· to protect the interest of the Lender under this
of the Trust Deed.
This appointment is hereby expressly
agent coupled with an interest and therefore irrevocable.

4
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authorize the Lender, as
Lender deems necessary or
Agreement or the security
declared or be that of an

1. 7.

That no waiver or an.ef.ault or breach by Borrower Aunder shall be implied from
'any omission by Lender to take action on account of such default if such default
persists or is repeated and no expres.s waiver shall affect any default other than
the default specified in the waiver and it shall be operative only for the time and
to the extent therein stated. Waivers of any covenant, term or condition contained
herein shall not ·be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach of the same
covenant, terms or conditions.
The consent or approval by Lender to or of any act by Borrower requiring further
consent or approval shall not be deemed to waive or render unnecessary the consent
or approval to or of·any subsequent similar act.

1.8.

That the Lender shall have the right to commence, appear in, or to defend any action
or proceeding purporting to affect the right or duties of the parties hereunder, or
the security of Lender in the subject property, or the payment of any fUhds in ·the
Trust Account and in ~onnection therewith pay necessary expenses, employ counsel and
. pay his reasonable fee; All sums paid or expended by the lender under the terms of
this Agreement in additional loan to the Borrower and the repayment · thereof,
together with i~terest thereto as set forth herein, shall be secured by the Trust·
Deed and shall be due and payable without notice, on demand, and the undersigned
jointly and severally agree to pay the same.

1.9.

That this Agreement is made and entered into for the sole protection and benefit of
Lender and Borrower, the successors and assigns of Lender and. the successor and
permitted assigns of Borrower, and no other person or persons shall have any right
of action on this Agreement or right to the funds at any time on deposit in the
Trust Account.
The un-disbursed balance of the loan shall be property of and under
the exclusive control of the Lender up to the time·of disbursements, and shall.not
be subject to attachment or garnish by Borrower's creditors.
20. It is intended that· the provisions of this Agreement are supplemental to the
provisions of the Trust Deed, and that the two documents be constructed together in
all respects.
In the event that an inconsistency between the two documents is
found, so that the provisions of both cannot be given effect, it is intended that
the Trust Deed shall be the controlling instrument.

21. The principal amount of the loan and accrued interest thereon shall be due and
payable, if not sooner paid as set forth in the note.
If any dwelling securing· the
loan is not sold, the loan closed to the permanent buyer, and the release price
applied to the loan balance by the date full payment is due, Borrower will have the
option to.

22. Pay the loan in full .

. 23.. Must. approach. L.ender. to .s.ee. if. Investor. will consider.. all.oYling Bar.rower to .pay . to
Lender a minimum extension fee equal to l percent of the loan amount to extend the
loan term for a period of two months.

24. The Lender may require a reserve up to 5% of the loan amount to be held back. This
amount may be used to cover accrued interest and other expenses that may be incurred
prior to payoff.
After 30
from end of construction, when all lien releases
become.unconditional, all outstanding obligations will be paid.

25. Borrower/Buyer may not and must not occupy home until loan is paid in full or
5
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written approval is . .ined from Lender.

26. A complete insurance policy of fire, liability, etc., must be taken out on· the·
project in an amount at least equal to the construction loan principal, before
construction begins and before any funds are distributed after purchase of land.
Century Mortgage should be named as loss payee and shall receive a copy of. the
policy naming Century Mortgage as loss payee.

27. Borrower to provide "Waiver of Lien" on a11 pa'Y!llents to subcontractors if lender
requests.

EXECUTED at

ST. GEORGE, UTAH, this

Pioneer Point LLC
Heath Jay Johnston (Managing Member)

Richard Stallings

10 th

day of

December 2008

. Heath Jay Johnston (Personally)

Eileen Stallings

ACCCEPTED _ _ _ _ _ __

2009 for Century Mortgage

By-------------------Title

6

Page 25

--------------------

'

.

•

•

EXHIBITB

Page 26

•

•
PROMISSORY NOTE
$ 945,000.00

Rexburg, Idaho

December 1O, 2008

For Value received, the undersigned promise to pay to the order of Leland Laub
Trustee of The Leland Alvin Laub Trust as to 6. 78% interest, Gwen Ludlow
Trustee of The Ludlow Trust as to 13.54% interest, Tiffany Meredith as to .63%
interest, Laurine Meredith as to 6.35% interest, Mary Lou Schmutz Trustee of Ray
Schmutz Family T1·ust as to 1.16% interest, David S. or Olive Esplin {J/f w/ right of
survivorship) as to 2.12% interest, Howard Bingham or Dale Bingham as to 2.12%
interest, George Peacock Trustee of Peacock Revocable Trust as to 8.57%, interest,
Don Randall as to 3.17% interest, Richard I. Burch as to 10.58% interest, Ray
Schmutz Family Partnership as to 6.56% interest, Ronald A Ludlow as to 2.54%
interest, Reba Earle Trustee of Earle Revocable Trust, as to 1.27% interest, Cleon
0. Da'vies or Joyce Davies as to 3.5% interest, Charles R. and Lorena Lambert (JT)
as to 14.18% interest, Donald Larkin Trustee of Donald J. Larkin Living Trust as to
6.35% interest, and Alan G. and Dayle Baird as to l 0.58% interest.
.
At such place as the holder may designate in writing, THE PRINCIPAL SUM OF
$945,000.00 together with interest at the rate of 12% percent per annum, lawful money
of the United States of America in installments as follows:
Monthly interest only payments. Interest payments will be in the amount of
$9,450.00 per month with the first payment due January 10, 2009 with the loan
coming due June 10, 2009, or upon long-term loan being obtained, whichever comes
first. There will be no prepayment penalty for early payoff.
Late fee of 5% of payment if not paid ·within 10 days of the due date.
Terms: Six (6) months with option to extend another 6 months

If default be made in the payment of any installment under this note, the entire principal
sum and accrued interest shall at once become due and payable without notice at the
option of the holder of this note. The failure of the holder of this note to enforce its rights
upon default in any of the tenns of this note shall not constitute a waiver of any such right
in the event of a subsequent default. If suit is instituted to collect this note or any portion
thereof, I agree to pay, in addition to the costs and disbursements as are allowed by law,
such additional sums as the court may adjudge reasonable ou attorney's fees in such suit
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for
payment, protest, notice of protest and of non-payment of this notice.
The indebtedness evidenced by this Note is secured by a Deed of Trust of even date, and
reference is made to the Deed of Trust for rights as to acceleration of the indebtedness
evidenced by this note.
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You are instructed to furnish to any broker or lender identified with
this transaction or anyom
behalf of such lende1·, any information concerning this escrow upon
request of said broker or
any reason funds are retained or remain in escrow after closing date,
you are to deduct therefi
reasonable monthly charge as custodian thereof of not less than $ I 0.00
per month.

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
None
DECLAR ATION OF ESCROW SERVICES:
BoITower{s) hereby acknowledge the following by their signature(s)
below:
I/We have been specifically informed that Alliance Title & Escrow Corp.
is not licensed to p1
no legal advice has been offered by Alliance Title & Escrow Corp.
or any of its ernployet
been further informed that Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. is acting
only as escrow l1olde1
forbidden by law from offering any advice lo any party with respect
to the merits of this escr,
or the nature and content of the documents executed herein, and that
they liave not done so.
We have been requested by Alliance Ti1le & Escrow Corp. to seek
legal and/or accounting ,
own choosing at our own expense, if we have any doubt concerning
any aspect of this transac
I/We finther declare all instruments to which we are a party, if prepared
by Alliance Titk &
have been prepared under the direction of my/our attorney(s) or
myself7ourselves. We h
advised that we can obtain a copy of the priva<;y policy of Alliance Title
& Escrow Corp by n
I/We have been afforded adequate time and opportunity to read and
understand these escro
and all other documents referred to therein.
These escrow closing illstructions constitute the entire agreement between
Alliance Title &
and the undersigned parties. Any amendme nt and/or supplement to
these instructions must b~
I/We further understand that Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. assumes
no liability as to any la\\
governmental regulations including, but not limited to, building, zoning
and division ofland c
assumes no responsibility for determining tl1at tl1e parties to
the escrow have comp.
requirements offue Truth in Lending, Consumer Protection Act (Public
Law 90-321), or simil

THE FOREGOING TERMS, CONDITIONS, CONSIDERATIO
N AND INSTRUC'
UNDERSTOOD AND APPROVED IN THEIR ENTIRETY BY
THE UNDERSIGNE
TO PAY ON DEMAND USUAL BORROWER'S CHARGES INCLUD
ING RECORJ
SETTLEMENT FEES, TITLE POLICIES, UNPAID,BALANCES
OF ANY ENCUMBl
RECORD THAT IS TO BE ELIMINATED FROM-THE TITLE
COMMITMENT PRI
~ G, DOCUMENT
REPARATION , S AND LENDERS FEES P
,,.- INSTR 1101~.-- ------

E1Iene Stallings- "

ADDRESS:

1270 W 1130 S
Orem, UT 84058

The foregoing instructions have been acknowledged and received by
Alliance Title & Escrow

-~&::M ·_

B~~ 1AL, cllJ

Page 28

DATE:

Jar
---- --
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or, if the note has hecn pledged, the pledgee thereof. In this Deed, whenever the context so requires~ the masculine

the feminine .ind/o.rncuter,. and the singular number includes 1hc p)ural.

8. Trustee is not obligated to notify any pany hereto of pending sole under anyotl,er Deed of Trust o
proceeding in which Grantor, Beneficimy or Trustee shall be n party unless brought by Trustee.
9.
In the event of dissotution or resignation of the Trustee, the Beneficiary rn:iy substitute a trustee or
execute the trust hereby crealeds..ind when any such substitution has been filed for record in the office of the
Recor
which the property herein described is silllatcd, it shall be concJusive evidence of the .:ippointmcnt of such trustee
o
new trustee or trustees shall succeed 10 all oflhe powers and duties oflhe uustce or lruslees named herein,
Request is hereby made th la copy of any Notice of Default am.I a copy of any Notice of Sale hcrcunde;
Grantor al his address t / 2 s e t f o l l / '

~~

_([~ /tct-Ex
Eilene Stallings

\

\.__

Stale of ID

l

}ss.
County of Madison

l

es1 mga:
Commission Expires:

Residing
Commiss

f-.a..l--,

Stale offfl- \,<..

County of MaEliS6ft (}..~~

Jss.
l

-ft,

On this
r 2009 before me, a Notary Public in and for said state, persrn
appeared7--'" ¼'='--'-'~--':-. ..,.~-:-="-':-"- "~::;--';'-f+--- -:-~ known or identified to me to be
1
person wh
to the within ins rument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they ex,
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year fi

written.

No~th~
Residing at: () (ei,,.i., LLT
Commission Expires: 1(- 1':i- :z.,

Stale of-klaho- U..f

Ah

}
1

_

County of Mamse& l,\_,--..,l,._

. ~,._

}ss.
}

trii~~ ..

J
.
On this I day of
2009, before me, a Notary Public in and for said state, personally
Heath Jay Johnston known or identified to me to be the Managing Member in the Limited Li,
Company known as Pioneer Point llC who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowl
that he executed the same in said LLC name.

lN WJTNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day,
this certificate first above written.

No
or the State oHd
Residing at: 0<-e"', >A1"
Commission Expires: f? -, S -
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5.

0

6. FILE NUMBER:

CONV. INS,
7. LOAN NUMBER

304100024IJS
8. MORTGAGE INS. CASE NO.:
C. NOTE: This form is fumished to give you a statement of act!l.al settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown, }terns
marked "(p.o.c.)" were paid outside the closing; they are shown here for infbnnational pw:poses and are not included in the totals.

D. NAME & ADDRESS
OF BORROWER:

G's Dairy Delights, LLC
6886 S 3100 W 2 Rexburg, ID 83440

E. NAME & ADDRESS
OF SELLER:

Pioneer Point LLC
P.O. Box 1296, Blackfoot, ID 83215

F. NAME & ADDRESS
OF LENDER;

Celtic Bank Corporation
340 E 400 s. Salt Lake City, trr 841 I l

600 Handcart Lane, Rexburg, ID 83440
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp.
PLACE OF SETTI..EMENT: 130 E. Main St., Rexburg, ID 83440 (208} 356-9323

G. PROPERTY LOCATION:

H. SETTLEMENT AGENT:

I SETTLEMENTDATE·
12/10/2010 Final
J.
Summary of Borrower's Transaction

K.

100. Gross Amount Due From Borrowe;,

400. Gross Amount Due To Seller:

101. Contract sales price
102. Personal property
103. Settlementch•=es to borrower: (line 1400)

401. Contractsalesvrice
402. Personal nrooertv
403,
404.
405.

104.
105.

Adiustments For Items Paid Bv Seller In Advance:
to
to

106. City/town taxes
107. County taxes
!08. Assessments
109.
110.
!IL
112.
113.
114.
115.

to

Summarv of Seller's Transaction
430 000.0(

Adiustments For Items Paid Bv Seller In Advance:
406. Citv/town taxes
407. Countv taxes
408. Assessments
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

to

12/10/10

lo l2/3I/IO

298.l\

to

415.

116.

416.

120. Gross Amount Due From Borrower:

420, Gross Amount Due To Seller:

200. Amounts Paid Rv Or Tn B•"•lf0f"'•-•r:
201. Dennsitorearoestmoney
202. Principal amountofnewloan(s)
203. Exislin£ loan(s) taken subieet In

500. t>-Aueti•-• Tn A-onnt Due To Seller:
501. Excess denosit(see instructions)
502. Settlement charges to seller (lino 1400)
503. Existing Joan(s) taken subject to
504. Payoff' 1st Mtg. Lil. Century Mortgage And Pioneer Po
505, Payoff 2nd Mtg. Ln.
506. Pron•-"" Tax-2010 Full Year Taxes

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

430,298.1,

2 486.0(
292629.41
5182.7f

507.
508.
509.

Adjustments For Items Unpaid By Seller:
to
to
to

Adjustments For Items Unpaid By Seller:
5 IO. City/town taxes
to
51 I. County taxes
to

210. City/town taxes
211. County taxes
212. Assessments
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

512. Assessments
to
5 !3. Rent Aoolied tnwards downoaymen!
514. Tenant Improvements - applied to downoaymen!
515.
5!6.
517.
518,
519.

220. Total Paid By/For
Borrower:
300. Cash At SPtt)ement Fromrro Bnrrnwer:
~nt nm~s:

RTt1flH11t

90 151.84
39848.lc

dlu>: ftnm hnnnwer rn11e 1'20)
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520. Total Reductions
In Amount Due Seller:
600. f' 0 •h At Settlement ll'romffo Seller:

I

601

t1msi: Mmnnnt rlt1e tn !U.>Jle.r fHna 420)

430,298.1~
I

'1~0 ?QR Jr

<ii'> 0MB No. 2502-0265
TYPE

B.
A.

SETTLEMENT STATEMENT (HUD-1)

J.
4.

D
0

OF

2.
5,

FHA
VA

0
0

6. FILE NUMBER;
3041000241JS

LOAN

FHMA
3. Ix] CONY. UNINS.
CONY. INS,
7. LOAN NUMBER

8. MORTGAGE INS. CASE NO.:

C. NOTE: This funn is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are sbown. Items
marked "(p.o.c.)" were paid outside the closing; they are shown here for infunnational purposes and are not included in the totals.

D. NAME & ADDRESS
OF BORROWER:

G's Dairy Delights, LLC
6886 S 3100 W, Rexburg, ID 83440

E. NA.i\1E & ADDRESS
Pioneer Point LLC
OF SELLER:
P.O. Box 1296 Blackfoot, ID 83215
F. NA.\1E & ADDRESS
Celtic Bank Corporation
OF LENDER:
340 E 400 S, Salt Lake City, UT 841 11
G. PROPERTY LOCATION: 600 Handcart Lane, Rexburg, ID 83440
H. SETI'LEMENT AGENT:
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp.
PLACE OF SETI'LEMBNT: 130 E. Main St, Rexburg, ID 83440 (208) 356-9323
I SETTLEMENTDATE·
12/10/2010 Final
J.
Summarv of Borrower's Transaction

K.

100. Gross Amount Due From Borrower:

400. Gross Amount Due To Seller:

10 I. Contract sales orice

40 I. Contract sales price
402. Personal nronerty

. o n a l property
ement chan,es to bon-ower: (line 1400)

Summarv of Seller's Transaction

430000.00

403.
404.

104.
105.

405.

!

Adiustments For Items Paid Bv Seller In Advancei
106. City/town taxes
to
107. County taxes
to

108. Assessments

Adiustments For Items Paid Bv Seller In Advance:

406. City/t'Own ta,(es
407. County taxes
408. Assessments

to

112.

409.
410.
411.
412.

113.

413.

109.
I JO.
JI!.

114.
115.

'

116.

12/10110

t'O
t'O 12/31/10

298.19

to

414.
415.
416.

430,298.19

120. Gross Amount Due From Borrower:

420. Gross Amount Due To Seller:

200. Amounts Paid 'Rv 0• Tn Behalf Of Borrower:
201. Deoosit or earnest 1noney
ncipal amount of new loan(s)
sting Ioan/s) taken subject to
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

.:nn. l>•Auct•·~- In A- ... nue Tn l':ella.50 L Excess rlP.nnsit (see instructions)
502. Settlement charges to seller (lino 1400)
503. Existin• loan(s) taken subiect to
504. Pavoff 1st MIJL Ln. Centurv Mortu••e And Pioneer Po
505. Payoff 2nd Mtg. Ln.
506. PropertyTax-2010 Full Year Taxes
507.

Adjustments For Items Unpaid By Seller:
210. City/town taxes
to

Adjustments For Items Unpaid By Seller:
5 lO. Cicy/town taxes
to
51 L Countv taxes
to
512. Assessments
to
513. Rent Applied towerds downuavrnent
514. Tenant Improvements - applied to downpayment

21 l. Countv taxes
212. Assessments
~ -

214.
215.
216.
217.

218.
219.

-

to

to

tt.

2 486.00
292 629.43
5 182.76

508.
509.

515.
516.
517.
518.

SI~.
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90 151.84
39 848.16

•

•
Order No. 3040818746TD

DEED OF TRUS 'f
THIS DEED OF TRUST, Made this December 10, 2008 BETWEEN Pioneer
Point, LLC,
Limited Liability Company and Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings herein
called GI,
whose address is: 1270 W 1130 S Suite 145, Orem, Utah 84058 AND Alliance
Title & E
herein called TRUSTEE,AND Leland Laub Trustee of The Leland
Alvin Lat
to 6.78% interest , Gwen Ludlow Trustee of The Ludlow Trust
as to 13.5
Tiffany Meredi th as to .63% interest , Laurine Meredi th as to
6.35% int(
Lou Schmut z Trustee of Ray Schmut z Family Trust as to ].16%
interes1
or Olive Esplin (Jff w/ right of sun-ivo rship) as to 2.12% interest
, Howa
or Dale Bingha m as to 2.12% interest , George Peacock Trustee
of Peaco
Re\'oca ble Trust as to 8.57% interest , Don Randal l as to 3.17%
interest ,
Burch as to 10.58% interest , Ray ScJmmt z Family Partner ship
as to 6.5f
Ronald A Ludlow as to 2.54% interest , Reba Earle Trustee of
Earle Rev
Trust, as to 1.27% interest , Cleon 0. Davies or Joyce Davies as
to 3.5% i
Charles R. and Lorena Lambe rt (JT) as to 14.18% interest , Donald
Lari
of Donald J. Larkin Living Trust as to 6.35% interest , and Alan
G. and l
as to 10.58% interest , herein called BENEF1CIARY, whose address is 45
Nm·th 300
George, Ut 84770.
WJTNESSEIB: That Grantor does hereby irrevocably GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL
AND C
TRUSTEE IN TRUST WITII POWER OF SALE, that property in the county
of Madison, ~
descnl>ed as follows and containing not more than eighty acres:
PARCE L I:
A parcel of land located in Section 25, Township 6 North, Range
39 East, Boise

Madison County, Idaho, described as follows:

Beginni ng at a point on the Section line that is 130.00 feet South 89°56'40
" East
Quarter corner of said Section 25, and continuing thence South 89°56'40
" East
thence North 00°00'59'' East (North, deed) 329.70 feet; thence North
89°55'27"
89°56'26" West, deed) 649.96 feet; thence South 00°00'59" West 107.93
feet; tht
89°56"40 East 120.00 feet; thence Soutll 00°00'59" East 222.00 feet
to the point,
SUBJEC T To a road right of way along the South side of the above
described p
LESS AND EXCEP TiNG therefro m the following describe d parcel:
A portion of the South Half Southwest Quarter Southwe st Quarter
Southea st Q
Section 25, Township 6 North, Range 39 East, Boise Meridia n, Madison
Count}
describe d as:
Beginning at the South Quarter corner of Section 25, Townsh ip 6 North,
Range
Boise Meridia n, Madison County, Idaho; and running thence North
a distance 1
feet along a line joining the South Quarter corner and the Center of
the Section
South 89°57'15" East a distance of 358.98 feet to the POINT OF BEGINN
ING;
continui ng South 89°57'14" East a distance of 300.98 feet; thence South
a dista11
feet to the South section line; thence North 89°56'40" West a distance
of 300.98
North a distance of 329.42 feet, more or less, to the point of beginnin
g.
PARCE L 2:
A portion of the South Half Southwe st Quarter Southwe st Quarter
Southea st Q
Section 25, Township 6 North, Range 39 East, Boise Meridia n, Madison
County
describe d as:
Beginning at the South Quarter corner of Section 25, Townsh ip 6 North,
Range
Boise Meridia n, Madison County, Idaho; and running thence North
a distance c
feet along a line joining the South Quarter corner and the Center of
the Section;
South 89"57'15" East a distance of 358.98 feet to the POINT OF BEGINN
ING; 1
continui ng South 89°57'14" East a distance of300.98 feet; thence South
a distan
feet to the Soutb section liue; theuce North 89°56'40" West a distance
of300,98 l
North a distance of 329.42 feet, more or less, to the point of beginnin
g.
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SUBJECT To a road right of way along the South side of the above described;
PARCEL 3:
Lot 2 in Block 2 of
:Pioneer Village Final Plat, being a replat of a portion of
Westates Subdivision No. I, Madison County, Idaho, as shown on the plat reco
February 28, 2005, as Instrument No. 317999.

the

TOGEHIER WITH the nmts. issues and profits thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authorit)
to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply sucb rents, issues and profits.
For the purpose of securing payment oftl,e indebtedness evidenced by• promissory note, of even date herewith, e:
in the sum ofS945,000.00, with fin~! payment due: June JO, 1011!1 and to sceure pnyment of all such furlhcr sum,
be loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary herein to the Grantor herein, or any or either of them, while record owne
for 1my purpose, arul ofany notes, drafts or other instruments representing such further Joans, advances or expcndi,
inleresl on all such sums at the rate therein provided. Provided, however, !hut the making of such further loans, ad
expenditures shllll be optional with the Beneficiary, and provided further, 111111 it is the express intention ornic parU
Trust that it shall stand as continuing security until paid for all such :id1r.1nccs together wilh interest thereon.
A. To prof•« thuecurily of ll1ls Deed of Trust, Grnntor agrees:
t. To keep said property in good condition and repair, not to remove ordemolisl1 any building there,
restore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner My building which may be constructed, damaged or <lestro
pay when due all claims for labor performed and materials furnished therefor; to comply with oll laws affecting sai
requiring any aUerations or i~rovcmcnts to be made thereon; not to commit or permit waste thereof; nqt to comm
any atr upon said property in violation of law; to cultivate, irritl"le, fenilize, fumigate, prune and do all other acts,
character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary. the specific cnumeratioos herein not excluding the 1
2. To prmide , mainlllin and deliver lo Beneficiary fire insurance satisfactory 10 and with loss pn)'IIO
The amount collected under any fire or other insurance policy may be applied by beneficiary upon ;iny indebtedne,
and in such order as Beneficiary may determine, or at option of Beneficiary the entire amount so collected or any p
released to Grantor. Such application or rck:ase shall not cure or waive ,my default or notice of default hereunder<
done pursuant to such notice~
3. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting lo affect the security bcrcof or !he ri1
Beneficiary or Trustee; nnd to pay all costs and expenses, including cost ofevidence- of title ;md attorney ~s fees in ;
any such action or procc,:ding in which Bcneficiazy or Trustee may appear.
4. To pay, nt least ten days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, whc
encumbranc,:s,. charges and liens, witb interest, on said property or any pllJ1 thercol; w!iicl, 11J>PCllr to bl' prior or s.11
costs, fees and expenses of this Trusl. In Addition to the payments due in acccrdance with the terms ofthe note he:
Grantor shall at the option, and on demand of the Beneficiary, pay each month 1/12 ofllrecstimatcd annual llll<es a
insurance premiums, mainlenance and other charges upon the property, nevertheless in In.Isl for Gnmtor's use and I
J)llymcnt by Beneficiary of any such items when due. Grantor's failure so to pay shall constitute a default under lhi
5. To pay immedmely and without demand all sums expended by Beneficiary or Trustee pursllllnt lo
hereof, with interest from date of expenditure at tlte rate of interest specifie<l in 1he above descnllcd promissory not
6. Should Gran tor fail to make any payment or lo do any act as herein provided, tltell Beneficiary or ·
without obligation so lo do and without nolice lo or demand upon Grantor and without rdeasing Grantor from any 1
may; make or do the same in such mannc. and to such exlcnt lll1 either may deem necessory to protect thtl securily t
or Trustee being authorizi,d lo enter upon snid property for such purposes; appear in lllld defend any action or proe<
affect the security hereof or lhe rights or powers ofBenefieinry or Trustee; pny, purchase, contest or compromise ru
charge or lien which in the judgement (')f cithcr appears to be prior or superior hereto; and, in exercising any such pi
enforeinll this Deed ofTnist bY judicial foreclosure, pay necessary expenses, employ eounsel and pay his re,isonabl
B. It Is mutually agreed lbnl:
I. Any awanl ofdmnages in connection with any condemnation for publie use of or injury to said pn
thereof is hereby assigned and shall be paid to Beneficiary who may apply or release such moneys received by him
manner :ind ,vith the $3me effect as above provided for disposition of proceeds of fire or other insurance.
2.
By •"""Piing paymml of any sum secured hereby after ils due date, Beneficiary docs not waive hi,
require prompt payment when due ofall oilier sums so secured or to declare default for failure so to pay.
3. At any time or from time to time~ without liability therefor and without notice, upon ,vrittcn reque.":
and presentation of 11,is Deed and said note for endorsemcni. and without affecting the persona! liability of any pers
the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may: Reconvey all or any parl of said properly; consent lo lhe making of,
thereof;join in granting any casement thereon; gr join in any extension agreement or any agreement subordinaling t
hereof.
·
4.
Upon written request of Beneficiary stating that all sums secured hereby have been paid, and upon
Deed and said note lo Tru•tee for canccllation nnd retention upon pnyrnent of its fees. Trustee shall rcconvey withoi
proper!JI then held hereunder. The Grantee in such reconvcyance may be described as 'the person or persons legal!:
5. As additional security. Grantor !,ereby gives to and comers upon Beneficiary the right, power and,
lhc continuance of these Trusts, to collect rents, i$SUCS and profits of said property, reserving unto Grantor the right,
default by Grantor in payment of ooy indebtedness secured hereby or in performance of any agreement ben:under, !
such rents, issues and profits as they become due and payable. Upon any such default, Beneficiary may at any time
citlier in person, by agenl, or by a received to be appointed by a court, and without regard to the adequacy of any set
indebtedness hereby ,ecu.red, enter upon and lake possession of said property of any part thereof, in his o..-n names
collect such rents, issues and profits, including those past due lllld unpaid, and llpply the same, less costs and ex.pen,
and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon and indebtedness secured hereby, ll!ld in such order as Be
determine. TI1e entering upon and taking posse.sion ofsaid property, the collection of such rents, issues ood profits
application tl!ereofas aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice ofdefault hereunder of invalidate any:
to such notice.
6. Upon default by G..mtor in payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in performance of any
hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the optioo of Oie Beneficiary. In
default. Bencliciary sholl execute or cause 1lle Trustee to execute a wrilten notice of such defauU and of his election
the herein descnlJcd property lo satisfy the obligations hereof, and shall cause such notice lo be recorded in !he om,
of cnch county wherein said real property or some part Ulercof is situated.
Notice of sale having been given as then required by law, nnd not Jess than lhc time then required by law ln1ving eta
without demand on Grantor,shall sell s:tid property at the time and place fixed by it in said notice of sale, eitlier as<
separate parcels and in such order as it may determine> at public auction to the highest bidder for cash in J;:iwful mor
Slates, payable at time of sale. Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying the property so sold, bu! w
covc-nant or warranty express or implied. llte recitals in such deed of any matters or faclsshaTI be conclusive proof
thereof. Any per.;on, including Grantor, Tru51ee, or Benelicia,y, may purchase at such sale.
After deducting all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee and of this Trust, including cost of evidence of title and re.lSC
in connection with sale, Trustee shall apply the proceeds of sale to payment of: all sums expended under the Jerrns h
repaid, \\ilh accrued interest at 1lle rote sp«ificd in the above described promissory note; alJ odicr sums then secure<
remainder~ jf -any~ lo the per.son or pt.~ons legally entitled thereto.
7. This Deed applies 10, inures to the benefit of, and binds al] panics hereto, their heirs, legalecs, dcvi1
administrators, executons,. successors and assigns. The 1enn Beneficiary shall mean the 1101der and owner of the not;
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When Recorded Return To:
CENTURY MORTGAGE
45 North 300 East
St. George, UT 84770

Instrument# 356344
REXBURG, MADISON, IDAHO

9-8-2009

12:12:57 No. of Pages: 2

Recorded for; CENTURYraRTGE
'ee;,6.08
MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN
Ex-Officio RecOt"der Dep
'-""'-/
_ _ _ _ __

ASSIGNMENT OF TRUST DEED
For VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,

Reba Earle Trustee of the Earle Revocable Trust, dated March 21, 2000, hereby assigns to, Century
Morteage LLC, as fo an undivided 0121% interest and Reba D. Earle and Aileen Earle as CO-Trustees
of the Earle Revocable Trust dated 3-21-00 Amended 7-18-09 as to an undivided 1.06% interest of the
beneficial interest and tights accrued or to accrue under that certain Trust Deed. Which Trust Deed is dared
10th day of December 2008, and recorded on February 11, 2009, as Document No.351772, in the Office of the
Recorder of Madison CoQnty, State of Idaho, executed by Pioneeer Point LLC and Richard and Eilene
Stallings as Trustor; in which Alliance Title & Escrow, as Trustee, in the records of the Office of the Recorder
of-Madison County. The Trust Deed which covers real property situated in Madison County is described as

foHowsi
PilCEI..11
.
A pan:d on111d lllnted In 811:Uuu ll!I, Tvmuh!p 6 North, Rania 39 Eut, Bollll Marldlan,
M1dllo11 CountJ, llilho, d11crlb11h1 lollollll
.. · .
- .

·.

Bt&Jmwll at~ pohlt on ~a ~eetlo11 llne that II l;D,OO·fllll South 8!1°56!4~" ll!~t ~f the. South·
.Quarter wrnei ohald S11itlo11 %5 1 and 1:ontlnulng then1:1t'Boli.tli 89"56'40" E~l 52M6 (eel; .
Uienu Nortk OO'DQ'!l!I" Eat (North~ died) 3J!l,'7o·f111i1 thanc!S North 89'55'1'.1~ Wea( (Nortli ..
.· 8''56'J6" West, deeil) 64!1JCHeet; thence South Otl'IID'S9" Weat 107.93 fcelf1he.m:e South ·-89"56"40 Eut 120.00 fnt1 th~nn B:o~th DO"Q0'5~' Eu(:JJl,00 ri,et to the polnt ~Cbeglnulng, ·
SUBIECT To road right ofway alo~g tie South slda or tha abon described paml,
LESS AND EX~PTlNG there.linm the lbll1rrd11g deac~lhed parcel:
A portion lit fhe Bol!,th IWf Bontlnrcst Quarter Soulhwlllt Qmut11r BouthEu·1t Q1tart11r ln
·section l!I, Tolll111dp 6 North, Ranae 39 Eut, Dobe Merldlanj Mntllson Comity, Idaho,
. 'dHCrlb&il IISI

•

.

B1ifauln1 at th, South. Quartor. turner ufSecUu_o·lS, Township 6 Nlirth;Ran11113!1 Eui.. Dube Meridian, Matll11n County, Idaho; IUld :ruunlllg the11e11 Norlti a dlltlUlca o.t 32!1.31
Ieet along a line j~mlu.i tha SuuJ.b Q!larlw lllll'D&r Bill! th11 Celder vr til.111 Eldon• ihuui:e
Sonth 89"57' 15'' E11t a dl1fllnca ol 358,98 feet to die FOl:NT 01!' llB:GiNNING1 lheni:e
conUnulq South 811"57'14".itut a dlatmi:11 of 3011.98 [eetJ thence Sou lb a dlit1u11:1 or 3}9,42
feet lo the Suuth le1)11on lfuu; thence Nortll B!J 56'4D'' West a dlitauca of30U.!18 feelj thence
North a.dlstaacu of32!J.4l feet, more or 11111; lo the point
.
·
. ofbezlnnlng.
.
0

PARCELl1

A portion or the South Half Buuthweat_ Quarter BoullmestQuarter So\llheut Quartllt lo
Becllon 25, Timlllhlp Ii North, Ruge 39 East, Bobe Merldlao, M.adbon Co1111ty; Idaho,
detulbed aa:
.
.

Begbmlni at ~e Soutlt Quarter tornel' 0£.Seetlon 251 Towll!IWp (i Nortll, R;..ae-3.!I East,

Dolle Merldlim,_l\latllsub. County, lilaho; and running tJiimce North n dbtanee or 319.31
_feet .aloil11 a llae Jolnlnz the South Qu,arter corner and tba Cent11r .or the SecU0111 theuca .
Su1tth 89"57'15" 11:ut a dlatanee or 35/J.98 r,et to tba l'OlNT OJI' BEGlNNING1 tbmce ·
1:ullth111lni $oath 89"~7•14n E111t a 11Jsta1,1te u£3Dll.98 reet1 thence South 11. dlslanee of 329,42
feet to the South 101:Uon lhte1 ~11m:e.North 89'56'~0'? West a dlatante of30D.98 feel; thence
North • d11ta11ce or 319.42-reet. more or ln11 to thu polllt or beglwdng.

· SUBJ.ECT To il rORd rl&ht or way 11lvn1 thil B~nlh 1lda ~~ the ab~ve d111crlhe~ parcel,.
PARCEL31
Lou in:Blockl or the l'lottel!l' Vlllagel!'~•• l'hlt, beh!g a replat oh portion.of the plat of
. W111tatea 8ubd1Yllilu11 No. 1, M:adlaon Co-utr, Iilabo, a■ ihuwn on the )lmt recotded
·· ll'llb~rfl8, JOOS. uln1ttllllllllll No, 311!19!1.
. ,
··
·
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Aileen Earle, Surviving Trustee
Earle Revocable Trust

State Of

~#t:7

)

) ss

County of ,&;Jt/,U~/t/;5

Residing

2.~5 £

14-th 1\7 10 83404

2
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Dated this

zd; o f ~

•

2009

_Reba Earle. Trustee
State of Utwi

)

County of Washington

) ss
)

On the _J...Q_ day of fu~Lli!..-\ , 2009 personally appeared before me: Reba Earle the signer of the above
instrument, who acknowledge to me that he/she executed the same. .

;' --- --- --- ~- --N;t';.;:; ii~iiiic' --··:
:

LINOA J. SAWCHENKO

I

•

4li N. 300 E,
1!11'11t Goorge, UT M770
Nf Cornml■.11lot1 Espinle
.lugust 22, 200\t

I
:

:

s:a1e of Utah

,

1
1

I

,

I

■

·~------~·-··-··------·-----·

NS*° ~

~~cL

My Commission expires: 1\-u&,.1.s."t ~,.J..C?O~

2
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When Recorded Return To:
CENTURY MORTGAGE
45 North 300 East ·
St. George, UT 84770

Instrument # 361544
REXBURG, MADISON, IDAHO
02:03:30 No. of Pages: 2
6-4-2010
Recorded for: CENTURY ~RTGAGE
6.00
MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN '
"'AL__~------Ex-Officio Recorder Deput

\Fu:

ASSIGNMENT OF TRUST DEED
For VALUABLE CONSJDERATION, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,.
Aileen Earle Surviving Trustee of the Earle Revocable Trust Dated 3-21-00 and amended 7-18-09 hereby
assigns to, Ceniury Mortgaee LLC as to an undivided 0. 74% of the beneficial interest and rights accrued or
to accrue under that certain Trustee's Deed recorded on December 10, 2008 and recorded on February 11,
2009 as Document No. 351772, in the records of the Office of the Recorder of Madison County, State of
Idaho, executed by Pioneer Point LLC and Richard and Eilene Stallings as Truslors; in which Alliance Title &
Escrow, as Trustee, in the records of the Office of the Recorder of Madison County, State of Idaho, which
covers real property situated in said described as follows:
Dated this

1,/_./'};.y of Yv\,M{ . 2010
PAR.CJ:L11
A parcel of laad lo1:at111l bi Bftllon 1!1 Tom111i.ll) 4 'North, Ruge 311 E!11t1 Bvlau Murldliqa,
M1dlna·C11;11.ni:J,Idahv,d11ulb1d ■1IJ1Uom1 ; · ". ',· .. : .

. - · ·. ·.

~l'!li'~~i, :itt~t ~i.lh~ Bou~·..n~ ~ ·• p~lnl o~ l~a SnUon µni uiat la ·1~0.oiu,,t ~outh 8!1'!16'40
·Jtul !119.96 Ieet1 ·

11
.Q•·•rlir· 1:11riiat ol 1ald Biecllon 25 1 md wotlnulilg lh8D1:1·s_oillli
(Niil1h..
89"5~'1'.J!!-Wea~
tha!i,1:11'{orth
70'fi11ii
3J9..
then1:1 North Oll".00'511" Eql (Nortli, dead)
. . · 89'!6 1l6"Well; dHil) G411.ll6.feel1 lh1n1:1 Suulh 00'00~!111 11.yle11~1U7.93 re~lrthem:e South •
OO'l!0'5P'1 E11t ~ll.00 (nl tu lll, pu!Gl of
·.RIJ0!!6"40 Eu~ 11D.OO feel) th~n111 Buulh
. beglnnlu1, ·
.

.

.

.

.

0

BUBJl&CT Tn i'IJad right Df1TI)' al111,1g lha Boulll 1ld~ 0( the abu111 deacrlb~d pmel,
·
tlt88 AN'D EXCEl"'l'lNO th,;efrotll the (ollu~lna t111c~llie1l"plimlt:
A porUon vi Oui 8011th Hal[ 8011lh1teil Qui(tilr Bout1n,111l Quarter Bonlhe111l Querler ln
·enttun lS, Tumub1p GNorth, Ranaa 3!1 Eaat, Do!11 M~ldJani Madllon CUuil.t)', Itlnllo,

. ·desulbeil u1

·

·

•

Beglilnln1·11 thi Bonth Qu11rln. Wl:'ll.er a! Bectton·1s, 'i'owll.llllp GNurth;:itimga Jll Eaai,.. Bol111 Ml!rldlan,.Mailll?ll County, lllllht11 lllld riiµnlng UU'1Cll ~otlh !l, ll11hulc111 lif3l9,Jl
feet alon1 a lln11 Jolnliiw lhil Sou!h Q1tai-l!lr ~urµ.iir aild lha-Cenl11r uHh!I Se1:Uun1 \liente
81!11th !!9"M;15" Eest it dbf5nc~ o! 358,98 !eet t~ tliii!'Dl!'iT OllBli:G:tffiirrNG1 l!t!!!lte
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.

A portlu or lh1 Boulll Hal! S~uthmat Qimter BouihlltstQuarter ~uuthmt Quatter In
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•
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. Bipnnlng at ilia Bd1dh Q11a(ler tonier d.Betl1111125, Tonruhlp 6 No(·th, R1il1e39 East,
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When Recorded Return To:
CENTURY MORTGAGE
45 North 300 East
St. George, UT 84770

Instrument # 363807
REXBURG, MADISON, IDAHO
10-6-2010
11:03:12 No. of Pages: 2
R11eorded for: CENTaRYR~GAGE
MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN_~J.OO
Ex-Officio Recorder
_,e.~~--'--- - ~ - -

ASSIGNMENT OF TRUST DEED
· For VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,.
Gwen Ludlow Trustte of the Ludlow Trust dated dated 05-06-86 hereby assigns to, David Ludlow as to
an undivided 1.27¾ of the beneficial interest and rights accrued or to accrue under that certai~ Trust.Deed
recorded on December IO 2008 and recorded on February 11, 2009 as Document No. 351772, m the records
of the Office of the Recorder of Madison County, State of Idaho, executed by Pioneer Point LLC and Richard
and Eilene Stallings as Trustors; in which Alliance Title & Escrow, as Trustee, ~ the rec?rds ?f the O~ce of
the Recorder of Madison County, State of Idaho, which covers real property situated m said descnbed as

follows:
Dated this

A

day of '::fU \~ .. , 2~_•?
PAllal.11

.

A p•~el 6f la11~ li>i:aled Iii Seclivn l!, 'l'onn1hJp GNorth, Ra•&• 39 J:~at1BulH MDrldla!l,
M~_dbua·C~11.atJ~ldah~1 ~111:rlb1dR,lpllotm . : :-··, - ·__- .- . · ·. ·.
_ _ __·_

ile~i ;:, ll pubi{ o~ the Bntlou Uu.il that li:139~00 ·(1!,; 811~th 89°5-6!4~11 ·Jl:i1t ;; iiui South·..9..rtiir eori111, of !Jdd Sedlou 251~II ¥0Dtlnulilg_ th~~tl -~_olitli ~9•!!6;40"'Eat& Sl9,~li le.lJ ·
lh111c11 Nortla oo•oo•~!J" JJ:•~t (Nor~b, dew) 3~Mo ·raetJ $hepc11 N_orth·B!J"S''l~-~-We1t (No~ ..

. · 89"56'16,.
Wal; deeil} 6411,Yli-[aeti th1Dc1 South 00°00'!9"-Wesl-1117.93 feetrthence Bti"lilh
1

-

. ·.e9. !!6"40_E~t 120,UO reeti:th-~Dlll BJ~lb OO"Q0'59" Eiut ~:a:too fvet to the point ~Ibe1lanln1, ·
SIDJJECT Tifa road rI11ht iirwiy alu11i tha South 1lda or the above deacrlbed p11rtel,
LEBS AND EX~EPTlNG tliereuotu thil IoUonlug deac_~llieit pimlt ·
·
A purllun Ii! th, Buulli Hall Bulltbneit Quarter BoulhT1lllt Quarter Boulbao·st Quarter bt
·sai:llun 15, Turrnshlp ~ North, Rania 39 E1111 Duin l'rl,rldlani MadlJon CiiWlty, Itlaho,
. "d1!1trlball a11 •
.
· .Jlailimln; at t~.Qllarlv· corner ur Beclh_~·1s, Tonnrhlp ~ ~1·a~11au ~9 ERi~•
. Doll" MerldlBD1.Mallh~~ Culinty1 ldaho1 and fu,unlllg tlu~i:a rfottli ~ dhllllc1 ot 3:29,31
feet along ll llll' J!!lnllig tha Soupa Qnllrl!lt: corjl~r and the ~enh,r .uf ill.ii BttllonJ tii11111:11 ·
Sllntk 8!J"_57'15" )!lul Ii dh_t•_nc;~ ul 358;98 fed to tli1iPO.lN'l' ojj ~lildifil'm;_GI lhi!nCil
cvnlhlil.illi South 851"S7'14''-Ea1t a d11t11nl!9 or 300,98 f1111tJ th•n1:1 _Slllltb a dlatanee or 319,41
I111l lu the 8011th Hedon llne; thence i:'(orlh ~9°56'40? Weit II dlitllllea o[3DD.Y8 feelJ lllBDCO
Nurlh •- dlslllllcu of32!1.4J feet, more or la111j tu tile pu~t 11f~e11lnnlu·11,
·
l'ARCEL21

A put1luR urtlut South Hal[ S~ulhweat Quarter BouiblleJt'Quarler BDU!heast Quarler Ju
Betllon 2!, Tow.n1hlp 6 North, Ranae jy Eaat, Doliil Msrldlan, Madison County; Idaho;
daulbadur

·

Jh1gbu1In1 at l!ie Btluth Qi/,arler ciruer of.BucUu·u: 25, Tomllhlp (i .Nur·lh, R~il1113.!I East,

. Dol11 Merldlim,_M_•tllivll Collllt)', lilakuJ 11111 tuu.nlng tlience Norw·a dlatanee ur 319,;il
_feet ,lloilz II llD• Jolnln11 ~• South Q'-'attir- turner and tbi! Center _of1he SimUon; lhenu. .-S~u~ 8ll'!17'1!1t Eul. dl1bµte11 lil.35!1.Y&.railt to thll'OlN'J.'. OE\BJCGINNtrm., uuince . ; .
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Gwen Ludlow, Trustee
The Ludlow Trust

Slate Of

llT"P<- \.-\-

)

I
) ss
County of W..'.\~~........._)

On the d-- day ofJ l...l.\L\ ,2010, personally appeared before me: Gwen Ludlow the signer of the above
instrument, who acknowledged td me that he/she exf{cuted the same.

r----------- . . . ,
........-......

,.1.,..,.-,....,

n-·bP·'"

uNaA'7sAWCHENKo
1
ColT\ITlt~&ioo 115798117 · I

1
I

My Commllflon Expires

J

Augus!1S,2013

- - - - - ~t!.?~t!,!! Residing

J
J

Notary Public
My Commission expires:

ll..'tt"\'='\

IJ\uff. '->,

\B} ci0 1~

2

Page 41

•

•

EXH IBITD

Page 42

,.·1 ·"'"-l<t 0

~"9+

.=

.,.,.

•

,g

•

First Atncrica.ll Title Inaurancr: Company
National Commercial Services
13924 (;(lid Citcle • Om.1.ha, NE 68144

Seller's Final Scttlcnwnt Statc1nc11t

Property:

File N1.J:

NCS~13618-OMffA

Officer: Jame& Odonnell/do
New l..oan ~o:
Settlement Date:

Disb1n·sement Date:
Printl>ate:

Buyer:
Address:
Seller:

12/21/2012
12/2)/2012
12/21/2012, 9:31 AM

Roclcwi;ll Court Limited l>artnership
,Rexburg, ll:l
Richard Stallings; Eilene Stallings

Addresst

Char

Seller Char e

e Descrf tlon

~------------------------f-----;;"".;:'t;;':~--......-lliJl.QP.00

--·--.,•-··••=-•-..--.-•--·-··~-~~~

,..____J.&.\l_0"",0;.;;0-1----,-----1
-~•-------------------t---·~-•--•·-•"-,.
...r.,--l!lQ.&00,D9_
.

4 381.92

43,818.10

~=.=,=.:c.b;;;;le..;;T.;;.;nll=tO.U=ed=-'1"'2•..;l.c.2·.;:0"-li---------------11----..;l;..;4,_60""06"'.3=..;l"-l--~...,,-••-,.,.-

ata Bin ham

14 606.31

Dalel!in ham

14,188.67
14,188.67

="'------------------------1·-·~---=._.ll,?09.2:5.._______
73031.01

17 Sl7.l!.+--------i

--~--4--~--+----,-,-=c-:-::+-------1
~-----~-~---------2.1,.100.13
_,__ _ _ _ _...
,:/,/:l<.1'..;.i...,,.,. _ _ _~,-••-•"'""""'~'~---••-••·••••-•--~··•--l-----9
...7_,.,f1..,.6...
l._13-+------""ll

73 031.01

l'a2e J otl

'l'nitia!&:
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Contin11cd From Page 1

Sdtlf!ment l>ate:
Print Date;

•

SeUeiJs Final Settlt11nent Statement

12/21/2012
12/21/2012

:File No:

NCS-513618-OMHA

Offiter:

James Odonnell/ds

Seller Chare:e

Charge Descrlntion

1,08(1,438.89

Totalt,

. · Seller Credit .

1,086,438.89

PaJli!>.2 or2
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Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,

Case No. CV-2017-1651

Plaintiffs,
ANSWE R

v.

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

Filing Category: 1.1.
Filing Fee: $136.00

Defendants.
COMES NOW, the Defendants Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, and for answer alleges
as follows:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
1.

Plaintiff s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

2.

Defendant denies each and every allegation not admitted or qualified.
ANSWE R

3.

Answering paragraph 1, admit.

4.

Answering paragraph 2, admit.

ANSWE R-I
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5.

Answering paragraph 3, admit.

6.

Answering paragraph 4, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to
the truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore deny the same.

7.

Answering paragraph 5, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to
the truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore deny the same.

8.

Answering paragraph 6, deny.

9.

Answering paragraph 7, deny.

10.

Answering paragraph 8, deny.

11.

Answering paragraph 9, deny.

12.

Answering paragraph 10, deny.

13.

Answering paragraph 11, admit that Defendants executed a Promissory Note. Deny
remaining allegations.

14.

Answering paragraph 12, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as
to the truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore deny the same.

15.

Answering paragraph 13, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as
to the truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore deny the same.

16.

Answering paragraph 14, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as
to the truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore deny the same.

17.

Answering paragraph 15, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as
to the truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore deny the same.

18.

Answering paragraph 16, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as
to the truthfulness or untruthfulness and therefore deny the same.

ANSWER-2
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19.

Answering paragraph 17, deny.

20.

Answering paragraph 18, deny.

21.

Answering paragraph 19, deny.

22.

Answering paragraph 20, deny.

23.

Answering paragraph 21, deny.

24.

Answering paragraph 22, deny.

25.

Answering paragraph 23, Defendants are unable to make sense of the statement. The
statement is not a sentence nor does it appear to be an allegation. Accordingly, Defendants
deny.

26.

Answering paragraph 24, deny.

27.

Answering paragraph 25, admit that Defendants sold Defendants' property to Rockwell
Court, LP. Deny remaining allegations.

28.

Answering paragraph 26, Defendants herein reallege the foregoing answers as if set forth in
full herein.

29.

Answering paragraph 27, deny.

30.

Answering paragraph 28, deny.

31.

Answering paragraph 29, deny.

32.

Answering paragraph 30, deny.

33.

Answering paragraph 31, deny.

34.

Answering paragraph 32, deny.

35.

Answering paragraph 33, Defendants herein reallege the foregoing answers as if set forth in
full herein.

ANSWER-3
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36.

Answering paragraph 34, deny.

37.

Answering paragraph 35, deny.

38.

Answering paragraph 36, deny.

39.

Answering paragraph 37, deny.

40.

Answering paragraph 38, deny.

41.

Answering paragraph 39, deny.

42.

Answering paragraph 40, Defendants herein reallege the foregoing answers as if set forth in
full herein.

43.

Answering paragraph 41, deny.

44.

Answering paragraph 42, deny.

45.

Answering paragraph 43, deny.

46.

Answering paragraph 44, deny.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

47.

Plaintiffs Complaint is barred under statutes oflimitations, including: Idaho Code§§ 5-216
and 5-217.

48.

Plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of frauds.

49.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages, if any.

50.

Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest as it respects to some or all of their claims,
contrary to Rule 17 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

51.

Plaintiffs may have failed to join, as parties to this action, one or more persons or entities
necessary for a just adjudication. If so, said persons or entities would be indispensable, and
this action should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) and 19(a) due to their absence.

ANSWER-4
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52.

Plaintiff's claim was caused by a fellow servant.

53.

The contract, if any, is unenforceable for lack of consideration.

54.

The contract, if any, is unenforceable due to failure of consideration.
WHEREFORE, Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, pray for judgment of this

Court against Plaintiff Jon Gregory as follows:
55.

That Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, that Plaintiff take nothing thereby
and that judgment be entered for the Defendant.

56.

That Defendant be awarded costs and attorney's fees in defending this action pursuant to
Idaho Code §12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54.

57.

For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.
DATED this?~ay of March, 2018.
BAKER & HARRIS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
L

I certify that on this #-day of March, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person( s) Served:

ANSWER
Nathan Rivera
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
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( ) Mail

()<} Fax

( ) Hand Delivered

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter
"Defendants") by and through its attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER &

HARRIS, and pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 56 moves this Court for Summary Judgment
against Plaintiff.
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum of the Law and the Affidavit of Richard
Stallings filed herewith.
DATED this

'J

4
day of July, 2018.
BAKER & HARRIS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this ;f~ay of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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( ) Mail

0() Fax
( ) Hand Delivered

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter "Defendant")
by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER & HARRIS, and
hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

I.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

1.

On or about the September 27, 2007, Richard Stallings purchased a piece of property of
approximately 2 acres located in Madison County Idaho (hereinafter "Property"). See
Affidavit of Richard Stallings ,r 2 Exhibit A.

2.

The Property was contiguous to property owned by Jon Gregory. See Affidavit of Richard
Stallings ,r 3.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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3.

That Plaintiff transferred his property to Pioneer Point, LLC on or about February 11, 2009.
See Affidavit of Richard Stallings 11 4 Exhibit B.

4.

That on or about May 2, 2012 Pioneer Point, LLC transferred Plaintiff's Property to
Defendants. See Affidavit of Richard Stallings 115 Exhibit C.

5.

That on or about December 21, 2012 the Defendant sold his Property and the Property that
he had received from Pioneer Point, LLC. See Affidavit of Richard Stallings ,r 6 Exhibit D.

6.

On or about September 6, 2017 Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant. See Affidavit of
Richard Stallings ,r 7.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that a judgment "shall be rendered forthwith

if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter oflaw." See also Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587, 887 P.2d 1094 (Ct.
App. 1994); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 (1991); Burgess v.
Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 119 Idaho 299,805 P.2d 1223 (1991). The burden is, at all times, on
the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v.
Salmon River Canal Co. 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969).
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored
in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue. Edwards v; Conchemo, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 727 P.2d 1279 (Ct. App. 1986).

III.

ARGUMENT

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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Plaintiff alleges three causes of action against Defendants: Breach of Contract, Breach of
Implied Contract, and finally for Quantum Meruit or Quasi Contract. Defendants assert that these
claims are barred by the stature of limitations, and by the statute of frauds.

a.

Statute of Limitations

Idaho Code§ 5-216 provides for a five (5) year statute of limitations based upon a written
contract. Defendants assert that there is no contract, nonetheless a written contract between Plaintiff
and Defendant. Defendants propounded discovery requests to Plaintiff requesting a copy of the
contract upon which they based their allegations. Plaintiff has failed to produce an agreement signed
by the Parties, or even one signed by the Defendants. Defendants assert that there was no agreement,
nonetheless an agreement in writing, between the parties.
By pleading the Breach of Implied contract and Quantum Meruit/Quasi Contract, Plaintiff
is acknowledging the lack of a written contract between the parties. To the extent there is an
agreement, Idaho Code § 5-217 provides that there is a four year statute of limitations for breach of
an oral contract. At the latest, that breach would have occurred on December 21, 2012 at the sale.
Accordingly, any clam for breach of contract would have run well before the lawsuit herein was
filed on September 6, 2017.

b.

Statute of Frauds

This matter is also barred by the statute of frauds.
Idaho Code § 9-505 states:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing
or secondary evidence of its contents:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof ...
4. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one (1) year, or for the sale,
of real property, or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an agent of
the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in
writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.

There is no contract, memorandum, or written document signed by the Defendants which
reflect any alleged terms. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot produce admissible evidence of any such
agreement. In Hoffman v. S V Co .• Inc. 102 Idaho 187,190,628 P.2d 218,221 (1981) the Supreme
Court stated:
for the oral agreement to be enforceable, there must exist a sufficient memorandum
signed by the parties evidencing that agreement. The only document signed by both
parties is the $5,000 deposit check (signed by payor Hoffman and endorsed by payee
Sun Valley). [ 1] Although the majority of jurisdictions require that the memorandum
be signed only by the party against whom enforcement is sought, this Court in Houser
v. Hobart, 22 Idaho 735, 127 P. 997 (1912), has construed the Idaho statute to require
both parties to a bilateral contract to sign the memorandum. Houser has consistently
been reaffirmed by this Court. Rouker v. Richardson, 49 Idaho 337, 288 P. 167
(1930); Kerr v. Finch, 25 Idaho 32, 135 P. 1165 (1913). Accord, C. Forsman Real
Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511,547 P.2d 1116 (1976).
Although no particular form of language or instrument is necessary to constitute a
note or memorandum required by the statute, 72 Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds § 295
(1974), the essentials of the oral agreement must be contained in the writing(s).
Remlinger v. Dravo Corporation, 94 Idaho 292, 486 P.2d 1005 (1971);
Blumauer-Frank Drug Co. v. Young. 30 Idaho 501, 167 P. 21 (1917); Houser v.
Hobart, supra. The memorandum must plainly set forth the parties to the contract, the
subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property and
all the essential terms and conditions of the agreement. Pettigrew v. Denwalt, 431
P.2d 333 (Okl.1967). See, Gaskill v. Jacobs, 38 Idaho 795, 225 P. 499 (1924).
There is no contract, memorandum or written document signed by Defendants which reflect
any alleged terms of a contract. Accordingly, Plaintiffs's Complaint should be dismissed.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant respectfully request this Court grant their Motion for Summar
y

Judgment.
~

DATED this ) ~ay of July, 2018.
BAKER & HARRIS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this ,.,,~a y of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Docume nt Served:

Person(s) Served:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
David N. Parmenter
PARME NTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

( ) Mail
(/) Fax
( ) Hand Delivered
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Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD
STALLINGS IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Richard Stallings, deposes and says:
1.

That he is the Defendant in the referenced matter, is of legal age, competent to testify, and
makes this Affidavit based on his own personal knowledge.

2.

That on or about September 27, 2007 I purchased a piece of property of approximately 2
acres located in Madison County Idaho. A true and correct copy of the deed reflecting the
property purchased is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

3.

That the Property was contiguous to property owned by Jon Gregory.

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD STALLINGS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMEN T-I
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4.

That Pioneer Point, LLC obtained Jon Gregory's property on or about February 11, 2009. A
true and correct copy of the deed reflecting the transfer to Pioneer Point, LLC is attached
hereto as Exhibit B.

5.

That on or about May 2, 2012, Pioneer Point, LLC transferred what had been Jon Gregory's
property to me. A true and correct copy of the deed reflecting the transfer from Pioneer Point,
LLC is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

6.

That on or about December 21, 2012 I sold my Property and the Property that I had received
from Pioneer Point, LLC. A true and correct copy of the deed reflecting the sale is attached
hereto as Exhibit D.

7.

That on or about September 6, 2017 Jon Gregory filed a lawsuit against me and my spouse.

8.

That I have read the foregoing affidavit, and I hereby certify (or declare) under penalty of
perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct.
FURTHER your affiant saith not.
DATED this }dday of July, 2018.

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD STALLINGS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r -~

day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
I certify that on this
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD STALLINGS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FORSUMMARYJUDGM ENT
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

( ) Mail

(,f!Fax
( ) Hand Delivered

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD STALLINGS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-3
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RECORDING REQUESTED BY
First American Tile Company

AND WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
First American ntle Company
168 West PadfiC'/P.O. Box 868
Blackfoot, ID 83221

Instrument# 340713
REXBURG, IIIIADl80N, IDAHO

2007-10,,02

03:59:00 No. of Page 2
Recordld for : FIRST AMeRICAN TITLE
MARILYN R. RASIIUSSEN
Ex-0111clo Rtccrdlr Depulf.~o:.JL-----

Above This Line for Recorder's Use Onl

WARRANTY DEED
Date: September 27, 2007

File No.: 220648-B (Id)

For Value Received, Jon C Gregory, an unmanied man, hereinafter called the Granter, hereby grants,
bargains, sells and conveys unto Richard Stallings and Ellene Stallings, husband and wife,
•
hereinafter called the Grantee, whose current address is 186 North 380 West, Blackfoot, ID 83221,
the following described premises, situated in Madison County, Idaho, to•wit:

,

A PORTION OF THE S½.SW1/tSW1/4SE1/4 IN SECTION 25, TOWNSHIP 6 NORTH, RANGE 39
E.B.M., MADISON COUNTY, IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS:
BEGINNING AT THE Slit CORNER OF SECTION 25, TOWNSHIP 6 NORTH, RANGE 39E.B.M.,
MADISON COUNTY, IDAHO; AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH A DISTANCE OF 329.31 FEET
ALONG A UNE JOINING THE S 111 CORNER AND THE CENTER OF THE SEcnON; THENCE S.
89°57'14° E. A DISTANCE OF 358.98 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. THENCE
CONTINUING S. 89°57'14" E. A DISTANCE OF 300.98 FEET; THENCE SOUTH A DISTANCE OF
329A2 FEET TO THE SOUTH SECTION UNE; THENCE N. 89°56'40" W. A DISTANCE OF 300.98
FEET; THENCE NORTH A DISTANCE OF 329.42 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO all easements, right of ways, covenants, resbictions, reservations, applicable building and
zoning ordinances and use regulations and restrictions of record, and payment of accruing present year
taxes and assessments as agreed tx> by parties above.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD tile said premises, witfl its appurtenances, unto the said Grantee, and to the
Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said
Grantee, that the Grantor Is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that said premises are free from all
encumbrances except current years taxes, levies, and assessments, and except U.S. Patent reservations,
restrictions, easements of record and easements visible upon the premises, and that Grantor will warrant
and defend the same from all dalms whatsoever.
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~f>=
JGregory

Ale No.: 220648-1 (Id)

Warranty Deed
- continued

Dat.e: 09/26/2007

k,.

STATE OF

Idaho

COUNTY OF

Bingham

}

ss.
}

On this ~ Y of September, 2007, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
appeared Jon C Gregory, known or identified to me to be the pel'!iOn(s) whose n a m ~ subscribed to
the within instrument, and acknowledged to me th
e
they executed the sa e.
~

.
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'

J...\..
ALLIANCE
TITLI 6

£6CAOW COffP',

WARRANTY DEED

Fee$ .
NC handler
Deputy
Recorded at Request of

Order No.:3040818746TD

ALLIANCE TITLE - REXBURG

FOR VALUE RECEIVED

Jon C. Gregory, an unmarried person
the grantor(s), do(es) hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto

Pioneer Point LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company
1270 W 1130 S Suite 145, Orem, Utah

whose currentaddress is

84058

the grantee(s), the following described premises, in Madison County, Idaho, TO WIT:

PARCEL 1:
A parcel of land located in Section 25, Towoship 6 North, Range 39 East, Boise Meridian, Madison
County, Idaho, described as follows:
Beginning at a point on the Section line that is 130.00 feet South 89"56'40" East of the South
Quarter comer of said Section 25, and continuing thence Sooth 89"56' 40" East 529.96 feet; thence
North 00°00'59" East (North, deed) 329.70 feet; thence North 89°55'27" West (North 89°56'26"
West, deed) 649.96 feet; thence South 00"00'59" West 107.93 feet; thence South 89"56"40 East
120,00 feet; thence South 00°00'59" East 222.00 feet to the point of beginning.
SUBJECT To a road right of way along the South side of the above described parcel.
LESS AND EXCEPTING therefrom the following described parcel:
A portion of the South Half Southwest Quarter Southwest Quarter Southeast Quarter in Section
25, Township 6 North, Range 39 East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho, described as:
Beginning at the South Quarter corner of Section 25, Township 6 North, Range 39 East, Boise
Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; and running thence North a distance of 329.31 feet along a line
joining the South Quarter corner and the Center of the Section; thence South 89"57'15" East a
distance of358.98 feet to the POINT OF BEGJNNING; thence continuing South 89"57'14" East a
distance of 300.98 feet; thence South a distance of 329.42 feet to the South section line; thence North
89"56'40" West a distance of300.98 feet; thence North a distance of329,42 feet, more or less, to the
point of beginning.
PARCEL3:
Lot 2 In Block 2 or the Pioneer Village Final Plat, being a replat or a portion of the plat of Westates
Subdivision No. 1, Madison County, Idaho, as shown on the plat recorded February 28, 2005, as
Instrument No. 317999.
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said Grantee, heirs and assigns
forever. And the said Onmtor does hereby covenant to and with the said Gnurtee(s), that (s)he is/are the owner(s) in
fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances Except: Current Year Taxes, conditions,
covenants, restrictions, reservations, easements, rights and rights of way, apparent or of record.

And that (s)he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
Dated:

, ~h

,P., / IJ- / 0 j
~

i

Y:("7\

State of ID
County of Madison

=r

}
}ss.

b

J

k

On this

day off;J:,,,,~e year 2009 before me, a Notary Public in and for said state, personally appeared
Jon C. Gregory known or identified to me to be the penson whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and
acknowledged to me that he/she/they exec11ted the same, IN WI.'Dfl'!SS"'WI-IIEIREOF 1 ha hereunto set my hand and
affixed my official seal the day and year first above written.
~\\\\\\IIUllll/lf/M

, . ~!).BIS;;', r~
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·Residing in Fremont Count?
Commission Expires: 6-21-2011'

I

QUIT CLAIM DEED
TIIlS INDENTURE made this

..2:._ day of

~112,

between Pioneer Point, LLC,

Grantor, to Richard Stallings, 398 W. 193 N., Blackfoot, Idaho, 83221, Grantee.
WITNESSETH: That the said Grantor, for and in consideration of good and valuable
consideration paid by the said Grantee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do by these
presents demise, release and forever quit claim unto the said Grantee, and to its heirs and assigns all
the certain land situate, lying and being in the County of Madison, State of Idaho, described as
follows, to wit:
See Exhibit "A'' attached hereto.
TOGETHER WITII all and singular the tenements, hereditaments,
and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,
including all water and water rights, ditch and ditch rights.
SUBJECT TO Reservations in United States Patent, existing and
recorded rights-of-way and easements, zoning and building
ordinances, and taxes and assessments.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises, together with the
appurtenances and privileges thereto incident, unto the said Grantee and to its heirs and assigns
forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor hereunto sets his hand the day and year first

~

Pioneer Point, LLC
By: Heath Jay Johnston

Instrument # 371767
REXBUIIG, MADISON, IDAHO
11:05:58 No. of P . - s : ~ 3
6-28-2012
Recorded for: GARRETT H. SANDOW
FN: 18.00
KN H. IIUIII
~-Otllc~ll~ordarl)epuly_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

QUIT CLAIM DEED - 1
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STATE OF

u-¼, \r) )

County of \

A V\ )

~

L

)ss.

.,,,I

~

'6

day of )q,rft,'2.012, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the
On this
State of U-\a..n, personally appeared HEATH JAY JOHNSTON, known to me to be an authorized
member of the limited liability company that executed the instrument or the person who executed
the instrument on behalfofsaid limited liability company, and acknowledged to me that such limited
liability company executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day
/

and year first above written.

•====
COIIMIIIIOlltf,619.,61

COMI.EJUl.1M3-2015

~

Residing at: 'f 41 S 6oo E
N~___i&6
MyCommissionExpires:
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I
Form No. 1068·2

EXHIBIT "A"
Commlbnent No.: NCS-111111-0NHA

ALTA Plain Language commitment

Page 1

The land referred to In this C~mmitment Is situated In the State of Idaho, County of Madison, and Is
described as follows:
A portion of Pioneer Point Condominiums recorded October 12, 2010 as Instrument No. 363925 In the
records of Madison County, Idaho and being described as follows:
A parcel of land located In Section 25, Township 6 North, Range 39 East, Boise Meridian, Madison
County, Idaho, described as follows:
Beginning at a point on the Section line that is 130 feet South 89°56'40• East of the South Quarter
corner of said Section 25, and continuing thence South 89°56'40"East 529.96 feet; thence North
00°00'59" East (North, deed) 329.70 feet; thence North 89°55'27" West (North 89°56'26• West,
deed) 649.96 feet; thence south 00°00'59" West 107.93 feet; thence South 89°56'40" East
120.00 feet; thence South 00°00•59• East 222.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Less and excepting therefrom the followlng described parcel:
A portion of the SYJSW¼SW¼SE¼ In Section 25, Township 6 North, Range 39 E.B.M ., Madison
County, Idaho, described as:
Beginning at the S¼ corner of Section 25, Township 6 North, Range 39 E.B.M., Madison County,
Idaho; and running thence North a distance of 329.31 feet along a llne Joining the S¼ corner and
the center of the section; thence S. 89°57'14" E. a distance of 358.98 feet to the point of
beginning, thence continuing S. 89°57'14" E. a distance of 300.98 feet; thence South a distance
of 329.42 feet to the South Section Une; thence N. 89°56'40" w. a distance of 300.98 feet;
thence North a distance of 329.42 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
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or 111

Microfile No. 379527
27 DAY Dec 2012
0
At
MADISON CO RECORDER
Fee $16.00
NChandler
Deputy
Recorded at Request of
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE - OMAHA CO

id7lfA~t8nfM

After recording return to:

Rockwell Court Limited Partnership
4110 Eaton A venue, Suite A, Caldwell, Idaho 83607
Attn: Chance Hobbs

WARRANTY DEED
For the consideration of the sum of Ten and 00/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration,
RJCHARD STALLINGS and EILENE STALLING$, husband and wife, whose current address is 398 W.
193 N., Blackfoot, ID 83221 (together, "Grantor"), do hereby grant, sell and convey unto Rockwell
Court Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership ("Grantee"), whose address is 4110 Eaton
Avenue, Suite A, Caldwell, Idaho 83607, and its successors and assigns forever, the folJowing described
real property located in Madison County, Idaho, as described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and
incorporated by this reference (the "Property").
TOGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, easements, rights and appurtenances
thereunto belonging or in any way appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders,
rents, issues, and profits thereof; and all estate, right, and interest in and to the Property, as well in law as
in equity.
SUBJECT to such matters as described in Exhibit B, attached hereto and incorporated by this reference
("Pennitted Exceptions").
Grantor hereby, for itself and its successors and assigns, covenants and agrees with Grantee that Grantor
is lawfully seized in fee simple of the Property herein conveyed; that it has good right to sell and convey
the same in the manner set forth herein and the Property is free and clear of all liens, claims and
encumbrances by and through and under the Grantor, except for the Permitted Exceptions; that Grantor,
its successors and assigns shall warrant and defend the same unto Grantee forever against the lawful
claims and demands of all persons claiming by, through or under Grantor, but against none other.
~ITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has caused these presents to be executed this+ day of
Ge
, 2012.

.

GRANTOR:

Prepared by:

Bryan W. Aydelotte, Esq.
4110 Eaton Avenue, Caldwell, Idaho 83607

EXHIBIT

0
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STATE OF IDAHO

n

COUNTY OF

Vt N lzt/1"""'

)
)SS.

)

On the ~ y of Wt.tm,K-42012, before me personally appeared RICHARD STALLINGS, known to
me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed to
the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his authorized capacity, and
that by his signature on the instrument the person, or the entity upon behalf of which the person acted,
executed the instrument.
month and year in this certificate first
above written.

Notary Public for -:~!ttt!!.._ _ _ _ _ __
Fo,
Residing at
My Commission Expiress}tqu, '(

il<Jt,x.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF

.'.?>1A1wi1i"":

r

) ss.
)

On the ~ y of ~£02012, before me personally appeared EILENE STALLINGS, known to
me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed to
the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she executed the same in her authorized capacity, and
that by her signature on the instrument the person, or the entity upon behalf of which the person acted,
executed the instrument.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal hereto affixed the d , month and year in this certificate first
above written.

Notary Public or _ __.OL--'~~- ---Residing at _J.!.!.e!:t:!'J!:!'JU LL---,~-+---My Commission Expires

--=-t-~~---
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EXIDBIT A

Legal Description
A PORTION OF THE S1/2SW1/4SWI/4SE1/4 IN SECTION 25 TOWNSHIP 6 NORTH, RANGE 39
EAST B.M. MADISON COUNTY, IDAHO MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SECTION LINE THAT IS 130.00 FEET S89°46'26"E OF THE
SOUTH QUARTER CORNER OF SAID SECTION 25; THENCE N00015'55"W 40.00 FEET, TO THE
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING RUNNING THENCE N00°15'55"W 142.00 FEET; THENCE
N00013'20"W 40.00 FEET; THENCE S89°46'40"W 120.00 FEET; THENCE N00°15'55"W 107.92
FEET; THENCE N89°47'39"E 649.93 FEET; THENCE S00°16'01 "E 289. 70 FEET; THENCE
S89°46'26"W 529.97 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

379527
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DAVID N. PARMENTER, ISB # 2441
NATHAN D. RIVERA, ISB # 8339
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, ID 83221
(208)785-5618
(208)785-4858 (fax)
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
Case No. CV-2017-1651

JON GREGORY, an individual,
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR
FILING RESPONSIVE AFFIDAVITS
AND BRIEFING IN RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
I MOTION TO CONTINUE AUGUST 6,
2018 HEARING

COMES NOW Plaintiff herein, through counsel, and moves the court for an order
continuing the date scheduled for the hearing, and requesting an additional 10 days to file
responsive affidavits or pleadings, memoranda of law, and affidavits. Said motion is made on the
basis that Plaintiffs counsel has been out of town for about 10 days, and did not receive
Defendant's motion until July 9, 2018 while he was still on vacation. Counsel needs additional
time in order to finalize preparation of the brief of memorandum in response to Defendant's

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME AND
MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING - 1
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Motion and may have additional affidavits to file as well. Said motion is made pursuant to Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(b)(3) and such other rules as may be applicable.
Further, Plaintiffs counsel has a previously scheduled vacation and trip with a group of
young man from his church which has been scheduled the week of August 6th through the 9th,
and would otherwise be unavailable on the date presently set for notice of hearing in the matter.
Because of the inability to make other arrangements to reschedule the trip, or to find someone
else who can take care of and supervise the group, Plaintiff requests that the hearing be
rescheduled for another hearing at a subsequent date and time, convenient to the court and
counsel. Said motion is made pursuant to IRCP Rule 56(b)(3).
DATED this .J!L~ay of July, 2018.

DAVID N. PARMENTER
Attorney for Plaintiff

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME AND
MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVI CE
I certify that on this __!!i___!day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the
following-described docum ent on the person(s) listed below by the method
indicated.
Docum ent Served:

Person(s) Served:

MOTI ON TO EXTE ND TIME FOR FILING RESPONSIVE
AFFIDAVITS AND BRIEFING IN RESPONSE TO DEFE NDAN T'S
MOTI ON FOR SUMM ARY JUDG MENT AND
MOTI ON TO CONTINUE AUGU ST 4, 2018 HEARING
Jared M. Harris
BAKE R & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-6749

( ..,,,Mail
(.l')Fax
( ) Hand Delivered

DAVID N. PARM ENTER

MOTI ON TO EXTE ND TIME AND
MOTI ON TO CONTINUE HEARING - 3
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DAVID N. PARMENT ER, ISB # 2441
NATHAN D. RIVERA, ISB # 8339
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, ID 83221
(208)785-5618
(208)785-4858 (fax)
parlaw@gm ail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
Case No. CV-2017-1651

JON GREGORY , an individual,
Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD STALLIN GS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSIDON TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment will be granted if the moving party can show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact. I.R.C.P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007);

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIDON TO
DEFENDANT S' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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(2006). Summary judgment must be denied if the record contains conflicting inferences or
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions. Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 120, 645
P.2d 350, 354 (1982). At all times, the burden is on the moving party to prove that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452
P.2d 362, 365 (1969).
II. ARGUMENT

Defendants move for summary judgment alleging Plaintiff's claims are barred by the
statute of limitations and by the statute of frauds. Additionally, Defendants allege that no
contract exists between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff and Defendants
have an enforceable contract, by way of an express contract, or in the alternative, an implied
contract or a quasi-contract. Plaintiff further argues that his claims are not barred by the statute
of limitations or by the statute of frauds. Plaintiff provides a sufficient showing to establish that
genuine disputes exist as to material facts in Plaintiff's case. Thus, the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgement should be denied.

1.

A valid contract exists between Plaintiff and Defendants.
An express contract exists when the parties expressly agree on a transaction. Continental

Forest Prods, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739,743,518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974). The
parties involved must come to a distinct understanding of all of its terms. Templeton Patents,

Ltd v. JR. Simplot Co., 220 F.Supp. 48, 60 (D.C.Idaho, 1963); Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171,
175, 174 P.2d 202,205 (1946).
Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an express agreement whereby Plaintiff and

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSillON TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Defendants, together, would develop commercial and/or residential housing on the Subject
Property, in which Plaintiff had already purchased half of. Defendants thereafter obtained a bank
loan in order to purchase the remaining half of the Subject Property, with the intent on working
together to develop and improve the Subject Property. Plaintiff and Defendants had a distinct
understanding that they would purchase the Subject Property for the purpose of developing and
improving said property, and this distinct understanding created an express contract.

a.

In the alternative, an implied contract exists between Plaintiff and
Defendants.

An implied contract exists where, in the absence of an express agreement, the parties'
behavior implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists. Kennedy v Forest,
129 Idaho 584,587,930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997); Continental Forest Prods, Inc., 518 P.2d at
1205.
By Plaintiff and Defendants taking on the required actions to develop and improve the
Subject Property, an implied contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff
performed all actions required of it under the implied contract, and more, in the investment and
development of the Subject Property. Summit Development, a third party, was brought in as the
developers of the project. In addition, Plaintiff subordinated its half of the Subject Property to
the Construction Loan obtained by Summit Development, so that Defendants could obtain their
financing for the development. Plaintiff kept Defendants informed of the progress of the Subject
Property, and ultimately its sale. Plaintiff and Defendants continued actions to develop and
improve the Subject Property constitutes an implied contract.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSillON TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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h.

At the very least, a quasi-contract exists between Plaintiff and
Defendants.

A quasi contract, also known as an implied-in-law contract, "is not a contract at all, hut
an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without
reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement
between the parties. Kennedy, 930 P.2d at 1029; Continental Forest Prods, Inc., 518 P.2d at
1205. The core of a quasi-contract is that one party inequitably received a benefit in which it
would he unjust for that party to retain. Continental Forest Prod<;, Inc., 518 P.2d at 1205.
Defendants, in this case, unjustly received proceeds from the sale of the Subject Property.
Plaintiff not only provided financial resources in excess of $500,000, but also put in his own
time, labor, and services to develop the Subject Property at the request of Defendants and to the
mutual benefit of both parties. When the commercial and residential market crashed, Plaintiff
immediately began work on selling the Subject Property, and Plaintiff even sold his property
known as G's Dairy Delights, LLC to keep the sale of the Subject Property alive. Plaintiff
contributed more of his own labor and services, as well as more financial resources, to the
development of the Subject property than Defendants. It would be unjust for Defendants to
retain Plaintiffs rightful reimbursement from the sale of the Subject Property.
2.

Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit within the four-year statute of limitations period
based on Defendants' breach of either the express, implied, or quasi contract it had
with Plaintiff.
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Section 5-217 of the Idaho Code states that a four-year statute of limitations applies to
actions based on oral contracts. The statute of limitations begins to run when a claim arises upon
the breach of the contract. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890 P.2d 714, 721 (1995).
The time at which a breach occurs is a factual question, and the court should look to the record to
determine whether competent and adequate evidence exists to support the findings of a breach.

Id.
The forwarded email from Tim Cobb to Garrett Sandow, and in effect, to Plaintiff, dated
September 9, 2013, is the point in time at which Plaintiff was made aware that Defendants were
not going to pay or reimburse Plaintiff for his contributions of both time and money, from the
sale of the Subject Property. See Exhibit I. Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit September 6, 2017,
which is within the four-year statute oflimitations period that began to run September 9, 2013.
At no point before this did Defendants relay any information to Plaintiff that Defendants would
not pay or reimburse Plaintiff. On the contrary, Defendants stated in two separate emails a
breakdown of draws and the amount that Defendants were going to pay Plaintiff. See Exhibits M
andN.
3. Plaintiff and Defendants oral contract does not fall within the purview of the statute
of frauds.

Section 9-505 of the Idaho Code provides, in part, the following:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or
secondary evidence of its contents:
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1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof. ..
4. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one (1) year, or for the
sale, of real property, or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an
agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent
be in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.

In examining whether an oral contract is capable of being completed in one year, the
Idaho Supreme Court has narrowly construed this provision. Spence, P.2d at 722; Whitlock v.

Haney Seed Co., 110 Idaho 347, 348, 715 P.2d 1017, 1018 (Ct.App.1986). An oral contract that
might have been fully completed within a year is not governed by the Statute of Frauds. Spence,
P.2d at 722.
At the time Defendants purchased the remaining half of the Subject Property, Plaintiff
was already seeking out developers for the project. However, at around this same time, the
commercial and residential market crashed. This caused great financial strain, and likely
impacted the timeframe in which the development could have be completed. The agreement
between Plaintiff and Defendants might have been completed within a year, and thus, is not
subject to the statute of frauds.
In determining whether an oral contract was purely for the sale of real property, the Court
in Spence decided that the oral contract was to form a partnership for the development of a
religious retreat, and that prior to the oral contract, the land had already been purchased and
designated for the retreat. Spence, P .2d at 722.
Similarly, here, Plaintiff and Defendants made an oral agreement to work together to
develop and improve the Subject Property. Plaintiff had already purchased half of the Subject
Property and had plans to develop the land for commercial and/or residential housing before
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Defendants bought the remaining half of the Subject Property. Plaintiff and Defendants' oral
contract was for the development of commercial and/or residential housing, and not purely for
the sale of the Subject Property.
4.

Even if Plaintiff and Defendants' oral contract is subject to the statute of frauds,
written notes exist to evidence the oral agreement.

Although no particular form of language or instrument is necessary to constitute a note or
memorandum required by the statute of frauds, LC. s 9-505, the essentials of the oral agreement
must be contained in the writing(s). Hoffman v. Sun Valley Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,190,628
P.2d 218,221 (1981).
Defendants' email sets forth the essentials of the oral agreement between Plaintiff and
Defendants. See Exhibit M. In Exhibit M, Defendants acknowledged the Subject Property
(stated as the "Rexburg Property" in Exhibit M), Defendants acknowledged that Plaintiff was
involved in the project, Defendants acknowledge investments contributed to the project by
Plaintiff and Defendants, Defendants acknowledge repayment of investments to Plaintiff and
Defendants from the sale of the Subject Property, and Defendants acknowledge the fact that
potential profits, at one point, were aspired to. Defendants' email constitutes a written note
evidencing the oral agreement.
5.

In the alternative, equitable estoppel should be used to prevent Defendants from
receiving unjust results from the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-7

Page 78

The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that equitable estoppel can be used as a bar
to the statute of frauds. Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489,495,236 P.3d 1249, 1255 (2010);

Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,556,381 P.2d 802, 804 (1963). The doctrine of equitable
estoppel can also be used as a bar to the statute oflimitations. Ferro v. Society ofSaint Pius X,
143 Idaho 538, 541, 149 P.3d 813, 816 (2006).
To use equitable estoppel as a means of defeating the statute oflimitations or the statute
of frauds, the aggrieved party must show the following:

(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the
person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his
prejudice.

Ogden, 236 P.3d at 1255; Ferro, 149 P.3d at 816.
Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff two separate offers payable to Plaintiff from
the sale of the Subject Property. See Exhibits Mand N. Likely, Defendants had no true intention
of ever paying Plaintiff any proceeds from the sale. Because the Subject Property had been
transferred out of Plaintiff's name, Plaintiff had no way of knowing the truth about the
distribution of the proceeds of the sale. Defendants likely wanted Plaintiff to believe that
Defendants would eventually pay Plaintiff, so as to keep the relationship civil and not invoke
action on Plaintiff's part. Plaintiff believed that, after ongoing negotiations with Defendants, he
would be paid some portion of his investment. Plaintiff relied on that representation, to his
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detriment, by being out a large sum of money, and by not sooner filing a suit. For these reasons,
equitable estoppel should apply and bar Defendants from asserting a statute of limitations or
statute of frauds defense.
6.

In the alternative, quasi-estoppel should be used to prevent Defendants from
receiving unjust results from the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds.

The purpose of Quasi-estoppel is "to prevent a party from reaping an unconscionable
advantage, or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing
positions. Quasi estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require misrepresentation by one
party or actual reliance by the other." Lunders v. Estate ofSnyder, 131 Idaho 689,695, 963 P.2d
372,378 (1998) (quoting Keesee v. Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360,362, 723 P.2d 904,906
(Ct.App.1986) ).
Plaintiff and Defendants had an agreement to develop and improve the Subject Property
for purposes of commercial and/or residential housing. After some time, Plaintiff and
Defendants realized the sale of the Subject Property was the only way to recoup their
investments. Thus, Plaintiff shifted his efforts into putting together a viable sale, even selling
some of his separate property to keep the sale alive. Plaintiff had invested a huge sum of money
into this project, more than double the financial resources Defendants invested. Plaintiff also
invested more time, labor, and services compared to Defendants. After the sale took place,
Defendants made multiple representations that Defendants would pay Plaintiff a certain sum of
proceeds from the sale of the Subject Property. See Exhibits Mand N. However, Defendants
changed their position by stating that they would no longer distribute any money to Plaintiff. See
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Exhibit I. By changing positions, Defendants reaped an unconscionable advantage and also
caused an unconscionable financial disadvantage upon Plaintiff
CONCLUSIO N
Plaintiff makes a sufficient showing of genuine disputes as to material facts in Plaintiffs
case. Thus, for this reason, and all other reasons listed above, Plaintiff respectfully asks this
Court to deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this _iL~ay of July, 2018.

DAVID N. PARMENTE R
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

--J!t-

I certify that on this
% ay of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:
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/

( -1 Mail

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-6749

( /JFax
( ) Hand Delivered

DAVID N. PARMENTER
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DAVID N. PARMENTER, ISB # 2441
NATHAN D. RIVERA, ISB # 8339
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, ID 83221
(208)785-5618
(208)785-4858 (fax)
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,

Case No. CV-2017-1651

Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF JON GREGORY
V.

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.

JON GREGORY, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.
2. I have enclosed a copy of my response to Defendant's first set of interrogatories, which
essentially outlines the facts and circumstances in the above-entitled matter (Exhibit A).
3. In summary, I had invested $205,000 in the purchase of 2 of 4 acres of property.
Richard Stallings purchased the other 2 acres for a similar amount.
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4. To keep the project financially viable, I subsequently liquidated and invested an
additional $292,629.43 of property, whereas Richard's primary investment for real property was
the $207,000 approximately he had paid for his 2 acres.
5. Over the course of my working with Summit Mortgage on several projects, including
this one, it was common for me to purchase the original property, and then transfer my interest to
them or subordinate my interest so they could complete their part of the development. I generaJly
received at the end of each project with Summit reimbursement for my expenditures for the
ground, and 50% of any profits or proceeds from the development or sale thereof.
6. We also generally set up a limited liability company for each of the several projects and used the name Pioneer Point, LLC for this particular project.
7. I may have transferred my interest to Summit on paper, but it was a similar transaction
and business operation that we had engaged in several times before.
8. Further, in order to assist with the transition and sale of the property, I had been
required to subordinate my interest to that of Pioneer Point, given the investments of some of the
parties they were working with to come up with the money. Nevertheless, that did not change
mutual interests and ownership that Richard and I had between ourselves.
9. I was aware that Pioneer Point LLC had transferred back their interest in the property
to us or Mr. Stallings because they had no funds to pay for construction funding, and wanted us
to take the project back over by quitclaim deed but we continued to work on sale together, in
order to try and accomplish a liquidation of the property that would benefit our interest mutually.
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10. I was instrumental in attempting to develop the property, and subsequently, in
obtaining a purchaser for the property for the sum of $1,086,000.
11. Richard Stallings and I were using Garrett Sandow, Esq., to help review contracts,
other matters, and to work as an intermediary for communication and other matters with other
parties involved in the sale.
12. Mr. Stallings agreed to pay me the balance of any funds from the sale after he
received back his original investment amount. That was the reason he forwarded the letter from
Terri Merkley (Exhibit 0) from Empire Funding to establish his original investment amount
minus the $30,000.00 draw he had already taken. He also received at least one extension fee to
his credit from the buyers, which was an additional several thousand dollars.
13. I though he was good to his word, relied on what he told me he would do around the
time of the sale. It was not until I received the email on or after September 9, 2013 that I realized
he was going back on his word.
14. I received an email through Garrett Sandow dated November 14, 2012, from Richard,
advising that he was proposing paying me the balance of the sale proceeds after deducting
$256,000 out of the proceeds of the sale (Exhibit M). Although I was not happy about the
proposed division, because of my greater investment in the properties, I was willing to accept the
same, given my circumstances at the time.
15. I conveyed that to Garrett.
16. On or about December 27, 2012, I received, through Mr. Sandow, another statement,
proposing a payment to me of 155,482.28 (Exhibit N). I reviewed that with Mr. Sandow.
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the funds from the
17. In the meantime, I believe that Mr. Stallings presumably received
sale of the mutual property.
Mr. Sandow,
18. On September 9, 2013, I was forwarded an email that I received from
g all of the funds and
advising that Mr. Stallings felt he owed me nothing, and that he was keepin
I had four years from the
money from the sale of the property (Exhibit I). He also advised me that
date of the notice I received, September 9, 2013, to file legal action.
FURT HER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT:
DATED this \9~a y of July, 2018.

2018.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ ay of Juh(J..L. ,

~I c~ 1! :'t

My cmn exprs:

State of Idaho, residing at
Blackfoot therein

01-I Dtt /1,tYil

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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t copy of the
I certify that on this ___j__[-J__ day of July, 2018, I served a true and correc
ted.
indica
d
metho
following-described docum ent on the person(s) listed below by the
Docum ent Served:
Person(s) Served:

Affidavit of Jon Gregory
( -thlai l
( .,YFax
( ) Hand Delivered

Jared M. Harris
BAKE R & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-6749

~

DAVID N. PARM ENTE R
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occupation of the individual; and a summary of the particular know]edge which each individual
has pertaining to the facts and issues involved in this case.
ANSWER: Presently, Plaintiff is unaware of anyone else who has any particular
knowledge of the facts or matters at dispute in this action.
lNTERROGATORY NO. 4: Describe each and every document or other writing in your
kind, whether in
possession, including any written notes, memoranda· or written statements of
your possession, or your attorney's, which in any way pertain to the facts and circumstances at
issue in this particular action.

any

ANSWER; See attached Exhibits/ Documents list

INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name and address of each person whom you
expect to call as an expert witness at trial. For each person please provide:
(a)
A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefore;
(b)
A description of the data or other inf01mation considered by the witness in forming
the opinions;
(c)
A description of any exhibits to be used as a surmna:ty of or support for the
opinions;
(d)
A description of any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years;
(e)
A statement of the compensation to be paid for the testimony; and
(f)
A listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or
by deposition within the preceding four years.
ANSWER: Plaintiff has not yet deteimined what expert witnesses; if any, he intends to
call.
lNTERROGATORYNO. 6: Please set forth with particularity each and every fact upon
which you assert any of your claims and for each fact indicate the source of the fact and how
evidence will be introduced regarding the alleged fact.
ANSWER: The facts are essentially as follows:
1.

Plaintiff became interested in a parcel of property owned by Macy Ann Beck of

Rexburg, Idaho, which he wanted to purchase for development of student housing and/or similar
commercial/ multi-family housing development.
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2.

Plaintiff purchased 2 of the 4 acres by paying cash of $205,000.00, but needed to

acquire the other 2 acres to complete the plan development.
3.

Defendant Richard Stallings contacted the Plaintiff, and advised that he had an

interest in purchasing the other 2 acres, and going in as pattners or associates in a joint venture on
the development.
4.

Defendants thereafter obtained a bank loan in order to finance their shai·e of the

necessaiy $205,000.00 to $207,000.00 for the purchase of the other 2 acres.

5.

A third party, Summit Development also knovvn as Pioneer Point LLC (Heath

Johnston) became involved as the developers for the project. It was to develop the property, put in
road, parking lots, sewer, water, and begin with at least two buildings on the property.
6.

Plainti.frs 2 acres were subordinated to The Construction Loan obtained by Summit

Development, so that the Defendants could obtain their financing for the development of the
property. Plaintiff was on a first Deed of Trust for his 2 acres and Mrs. Gregory's property to
Century Mortgage. Defendants had actually borrowed $289,000.00, the difference above
approximately $205,000.00 which they requested for other matters or investments. Defendants
were on a second Deed of Trust for their 2 acres, to Century M01tgage; their :first Deed of Trust
was to The Bank of Commerce/ Empire Funding for their original loan.

7.

Some time thereafter, Century Mortgage Company, also had Defendants execute a

Construction Loan Agreement and Assignment of Trust, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
8.

Further, Defendants executed a Promissory Note around the same time, a copy of

which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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9.

The Construction Loan Agreement and Assignment of Trust was financed by

Century Mmtgage Company, who had acquired several individual investors to :finance the
mortgage, and who were also parties of interest through their investments.
10.

The Plaintiff also owned an adjacent but separate property known as G1s Dairy

Delights, LLC, which he leased to an individual who operated that business.
11.

Around 2007, the market in residential and commercial values crashed and fell,

causing considerable economic turmoil in the United States, and as it related to the property in
question.
12.

Century Mortgage advised the Plaintiff that they could not provide him a draw for

construction work, and essentially went out of business. Summit Development had done some
initial work, and had provided some initial development. However, they were unable to complete
the project.
13.

Plaintiff immediately began working on trying to sell the property and to try and

recoup the investments that he, Defendants, and the other investors for the mortgage had put into
the property.

14.

During the process, in order to keep project viable, The Plaintiff further sold his

property known as G1s Dairy Delights, LLC, and took the proceeds from that sale and invested
them in the Marian Beck property and project. Those funds were approximately $292,629.43. See
attached Exhibit C.
15.

The Plaintiff also began working on efforts to sell the Maiy Ann Beck property and

project, in order to recoup their investments for both himself, Defendants, and the other witnesses,
given the economic crash.
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16.

The Plaintiff was able to locate a buyer, Rockwell Comt Limited Partnership, who

was willing to purchase the property for the sum of$1,086,000.00. With that sale, all of the
mortgage investors were paid back their initial investments. Sec attached Exhibit D.
17.

The balance of the proceeds from the sale of the propeity was to be divided

between the original investors, the Plaintiff and Defendants.

18.

The patties had originally agreed to divide the anticipated balance of the proceeds

of$433,000.00 by 2, each of them receiving $216,758.86.

19.

Thereafter, despite Plaintiffs greater investment in supplying the additional

$292,000.00 from the sale of G's Dairy Delights, LLC, and having paid as well additional interest
payments, Defendants sent a statement to Plaintiff, from the sale of the proceeds proposing to pay
Plaintiff the sum of $256,000.00 (through GatTett Sandow).
20.

Even though Plaintiff had by far the greater investment, he needed the money at the

time, and was willing to acquiesce to that proposal and offer of the :initial $256,000.00 offer.
Defendants subsequently proposed paying to Plaintiff the sum of $300,000.00, paying to Plaintiff

the sum of $155,482.28, and to the Defendants, the sum of $144,517.72.
21.

Thereafter, despite his previous statement, and the fact that they were partners in

the project, Defendants thereafter advised the Plaintiff through Mr. Sandow that they were
keeping all proceeds from the sale with Rockwell Court Limited Partnership, and that the Plaintiff
should receive nothing.
22.

Defendant thereafter kept and retained all of the proceeds from the sale of property

with Rockwell Court Limited paitnership, and paid nothing to Plaintiff.
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The source of those facts will come through the testimony of Plaintiff and other witnesses,
as well as the several documents, emails, contracts, loan agreements, promissory notes, deeds of
trust, settlement statements, and other documents that are sent, involved, or signed in this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please set forth the amount and the computation ofyour
damages in this matter.
ANSWER: The amount is based on Plaintiff's original purchase of the 2 acres for
$205,000.00 plus the sale of G's Dairy and inclusion of those funds in the investment of
$292,000.00, and taking into consideration Defendants original offer, his loans, and other factors.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please set forth the te1ms of any alleged partnership between
Plaintiff and Defendants.
ANSWER: The parties were partners/ a joint venture to share profits equally after
consideration and repayment of their original respective investments.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please set forth all terms of the alleged implied contract,
including the date it was entered into, its terms, and any alleged breach of said contract
ANSWER: The terms and agreements were as set forth above in Answer# 8. Furthermore,
Defendant, Richard Stallings, sent an email stating he would pay $256,000.00 to Plaintiff after the
property was sold.
lNTERROGATORY NO. 10: Have you ever been convicted of a felony? If so, please
state:
(a)
(b)
(c)

The case number and Court;
Each crime to which a guilty plea or verdict was entered;
The sentence enforced for each crime to which a guilty plea or verdict was entered.

ANSWER:No.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: For each of the Requests for Admissions set forth below,
in which your answer is anything but an unqualified admission, please describe in full and
complete detail the factual basis upon which said Request for Admission was answered.
ANSWER: See Answers/ Complaint.
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•
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUE ST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce a true and co1Tect copy of any
t,
letter, memorandum, contract, exhibit, waJ.Tanty, statement, advertisement, brochure, pamphle
invoice, receipt, or other document which you intend to introduce as an exhibit at trial.
REQUE ST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Please produce co1Tect, complete and legible

the
copies of every document, record or other writing identified by you in response to any of
the
above Inte1wgatories. For each document produced, please state the Interrogatory to which
document relates.
·
REQUE ST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce a true and co11"ect copy of any
the
letter, e-mail, deleted e-mail, memorandum, contract, or other document which relates to
relationship of Richard and Eileen Stallings and Jon Gregory.
REQUE ST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce a true and correct copy of any
,
letter, e-mail, deleted e-mail, memorandum, warranty, statement, advertisement, brochure
invoice, receipt or other document upon which you base any portion of your claims.
REQUE ST FOR PRODU CTION NO. 5: Please produce a true and correct copy of the
written agreement entered into between Plaintiff and Defendants which fo1ms the basis of

this

lawsuit.
REQUE ST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce true and con-ect copies of any
deeds showing your ownership interest in the subject prope1ty.
REQUE ST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce a true and correct copy of any
document showing your alleged ownership interest in the two acre parcel.

RIES, AND
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce all documents verifying
allegations that the Defendants obtained a bank loan to purchase the two acres.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please produce any subordination agreement you
entered into regarding the two or four acre parcels of property.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce all documentation regarding the
sale of G's Daily Delights LLC's property.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce all documentation regarding
your allegation that $292,629.43 of your funds were invested in the Mary Ann Beck project.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce copies of statements allegedly
made set forth in paragraph 22 of the Complaint.
REQUEST FOR PRODUC'DON NO. 13: Please produce verification of all
improvements made by Plaintiff to the four acre properties.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce copies of all requests made by
Plaintiff to Defendants for labor and improvements to the properties.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce the tax returns for G's Dairy
Delights, LLC for the years 2000 through 2017.
These requests are deemed continuing, and your answers thereto are to be supplemented as
additional information, knowledge or documents become available or known to you.

DATED this

-1!/-~ay of April, 2018.
DAVID N. PARMENTER
Attorney for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
DATED this

_{J_day of /}ff, Jb,018

)
ss:
County of ~\~~W\ )
STATE OF IDAHO

On the \ :\ day of An,, i. \ , 2018, before me, a Notary Public in and for said state,
personally appeared Plaintiff,JDNGREGORY, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IN WI'INESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the
day and year in this certificate first above written.

~ b l i c for Idaho

-Y~.\<l.J-.o

Residing at:
My Commission Expires:\ "2..\

,~l '2-2..
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this ___l!!J__./J:tray of April, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS
Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-6749

( ) Mail
( ) Fax
( v-) Hand Delivered

DAVID N. PARMENTER

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' FffiST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 12
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1

Prom: Tim Cobb <tim@Con1,tructionenhancemerit.com>

To.: <;3 9andowJaw <Gsandowlaw@aol.com>
Subject: Fwd: Rexburg Property
Date: Mon, Sep 9, 2013 5:26 pm

GarrettHope you are doing well... I received the below from Richard Staflings in the past few weeks_, and then
_
followed up with a call to him and conversation, in which he mentioned some of the items that w~nt wrong
in·
this deal.
G!ve me a call when you get a moment.
509-990-2324

Sent from Tim's iPad
Begin forwarded message: .
.

.

From: "_State Recovery, Inc.. " <staterecovery@hotmail.com::;
Date:_August27, 2013, 2:01:42 PM PDT
To: Tim Cobb <tim@Constructionenhan'cement.com>

Subject: Rexburg Prop!3rty

Tim I have been_ doing a lot of thinking irJ reference to John Gregory and the sale of the Rex~urg
property. When John had fhe IRS-call me it really caught me_ off gu<;1rd. In that they asked me If I
had anything to do with John Gregory arid I assured them that we had no partnershil:) and that I
owed him no money in this transaction. ffhen shortly after that John told me that in selling of th·e
property that the buyer only wanted to deal with one person not two, I thought th-at was strange .
but said notliing· at that time. Latter I learned that the whole reason for this is because the IRS is
after John for past taxes. I am very unhappy with John In trying to put me in the middle· of his
problems .. As I• review this entire project'[· was no more than an investor in that John mad-e all the
decisions on this property. The only ·thing I did is purchase my ground and John thought he _could
market it. About two years ago John call~d up and said for us to go up to Rexburg and sign some
papers. We tliought we· W1?re selling the1 property and when we got up to Rexburg they had us
sign a guarantee for 950,000.-00. The closing agent said we were in good shape and it was a
normal procedure. John should have said something to me-. I am upset that John allowed this
project .to borrow hard money that took afl the profits_. I look at the opportunity cost of this project
that was given away through Johns poor management of this-property. I feel that I should ge.t the·
full opportunity cost back on my risk of my investment. Beside the opportunity cost, by John ..
having_ me talk to the IRS put me in a position that I am very uncomfortable with. I feel John is .
way out of line in putting me in any position that could threaten
financial position. In
conc!uslon I feel in order for me to get a return on my investment there is no money owed to John
from the current sell. ·
·

my

Thank you
Richard Stallings
STATE RECOVERY
lOOMARKLN
BLACKFOOT, ID 83221
208-78.5-6591

http://mail.aol.com/3 8022-111/aol-6/en-us/m.ail/Pr.intMessage.aspx
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Page 1 of 1
Subj:
Date:
From:

Rexburg Property
1
11/14/2012 10:24:26 AM. Mountain Standard Time
staterecovery@hotmail.com
·
To:
Gsandowlaw@aol.com
Garrett Sandow

The following facts are the reasons why the.payoff op the Rexburg property should be alocated as
stated.
·
'

1. My principle and interest paid out at the time my bank went broke was 287,000.

2. When my bank, America West closed down I had the F.D.I.C. come after me threatoning to go after
everything that I have. Niether Larkins or John had any interest or financial responsability In helping me
at all. Just because I was able to get out of that problem does not mean that I share that risk with
John.
.

3, Tim Cobb told me he was really disappionted in d~ling with John because he could not get him to

foJlow through in a promptly time. He commended m:e for getting things back in a efficient time. Tim
Cobb told me that he would not have any future dealifiQS with John.

r

4. This entire project was under John watch. I totallyileft everything up to his dlsgresslon. I am very
disappointed that we sold this property under his aclv(sment to some one who barrowed hard money on
it. This ruined potential profits thst would have beeri good for both of us.
.

s.

l

Since this property has drug on. I have been forced to sell some other property at a discount for

I

need capital on a project in Caldwell.
Conduslon

My mistake was putting this In Johns hands. I feal if he would have been more ascertlve we would not
be in this position. For this reason I feal that !should at least get the mane that I invested into this

~

property back.
' 286,000.

Investment
I recieved a draw
balanced left

f

g fo \. eoo •DO
,.......

t

$1

.

;J-(J O \ b D CD

. .

-

:3 a , 'O 0-D

30,000. 256,000.

.

:__-,,,

I plan on takin~ the following a~ounts ;;!then givln~ the balance of each draw to Garret S-andow for
.
j
·
.
·
second draw 150,000
l () o
.

Johns disperse!.
First draw
106,000

j

·

STATE RECOVERY
l0OMARKLN
BLACKJt'OOT, ID 83221
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I
EMPIRE FUNDING
175 N 300 W •Blackfoot ID 83221 • Tel 208-681-7546 , Fax 208-785-1809

December 6, 2012

Dear Garrett Sandow, ·
This letter is to inform you of a loan that my company Brokered.to America West Bank
on October 2, 2007. This loan was made to Richard and Eileen Stallings in the amount of
$235,000.00. Since the original funding date, with interest and penalties, the FDIC called
the note due in the amount of $289,000.00.

If you have any questions please feel free to call me at 208-681-7546.
Sincerely,

Terri L. Merkley
Owner/ Broker

\

\
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DAVID N. PARMENTER, ISB # 2441
NATHAN D. RIVERA, ISB # 8339
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, ID 83221
(208)78 5-5618
(208)785-4858 (fax)
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,

I Case No. CV-2017-1651

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF GARRETT SANDOW

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.

GARRETT SANDOW, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1. I am a licensed attorney, practicing in the State of Idaho. My office is in Blackfoot,
Idaho.
2. Around 2011 or so, I was contacted by Jon Gregory to assist him in reviewing
contracts and other matters, relative to a mutual interest he had in certain property with Richard
Stallings. I was advised generally that they each had ownership in certain property in Rexburg,
which they were in the process of developing as Pioneer Point, LLC. My only role was to act as a

AFFIDAVIT OF GARRETT SANDOW- I
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communication intermediary between Jon Gregory, Richard Stallings, and others involved in
liquidating the investment property, and the subsequent sale thereof.
3. I had worked with Richard Stallings several times previously in other matters, and
knew Jon Gregory as well. They are both businessman who I had dealt with at other times in the
past, and agreed to act only as a liason or intermediary for their mutual interests.
4. I became involved about the time they were attempting to liquidate or sell their
interests. Most of my personal communications were with Jon Gregory; however, I did have
some communication with Richard Stallings, particularly by email.
5. Exhibit O is a letter I received from Terri Merkley relative to a loan made to Richard
and Eileen Stallings in the matter, directed to me.
6. I understand they had a joint, mutual interest because of their separate, individual
investments in the property in question.
7. As the property was being sold, Mr. Stallings communicated to me, and I passed on to
Jon Gregory, what Stallings had agreed to settle for on the division of their mutual interests.
8. On November 14, 2012 I received an email from Richard Stallings (Exhibit M). In that
email, he advised of his proposed division of Stallings and Gregory's mutual interest, by
proposing to pay, through me, Jon Gregory's share in their mutual interests upon sale of the
property.
9. On or about December 27, 2012, I received a second email, a statement from Richard
Stallings, proposing that the amount to be paid to Jon Gregory was $155,482.28 (Exhibit N).

AFFIDAVIT OF GARRETT SANDOW- 2
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10. I discussed both amounts with Jon Gregory, and even though he was not excited
about the proposed division, having had a greater investment in the property, he was willing to
accept the original proposal and decide later what to do about the balance Jon claimed.
11. I did not hear much more on the matter from Mr. Stallings or Mr. Gregory, until I
received an email from Tim Cobb, another individual who is involved in the matter peripherally.
The email was dated September 9, 2013, and included an email from Richard Stallings
essentially advising me that he had decided that he was not going to pay Jon Gregory anything
for his mutual interests, and that according to him, there was no money owed to Jon Gregory
from the current sale. I passed that information on to Jon Gregory, as I had the other emails
(Exhibit I). His decision not to pay Jon Gregory was a breach of my understanding of their joint
venture and mutual interest in the property.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT:
DATED this

jJ_ day of July, 2018.

GARRETT SANDOW
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

My cmn exprs: \

tj I1,pf 2.1..

\&\ day o f ~ ' 2018.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the
State of Idaho, residing at
~herein
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this _ _ day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

Affidavit of Garrett Sandow
Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-6749

( ) Mail
( ) Fax
( ) Hand Delivered

DAVID N. PARMENTE R
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From: Tim Cobb <tim@Coni:;tructionenhancement.com>

To_: <;31;1andowlaw <Gsandowlaw@aoLcom>
Subject: Fwd: Re_xburg Property
Date: Mon, Sep 9, 2013 5:26 pm

GarrettHope you are doing well... I received the below from Richard Stalling
s in the past few weeksJ and then
_
followed up with a call to him and conversation, in which he mention
ed some of the items thatw(j'!nt wrong in·
this deal.
Give me a call when you get a moment.
509-990-2324

Sent from Tim's iPad
Begin forwarded message; _
.

.

From: 11~tate Recovery, Inc.. " <staterecovery@hotmail.com:::>
Date:.August 27, 2013, 2:01:42 PM PDT
Ta: Tim Cobb <tirn@Constructionenharicement.com>
Subject: Rexburg Prop~rty

Tim I have been_ doing a lot of thinking ii} reference to John Gregory
and the sale of the Rexpurg
property. When John had the IRS-call me it really caught me_ off guard.
In that they asked me if I
had anything to do with John Gregory ai-ld I assured them that we had
no partnershfµ and that I
owed him no money in this transaction. ffhen shortly after that John
told me that in selling of ttie
property that the buyer only wanted to deal with one person not two,
I thought th·at was strange .
but said nothing· at that time. Latter I learned that the whole reason
for this is because the IRS is
after John for past taxes. I am very unhappy with John in trying to put
me in the middle· of his
problems .. As I-review this entire project' twas no more than an investo
r in that John made an the
decisions on this property. _!he only ·thing I did is purchase my ground
and John thought he _could
market it. About two years ago John call!3d up and said for us to go
up to Rexburg and sign some
papers. We Uiought we· were selling the1 property and when we got
up to Rexburg they had us
sign a guarantee for 950,000.-00. The closing agent said we were in
good shape anct it was a
normal procedure. John should have said something to me. l am upset
that
project .to borrow hard money that took an tl:le profits .. I look at the opportu John allowed this
nity cost of this project
that was given away through Johns poor management of this-property.
l feel that J should get the·
full opportunity cost back on my risk of my investment. Beside the opportu
nity cost, by John ..
having_ me talk to the IRS put me in a position that I am very uncomfortable
with. l feel John is .
way out of line in putting me in any position that could threaten
financial position. In
.
conclusion l feel in ord~r for me to get a return on my Investment there
is
no
money
owed
to
John
from the current sell.
·

my

Thank you
Richard Stallings
STATE RECOV ERY
I00MA RKLN

BLACKFOOT, ID 83221
208-78.$-6591

http://mail.aoLcom/3 8022-111/aol-6/en-us(mail/PrintMessage.aspx
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Page I of 1
Subj:
Date:
From:

Rexburg Property
1
11/14/2012 10:24:26 AM. Mountain Standard Time
staterecovery@hotmail.com
·
To:
Gsandowlaw@aol.com
.
Garrett Sandow

The following facts are the reasons why the.payoff on the Rexburg property should be alocated as
I
stated.
·
'

1. My principle and interest paid out at the time my bank went broke was 287,000.

2. When my bank, America West closed down I had the F.D.I.C. come after me threatoning to go after
everything that I have. Niether Larkins or John had any interest or financial responsability in helping me
at all. Just because Iwas able to get out of that problem does not mean that I share that risk with
John.
·
3. Tim Cobb told me he was really disappionted in dJaling with John because he could not get him to

foJlow through in a promptly time. He commended m'.e for getting things back in a efficient time. Tim

Cobb told me that he would not have any future dealipgs with John.
t·
4. This entire project was under John watch. I totally; left everything up to his dlsgression. I am very
disappointed that we sold this property under his adv{sment to some one who barrowed hard money on
it. This ruined potential profits thst would have been good for both of us.
.

I

5. Since this property has drug on. I have been forced to sell some other property at a discount for

I

need capital on a project in Caldwell.
Conclusion

My mistake was putting this in Johns hands. I feal if he would have been more ascertive we would not
be in this position. For this reason I feal that !should at least get the mane that I invested into this

Jl: g (o '- e,c,.o •U-0 ·t

property back.

Investment
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I plan on taking the following amounts and then glvin~ the balance of each draw to Garret s·andow for
Johns disperse!:
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First draw
106,000
second draw 150,000
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I
EMPIRE FUNDING
175 N 300 W •Blackfoot ID 83221• Tel 208-681-7546 , Fax208-785-1809

December 6, 2012

Dear Garrett Sandow, ·
This letter is to inform you of a loan that my company Brokered.to America West Bank
on October 2, 2007. This loan was made to Richard and Eileen Stallings in the amount of
$235,000.00. Since the original funding date, with interest and penalties, the FDIC called
the note due in the amount of $289,000.00.

If you have any questions please feel free to call me at 208-681-7546.
Sincerely,

Terri L. Merkley
Owner/ Broker

\

\
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Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALUNGS, an individual,

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter "Defendant")
by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER & HARRIS, and
hereby submits the following Reply Brief in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
In their Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that issues of fact exist, but fail to point out any factual
issues.
Plaintiff asserts that the parties entered into an express agreement, but have failed to submit
any documentation to support that allegation or even state what the agreement was. Plaintiff takes
the position that the parties had an agreement to develop and improve the subject property. The
property got improved. Accordingly, there is no breach of any such alleged contract. The Plaintiff

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-I

Page 118

then asserts that there was an implied agreement or a quasi agreement and again fails to set forth the
terms of any such alleged agreement.
The terms of the alleged agreement are not set forth in the Complaint. The only
representation as to what the Plaintiff asserts are the terms of any alleged agreement are set forth in
Plaintiff's discovery response to Interrogatories No. 8 and 9, noticably not referenced to the Court.
The answers state:
INTERROGATORY N0.8: Please set forth the terms of any alleged partnership
between Plaintiff and Defendants.
ANSWER: The parties were partners/ a joint venture to share profits equally after
consideration and repayment of their original respective investments.
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please set forth all terms of the alleged implied contract,
including the date it was entered into, its terms, and any alleged breach of said
contract.
ANSWER: The terms and agreements were as set forth above in Answer# 8.
Furthermore, Defendant, Richard Stallings, sent an email stating he would pay
$256,000.00 to Plaintiff after the property was sold.

See Affidavit of Jared M. Harris.
This matter is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argues that the statute starts to run
on September 9, 2013 based on an alleged representation that Defendants were not going to make
payment to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff is starting from the wrong date. If the parties had an
agreement, Plaintiff would have been entitled to be paid at the point in time when Defendants
received money from the sale of the property which was on December 21, 2012. See Affidavit of
Richard Stallings at Paragraph 6. In Spence v. Howard, 26 Id. 763, 770, 890 P.2d 714,771 (1995)
the Court stated, "The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claim accrues upon the
breach of contract. Prewett v. First Nat'l Bank ofHa~erman, 45 Idaho 451,457,262 P. 1057, 1058
(1928)." The statute of limitations would have started on December 12, 2012, when Defendants

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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allegedly failed to pay, not on September 9, 2013, when Plaintiff was allegedly informed that they
would not be paid. Accordingly, any suit should have been initiated by December 21, 2016.
Further, Plaintiff transferred his interest in his portion of the property to Pioneer Point, LLC
who then transferred his interest in the property to Defendants. Any claim that Petitioner has should
be against Pioneer Point, LLC, not Defendants.
For the first time, Plaintiff now asserts an equitable estoppel argument. Plaintiff should be
prohibited from asserting that argument inasmuch as equitable estoppel has not been pled. Further,
the Plaintiff has failed to set forth the required facts for application of equitable estoppel.
The elements of equitable estoppel are:
1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive
knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not
discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the
intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation was
made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the
representation or concealment to his prejudice.
Ferro v. Society of St. Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540-41, 149 P.3d 813, 815 (2006)
Plaintiff has not pled the elements of equitable estoppel, nor do they exist in this matter.
Defendants made no false representation or concealment of material fact. The Plaintiff did not know
or could not discover the truth. No false representation was made with intent to be relied upon and
the Plaintiff did not rely upon any alleged misrepresentation of Defendants. Further, equitable
estoppel is not a catch all bar.
Even if equitable estoppel had been pled it is not applicable in this matter because Plaintiff
clearly learned of any alleged concealed facts within adequate time to bring the lawsuit prior to the
running of the statute of limitations. In Ferro v. Society of St. Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540-41, 149

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-3

Page 120

P.3d 813, 815 (2006)(emphasis added) the Supreme Court explained some limitations on the
application of equitable estoppel and the statute of limitations:
'Equitable estoppel does eliminate, toll, or extend the statute of limitations.' J.R.
Simplot Company v. Chemetics International, Inc. 126 Idaho 532, 887 P.2d 1039
(1994). It merely bars a party from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense,
that bar does not last forever, however. It only lasts for a reasonable time after the
party assertin~ equitable estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered the
truth. Knudson v. A~ee, 128 Idaho 776, 918 P.2d 1221 (1996) (estoppel did not bar
defendants from relying on the stature of limitations where Plaintiff learned of an
allegedly concealed fact within adequate time to bring the lawsuit prior to the run of
the statute of limitations); ... Once the party claiming the estoppel discovers the truth
with respect to the alleged misrepresentations upon which the estoppel is based, that
party must act with due diligence in asserting the claim.
According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was notified by Defendant on September 9, 2013 that Defendant did
not intend to pay him any monies. Accordingly, the defense of equitable estoppel is at best a red
herring. It is interesting that Plaintiff did not site this controlling argument to this Court.
Similarly, Plaintiff has not pied quasi estoppel. Quasi estoppel is not a defense to the statute
of limitations. In Ferro v. Society of St. Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540, 149 P.3d 813, 815 (2006) the
Supreme Court stated: "The only non-statutory bar to the statue oflimitations defense in Idaho is the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.' J.R. Simplot Company v. Chemetics International, Inc. 126 Idaho
532, 534, 887 P.2d 1039, 1041 ( 1994)". Additionally, factually, there is no evidence that Defendants
ever changed their position in this matter. If Defendants changed their position, they did so well
within the time for Plaintiff to file an action, which Plaintiff failed to do.
This matter is also barred by the application of the Statute of Frauds. Idaho Code § 9-505 (1)
and (4) states:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing
or secondary evidence of its contents:
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof ...
4. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one (1) year, or for the sale,
of real property, or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an agent of
the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in
writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.
Because of lack specificity, its difficult to know if the contract could be performed within a year. As
a practical matter the development and sale of real property its virtually impossible to be done within
a year. In any event, the alleged agreement is clearly for the sale of real property. In an attempt to
dance around the application of the statute, Plaintiff makes the following statement in their briefing
at pg. 6, "Similarly, here, Plaintiff and Defendant made an oral agreement to work together to
develop and improve the subject property." If that were the extent of the agreement, then there was
absolutely no basis for this lawsuit because the property was in fact developed. But the full
agreement was for the development and sale of the property. The holding in Spence v. Howell, 126
Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995) does not change the application of the statute. In Spence the Court
was faced factually with a completely different situation. The parties in that matter wanted to have
a religious retreat. They formed a partnership for the development of the retreat, and the land had
already been purchased. The court noted:
The oral contract was for the formation of a partnership for the purpose of developing
a Christian retreat ranch. Incidental to this oral contract was a transaction involving
the land, but the initial agreement did not depend on the transfer of the land, except
for the alleged tax purposes. The land had already been purchased and designated for
the retreat, prior to the oral contract.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-5

Page 122

Id at 771,890 P.2d at 722. In this matter, the very terms of the agreement, are allegedly to share in
the profits from the sale of the property. Accordingly, the statute of frauds applies here. There is no
appropriate memoran dum signed by both parties setting forth the terms of the alleged deal.
The memoran dum must plainly set forth the parties to the contract, the subject matter
thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property and all the essential
terms and conditions of the agreement. Pettigrew v. Denwalt, 431 P.2d 333
(Okl.1967). See, Gaskill v. Jacobs, 38 Idaho 795,225 P. 499 (1924).
Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc. 102 Idaho 187,190 ,628 P.2d 218,221 (1981).
Plaintiff takes the position that Exhibit M to his affidavit sets forth the required terms. This
argument fails. Defendants name is not listed on Exhibit M. Plaintiff s name is not listed on Exhibit
M. The price or consideration and description of the property and all the essential terms and
conditions of the agreement are not listed on Exhibit M. Plaintiff did not sign Exhibit M. Defendant
did not sign Exhibit M. Accordingly, the document is not sufficient to take the matter out of the
statute of frauds.
Accordingly, Defendants assert there is no disputed issue of fact and defendants are entitled
to judgmen t as a matter of law.
DATED this

f/f-:f day of August, 2018.
BAKER & HARRIS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC E
~

I certify that on this J!d__ct ay of August, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of
the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
David N. Parmenter
PARME NTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

( ) Mail
(,\!)Fax
( ) Hand Delivered
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Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED M.
HARRIS IN SUPPORT OF REPLY
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGME NT

Defendants.
Jared M. Harris, deposes and says:
1.

That he is now the attorney for the Defendants Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, and
makes this Affidavit based on personal knowledge.

2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Answers to
Interrogatory No. 8 and 9.

3.

That I have read the foregoing affidavit, and I hereby certify (or declare) under penalty of
perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct.
FURTHER your affiant saith not.

AFFIDAV IT OF JARED M. HARRIS IN SUPPORT OF REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDA NTS' MOTION FOR SUMMAR Y JUDGME NT - 1
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:t
DATED this ~day of August, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

f

I certify that on this / ~ay of August, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Documen t Served:

Person(s) Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED M. HARRIS IN SUPPORT OF REPLY BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIO N FOR SUMMA RY
JUDGM ENT
David N. Parmenter
PARMEN TER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

( ) Mail
(() Fax
( ) Hand Delivered

AFFIDA VIT OF JARED M. HARRIS IN SUPPORT OF REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPOR T OF
DEFEND ANTS' MOTIO N FOR SUMMA RY JUDGMENT - 2
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The source of those facts will come through the testimony of Plaintiff and other witnesses,
as well as the several documents, emails, contracts, loan agreements, promissory notes, deeds of
trust, settlement statements, and other documents that are sent, involved, or signed in this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please setforth the amount and the computation ofyour
damages in this matter.
ANS WgR: The amount is based on Plaintiff's original purchase of the 2 acres for
$205,000.00 plus the sale of G's Dairy and inclusion of those funds in the investment of
$292,000.00, and taking into consideration Defendants original offer, his loans, and other factors.
~TE&ROGATORY NO. 8; Please set forth the terms of any alleged partnership between
Defendants.
Plaintiff

and

ANSWER: The parties were partners/ a joint venture to share profits equally after
consideration and repayment of their original respective investments.
JNrmlRQOATORYN0•.9:Please set forth all terms ofthe alleged implied contract,
including the date it was entered into,its terms, and any alleged breach of said contract.

ANSWJ;;R: The terms and agreements were as set forth above in Answer# 8. Furthermore,
Defendant, Rlchard Stallings, sent an email stating he would pay $256,000.00 to Plaintiff after the
property was sold.
INTERR.OGATOR.YNO. l 0: Have you ever been convicted of a felony? If so, please
state:
(a)
(b)
( c)

The case number and Court;
Each crime to which a guilty plea or verdict was entered;
The sentence. enforced for each crime to which a guilty plea or verdict was entered.

ANSWER:No.
J,NTERR.OGATORYNO. 11: For each of the Requests for Admissions set forth below,
in which your answer is anything but an unqualified admission, please describe in full and
complete detail the factual basis upon which said Request for Admission was answered.
ANSWER: Sec Answers/ Complaint.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 8

EXHIBIT

ii
Page 127

I

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRIC T COURT OF THE SEVENT H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHA M
JON GREGOR Y, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

OBJECTION TO THE
AFFIDAVITS OF GARRE TT
SANDOW AND JON GREGO RY

Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter "Defendant")
by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER & HARRIS, and
hereby objects to portions of the Affidavits of Garrett Sandow and Jon Gregory as follows:
1.

Defendant objects to any portion of Garrett Sandow's Affidavit (hereinafter "Sandow
Affidavit") that references to statements made by Jon Gregory and Richard Stallings on the
basis of hearsay and lack of foundation. There is no indication as to when, where, or with
whom the discussions occurred.

2.

Defendant objects to ,r 5 of the Sandow Affidavit on relevance.

3.

Defendant objects to ,r 6 of the Sandow Affidavit as hearsay and lacking foundation.

OBJECT ION TO THE AFFIDAVITS OF GARRE TT SANDOW AND JON GREGO RY - 1
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4.

Defendant objects of ,r,r 8 and 9 of the Sandow Affidavit on the best evidence rule.

5.

Defendant objects to ,r 11 of the Sandow Affidavit as hearsay, lacking foundation, and on the
best evidence rule.

6.

Defendant objects to,, 5, 6, and 7 of the Affidavit of Jon Gregory (hereinafter "Gregory
Affidavit") on relevance.

7.

Defendant objects to ,r 8 of the Gregory Affidavit on relevance and the paragraph states a
legal conclusion.

8.

Defendant objects to 11 9 of the Gregory Affidavit on hearsay and lacking foundation.

9.

Defendant objects to 11 11 of the Gregory Affidavit as lacking foundation as to what if
anything Richard Stallings was using Garrett Sandow for.

10.

Defendant objects to ,r 12 of the Gregory Affidavit as speculation, hearsay, and lacking
foundation.

11.

Defendant objects to ,r 18 of the Gregory Affidavit on the best evidence rule.

12.

Defendant objects to Exhibit A of the Gregory Affidavit because of lack of foundation,
hearsay, and the best evidence rule.
~

DATED this J!i._:;J~y of August, 2018.
BAKER & HARRIS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~

(tf -

I certify that on this
day of August, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

OBJECTION TO THE AFFIDAVITS OF GARRET T SANDOW AND
JON GREGORY
David N. Parmenter
PARMENT ER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

( ) Mail
('I) Fax
( ) Hand Delivered
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Filed:10/15/2018 17:35:42
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual,

)

CASE NO. CV-2017-1651

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
and EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

)
)

Defendants.

)

)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Jon Gregory (hereinafter "Gregory") filed the above-numbered lawsuit
against Defendants Richard Stallings, an individual, and Eileen Stallings, an individual
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Stallings") and claimed breach of contract,
breach of implied contract, and quantum meruit. 1 The Stallings now move for summary
judgment as to all of Gregory's claims. 2 Gregory objects to the Stallings' Motion. 3

1

Verified Complaint, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed September 6,
2017) (hereinafter "Gregory's Complaint").
2
Motion for Summary Judgment, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed
July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Motion").
3
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Gregory v.
Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 19, 2018) (hereinafter "Gregory's
Opposition").
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1

A hearing was held on the Stallings' Motion on August 21, 2018. 4 Based upon
the record, the parties' arguments, and the relevant authorities, the Stallings' Motion shall
be granted.
II.

ISSUES

The Stallings contend that Gregory's three causes of action against them are
barred by the statute of limitations and by the Statute of Frauds. 5 Gregory responds that a
valid contract existed between him and the Stallings,6 which does not fall within the
Statute of Frauds. 7 In the alternative, Gregory maintains that an implied contract existed
between the parties. 8 At the very least, Gregory argues, a quasi-contract existed between
the parties. 9 If the Statute of Frauds bars enforcement of the alleged contract, Gregory
pleads equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel to prevent the Stallings from allegedly
receiving "unjust results." 10
The Stallings object to the affidavits of Garrett Sandow 11 and Jon Gregory1 2 on the
bases of hearsay, lack of foundation, relevance, the best evidence rule, stating a legal
conclusion, and speculation. 13
The parties' arguments raise the following issues m light of the relevant
authorities:

4

Minute Entry, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 21, 2018).
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case
no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Memorandum"), at pp. 3-4.
6
Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 2-3.
7
Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 5-7.
8
Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 3.
9
Gregory's Opposition, at p. 4.
10
Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 7-10.
11
See; Affidavit of Garrett Sandow, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-201 7-1651 (filed
July 19, 2018) (hereinafter the "Sandow Affidavit").
12
See: Affidavit of Jon Gregory, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July
19, 2018) (hereinafter the "Gregory Affidavit").
5
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2

1.

Should portions of the Sandow Affidavit be stricken from consideration on

summary judgment?
2.

Should portions of the Gregory Affidavit be stricken from consideration

on summary judgment?
3.

Is Gregory's breach of contract action barred by the Idaho Statute of

Frauds?
4.

Is Gregory's breach of contract action barred by the applicable statute of

limitations?

III.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Gregory purchased two (2) acres of a four (4) acre parcel of land in

Rexburg, Idaho because he wanted to develop the property into student housing or a
similar commercial venture. 14
2.

On September 27, 2007, Gregory sold an approximately two (2) acre

parcel of land to the Stallings. 15 The two-acre parcel purchased by the Stallings was
contiguous to the two-acre parcel owned by Gregory. 16

According to Gregory, this

purchase represented the other two acres of the four-acre parcel in Rexburg. 17
3.

On February 2, 2009, Gregory transferred his interest in his two-acre

parcel to Pioneer Point LLC. 18 Gregory asserts that Pioneer Point LLC was to develop

13

Objection to the Affidavits of Garrett Sandow and Jon Gregory, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County
case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 14, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Objections to Affidavits").
14
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 15.
15
Affidavit of Richard Stallings in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Gregory v. Stallings,
Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings Affidavit"), at p.
1, 1 2; and at Exhibit A.
16
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 1, 1 3.
17
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2,116, 7.
18
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 4; and at Exhibit B.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 133

3

the property, put in roads, parking lots, sewer, and water, and to begin construction on at
least two buildings. 19
4.

On December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings entered into a

construction loan with Century Mortgage Company
. . . to finance a part of the cost of construction of certain improvements
upon the described premises in accordance with plans and specifications
that have been or will be deposited by [Pioneer Point, LLC and the
Stallings] with [Century Mortgage Company]. 20
The construction work was to be completed seven calendar months from December 8,
2010. 21
5.

On the same date, December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings

signed a promissory note, in the amount of $945,000, to various lenders, with the promise
to pay the note within six (6) months, or by June 10, 2009, with an option to extend for
another six (6) months. 22
6.

On May 2, 2012, Pioneer Point LLC transferred what had been Gregory's

property to Richard Stallings. 23
7.

On December 21, 2012, the Stallings sold both parcels of property to

Rockwell Court Limited Partnership for the sum of $1,086,438.89. 24

According to

Gregory, following the sale of the property, all of the mortgage investors were paid back
their initial investments. 25

19
20

21
22
23
24
25

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, ,r 8.
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit A.
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit A, p. 1, ,r 1.
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit B.
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, ,r 5.
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4, ,r 19; and at Exhibit D, p. 1.
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8.

Prior to the sale, on November 14, 2012, Richard Stallings informed

Gregory, through attorney Garrett Sandow, that he "plan[ned] on taking the following
amounts and then giv[ e] the balance of each draw to Garret Sandow for Johns [sic]
disperse! [sic]. First draw 106,000 second draw 150,000."26
9.

On September 9, 2013, an e-mail from Richard Stallings (originally date

August 27, 2013) was forwarded to attorney Garrett Sandow. 27 In his e-mail, Richard
Stallings wrote, inter alia: "In conclusion I feel in order for me to get a return on my
investment there is no money owed to John from the current sell. " 28
10.

Gregory sued the Stallings for breach of contract on September 6, 2017. 29

IV.
A.

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Standard of Review - Motion for Summary Judgment.
1.

If the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any

affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be granted. 30
Disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party.31
2.

The party moving for summary judgment (in this case, the Stallings) has

the burden of presenting admissible evidence showing that there is an absence of any

26

Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
28 Id.
29
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 1.
30 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a); Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d
694,698 (2009); G &M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-7, 808 P.2d 851, 853-4 (1991).
31 Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho
State Tax Commission, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006).
27
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genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issues raised by the summary judgment
motion. 32
3.

If the moving party demonstrates the absence of a question of material

fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate an issue of material fact that
will preclude summary judgment. 33
4.

The non-moving party (in this case, Gregory) cannot merely rest on its

pleadings. 34 When faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing party
must show material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. 35
5.

While the moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, 36 the opposing party cannot simply speculate. 37 A mere scintilla of evidence is
not enough to create a genuine factual issue. 38 Summary judgment is appropriate when the
non-moving party cannot establish the essential elements of the claim. 39
6.

If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on material issues, or

draw conflicting inferences therefrom, then the motion for summary judgment must be
denied. 40

32

Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932,938,265 P.3d 1144, 1150 (2011).
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308,317,246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010).
34
Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 688, 183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008); R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho
409,410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990).
35
Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008).
36
Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210, 214 (2008); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho
792, 798, 41 P.3d 220,226 (2001).
37
Cantwell v. City ofBoise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205,211 (2008).
38
Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P .3d 982, 986 (2009); West v. Sanke, 132 Idaho
133, 138, 968 P.2d 228,233 (1998).
39
Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004);
Dekker v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332, 333, 766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989).
40
Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,
873,204 P.3d 508,513 (2009).
33
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B.

Admissibility of Affidavit Testimony.
1.

Admissibility of evidence contained m affidavits in support of or in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed before
applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the
evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 41
2.

Affidavits may be used to support or defend a motion for summary judgment

as long as they are "made on personal knowledge, set out facts which would be admissible
in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated."42 These requirements "are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based
on hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge. " 43
3.

Affidavits may be used to show a genuine issue of material fact where the

affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. 44
4.

"Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the

testimony of the witness."45 Thus, "an affidavit need not contain an explicit recital of
personal knowledge when it can be reasonably inferred from its contents that the material
parts thereof are within the affiant' s personal knowledge." 46
5.

A trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in

connection with a motion for summary judgment is discretionary. 47

In exercising its

discretion, a trial court must: (a) correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion; (b) act

41

MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos, 163 Idaho 252,409 P.3d 832, 835 (2018).
MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos, 163 Idaho at_, 409 P.3d at 836 [citing: Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
56( C)(4)].
43
Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 369 P.3d 299 (2016) [citing: State v. Shama Resources Limited
Partnership, 127 Idaho 267,271,899 P.2d 977,981 (1995)].
44 Id.
45
Idaho Rule of Evidence 602.
46
Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho at 86, 369 P.3d at 304 [citing: 2A .J.S. Affidavit§ 47].
42
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within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the consideration of the issue; (c) reach its decision by an exercise of
reason. 48

C.

Relevance of Evidence.
1.

When a trial court is being asked to admit or to strike evidence, the initial

inquiry is whether the evidence is relevant. 49
2.

"Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the

action, and has any tendency to make the existence of a fact more probable than it would
be without the evidence, is relevant." 50
3.

All relevant evidence is admissible, while evidence which is not relevant

is not admissible. 51
4.

Relevant evidence can be excluded "if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues , ... waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. " 52

D.

The Best Evidence Rule.
1.

The best evidence rule states that "to prove the content of a writing,

recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required,
except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute." 53

47

Green v. Green, 161 Idaho 675, 679, 389 P.3d 961, 965 (2017).
Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
49
Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281,287, 385 P.3d 459, 465 (2016).
50
Id; Idaho Rule of Evidence 401.
51
Id; Idaho Rule of Evidence 402.
52
Id; Idaho Rule of Evidence 403.
53
State v. Rodriguez, 161 Idaho 368, 370, 386 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2017) [ citing: Idaho Rule of
Evidence 1002].
48
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2.

The purpose of the best evidence rule is to safeguard against inaccuracies

or fraud by requiring the production of original documents. 54
3.

The best evidence rule directs a party that to prove content, the party must

produce the original, a duplicate, or offer an adequate explanation why the party cannot
do so. 55
E.

Real Party in Interest.

1.

An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 56

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified the phrase "real party in interest"

as follows:
The real party in interest is the one who has a real, actual, material or
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, the primary object
being to save a defendant from further suits covering the same demand or
subject matter, i.e., the real party in interest is the person who can
discharge the claim upon which the suit is brought and control the action
brought to enforce it, and who is entitled to the benefits of the action, if
successful, and can fully protect the one paying the claim or judgment
against subsequent suits covering the same subject matter, by other
persons. 57
3.

An assignee is the real party in interest to bring an action, and the assignor

is not the real party in interest and has no standing to prosecute an action on the chose in
action. 58

54

State v. Rodriguez, 161 Idaho at 370, 386 P.3d at 511 [citing: Federal Rule of Evidence 1001, advisory
committee's note 1972].
55
State v. Rodriguez, 161 Idaho at 370, 386 P.3d at 511 [citing: Idaho Rule of Evidence 1002, 1003;
Federal Rule of evidence 1002, 1003].
56
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).
57
MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos, 163 Idaho at_, 409 P.3d at 835 [citing: Caughey v. George Jensen &
Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 134-5, 258 P.2d 357, 359 (1953)].
58
MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos, 163 Idaho at_, 409 P.3d at 835 [citing: McCluskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho
472, 474-5, 511 P.2d 289, 291-2 (1973)].
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F.

Breach of Contract Actions.
The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the

1.

contract, (b) the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the
amount of those damages. 59
2.

A contract will be enforced if it is "complete, definite and certain in all its

material terms, or contain[ s] provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced
to a certainty. 60
3.

G.

The question as to the existence of an oral contract is one of fact. 61

Statute of Frauds.
1.

An interest in real property (other than leases not exceeding one year)

cannot be created without a written instrument. 62
2.

An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from

the making of the agreement is invalid unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or his agent. 63

H.

Statute of Limitations.
1.

Generally, a cause of action accrues when one party may maintain a

lawsuit against another. 64
2.

A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for limitation

purposes. 65

59

Franklin Building Supply Company, Inc. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 637, 339 P.3d 357, 362 (2014).
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890 P.2d 714, 721 (1995).
61 Id.
62
Idaho Code§ 9-503.
63
Idaho Code § 9-505.1.
64
Western Corporation v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 151, 158 P.3d 313,314 (Ct. App. 2006).
65
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511,517,198 P.3d 740,746 (Ct. App. 2008).
60
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3.

The question of when the breach occurred is a factual one. 66 Courts must

look to the record for sufficient and competent evidence to support the findings. 67

V.
A.

DISCUSSION

The Sandow Affidavit.
The Stallings object to "any portion" of the Sandow Affidavit that references

statements made by Gregory or by Richard Stallings. 68 The Stallings argue that such
references are hearsay. 69 They also contend that the references lack foundation because
' [t]here is no indication when, where, or with whom the discussions occurred. " 70 Gregory
did not respond to the Stallings' Objections to Affidavits.
The Stallings' broad objection to any references to statements by Gregory or
Richard Stallings does not provide appropriate identification of the specific statements
the Stallings seek to exclude. This Court should not be required to search the record for
error. 71
Next, the Stallings object to paragraph 5 of the Sandow Affidavit on the grounds
ofrelevance. 72 In paragraph 5, Sandow states:
Exhibit O is a letter I received from Terri Merkley relative to a loan made
to Richard and Eileen Stallings in the matter, directed to me. 73
Exhibit 0, attached to the Sandow Affidavit, evinces the December 6, 2012 letter from
Terri L. Merkley, owner/broker of Empire Funding, to Sandow. 74

66

Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho at 770, 890 P.2d at 721.
Id.
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 1, 1 1.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71
Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855,857, 736 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1987).
72
Stallings' Objections to Affidavit, at p. 1, 12.
73
Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 5
74
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit 0.
67
68
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Sandow may testify as to correspondence he received. As the Stallings point out,
however, nothing in Exhibit O appears to be relevant to Gregory's claims in this lawsuit.
For these reasons, paragraph 5 of the Sandow Affidavit, together with Exhibit 0, shall be
stricken for purposes of the Stallings' Motion.
The Stallings then object to paragraph 6 of the Sandow Affidavit as hearsay and
lacking foundation. 75 Paragraph 6 of the Sandow Affidavit reads:
I understand they had a joint, mutual interest because of their
separate, individual investments in the property in question. 76
This statement is corroborated by the affidavit of Richard Stallings, wherein
Richard Stallings states that both he and Gregory bought real property, the portions being
contiguous to each other, Gregory's property was transferred to Pioneer Point, LLC and
then to Richard Stallings, and that Richard Stallings sold both pieces of property. 77 The
Stallings Affidavit provides dates of the land sale purchases and sales. 78

Because

Sandow's statements in paragraph 6 of his Affidavit are corroborated by the Stalling
Affidavit, paragraph 6 of the Sandow Affidavit shall be admitted.
Next, the Stallings object to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Sandow's Affidavit as
violating the best evidence rule. 79 Paragraphs 8 and 9 read:
On November 14, 2012 I received an email from Richard Stallings
(Exhibit M). In that email, he advised of his proposed division of
Stallings and Gregory's mutual interest, by proposing to pay, through me,
Jon Gregory's share in their mutual interests upon sale of the property. 80

Stallings' Objections to Affidavit, at p. 1, 13.
Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 6.
77
Stallings Affidavit, at pp. 1-2.
78 Id.
79
Stallings' Objections to Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 4.
80
Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 8.
75

76
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On or about December 27, 2012, I received a second email. A statement
from Richard Stallings, proposing that the amount to be paid to Jon
Gregory was $155,482.28 (Exhibit N). 81
Exhibit M to the Sandow Affidavit is an e-mail communication from Richard
Stallings to Garrett Sandow, dated November 14, 2012. 82
handwriting on it, which shall not be considered.

It contains unidentified

Exhibit N reveals a statement to

Richard Stallings, showing an amount due of $144,517.72. 83
Sandow may testify as to what he received by e-mail, but Exhibits Mand N are
the best evidence of the information communicated in those e-mails. Exhibits M and N
shall be admitted for consideration of the Stallings' Motion, except for the unidentified
handwriting on Exhibit M.
The first sentence of paragraph 8 to the Sandow Affidavit shall also be admitted.
The second sentence of paragraph 8 shall not be considered, since Exhibit M is the best
evidence of the November 14, 2012 e-mail's contents.
The portion of paragraph 9 to the Sandow Affidavit which reads "On or about
December 27, 2012, I received a second email, a statement from Richard Stallings .... "
The remainder of paragraph 9 shall not be considered.
Finally, the Stallings object to paragraph 11 of the Sandow Affidavit as hearsay,
lacking foundation, and in violation of the best evidence rule. 84 Sandow' s paragraph 11
states:
I did not hear much more on the matter from Mr. Stallings or Mr. Gregory,
until I received an email from Tim Cobb, another individual who is
involved in the matter peripherally. The email was dated September 9,

81
82
83
84

Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, ,r 9.
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit N.
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ,r 5.
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2013, and included an email from Richard Stallings essentially advising
me that he had decided that he was not going to pay Jon Gregory anything
for his mutual interests, and that according to him, there was no money
owed to Jon Gregory from the current sale. I passed that information on to
Jon Gregory, as I had the other emails (Exhibit I). His decision not to pay
Jon Gregory was a breach of my understanding of their joint venture and
mutual interest in the property. 85
Sandow may testify as to his contacts with various persons, and the dates of those
contacts. The contents of Exhibit I should be interpreted pursuant to the best evidence
rule: that is, the communications in Exhibit I speak for themselves.

The underlined

portions of paragraph 11 shall be considered within the adjudication of the Stallings'
Motion, as shall be the contents of Exhibit I.

The remainder of the paragraph (the

portions that are not underlined), shall not be considered.
B.

The Gregory Affidavit.

The Stallings also object to paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the Gregory Affidavit on the
basis of relevance. 86 Those paragraphs read as follows:
Over the course of my working with Summit Mortgage on several
projects, including this one, it was common for me to purchase the original
property, and then transfer my interest to them or subordinate my interest
so they could complete their part of the development. I generally received
at the end of each project with Summit reimbursement for my
expenditures for the ground, and 50% of any profits or proceeds from the
development or sale thereof.
We also generally set up a limited liability company for each of the
several projects - and used the name Pioneer Point, LLC for this particular
project.
I may have transferred my interest to Summit on paper, but it was a
similar transaction and business operation that we had engaged in several
times before. 87

Sandow Affidavit, at p. 3, ,r 11 (emphasis added).
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2,
87
Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, ,r,r 5, 6, 7.
85

86
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In his Complaint, Gregory alleges that Summit Development is also known as
Pioneer Point, LLC. 88 Whether or not Gregory engaged in a similar course of conduct
with regard to land development in the past is not relevant insofar as the statute of
limitations and the Statute of Frauds, which are ultimately dispositive of Gregory's
lawsuit, are concerned.

Therefore, any facts regarding former courses of dealings

between Gregory and Summit Development, also known as Pioneer Point, LLC, shall not
be considered in the adjudication of the Stallings' Motion.
The Stallings object to paragraph 8 of the Gregory Affidavit on the grounds of
relevance and stating a legal conclusion. 89 In paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, Gregory
testified:
Further, in order to assist with the transition and sale of the property, I had
been required to subordinate my interest to that of Pioneer Point, given the
investments of some of the parties they were working with to come up
with the money. Nevertheless, that did not change mutual interests and
ownership that Richard and I had between ourselves. 90
That Gregory transferred his interest in the property to Pioneer Point is found
elsewhere in the record. 91 Ownership of property, on the other hand, is determined by the
law, rather than any tacit understanding between parties. Therefore, the second sentence
in paragraph 8 of the Gregory Affidavit shall not be considered herein.
The Stallings object to paragraph 9 of the Gregory Affidavit as hearsay and
lacking foundation. 92 Paragraph 9 states:
I was aware that Pioneer Point LLC had transferred back their interest in
the property to us or Mr. Stallings because they had no funds to pay for

88

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 18.
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, 17.
90
Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 8.
91
See: Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 4.
92
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, 18.
89
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construction funding, and wanted us to take the project back over by
quitclaim deed but we continued to work on sale together in order to try
and accomplish a liquidation of the property that would benefit our
interest mutually. 93
The reasons for the transfer of property ownership, and the continuing business
relations of the parties have no bearing upon the dispositive statute of limitations and
Statute of Frauds determinations. Accordingly, paragraph 9 of the Gregory Affidavit
shall not bear further consideration herein.
The Stallings object to paragraph 11 of the Gregory Affidavit "as lacking
foundat6ion as to what if anything Richard Stallings was using Garrett Sandow for." 94
Gregory may testify as to the reasons why he consulted attorney Garrett Sandow.
Gregory may not speak for Richard Stallings, however. That portion of paragraph 11
which refers to the reasons why Richard Stallings consulted Sandow shall not be
considered in this opinion.
The Stallings complain of Gregory's statements in paragraph 12 of his Affidavit
as hearsay and lacking foundation. 95 In paragraph 12 of his Affidavit, Gregory affies:
Mr. Stallings agreed to pay me the balance of any funds from the sale after
he received back his original investment amount. That was the reason he
forwarded the letter from Terry Merkley (Exhibit 0) from Empire Funding
to establish his original investment amount minus the $30,000.00 draw he
had already taken. He also received at least one extension fee to his credit
from the buyers, which was an additional several thousand dollars. 96
Richard Stallings' November 14, 2012 e-mail to Garrett Sandow97 states:
I plan on taking the following amounts and then giving the balance of each
draw to Garret Sandow for Johns disperse I [sic].

Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, ,r 9.
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ,r 9.
95
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ,r 10.
96
Gregory Affidavit, at p. 3, ,r 12.
97
See: Sandow Affidavit, Exhibit M.
93

94
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First draw
second draw

106,000
150,00098

Such language may signify an intent to pay, but does not amount to a written agreement
to pay the balance of the draws to Gregory.
Although Exhibit M to the Sandow Affidavit shall be considered in adjudicating
the Stallings' Motion, Gregory's interpretation of Exhibit M shall not be considered.
Neither shall Gregory's opinion as to the reasons other people took certain actions be
considered herein.
The Stallings object to paragraph 18 of the Gregory Affidavit as a violation of the
best evidence rule. 99 Paragraph 18 reads:
On September 9, 2013, I was forwarded an email that I received from Mr.
Sandow, advising that Mr. Stallings felt he owed me nothing, and that he
was keeping all of the funds and money from the sale of the property
(Exhibit I). He also advised me that I had four years from the date of the
notice I received, September 9, 2013, to file legal action. 100
Gregory may testify as to the date he received an e-mail from Mr. Sandow. The
content of Richard Stallings' communication, contained in Exhibit I to the Sandow
Affidavit, speaks for itself. As for any legal advice Gregory received from Mr. Sandow,
that is hearsay and shall be excluded from further consideration.
C.

The Statute of Frauds does Not Apply to Gregory's Lawsuit against the
Stallings.

In support of their argument that the contract alleged by Gregory is barred by the
Idaho Statute of Frauds, the Stallings simply aver: "There is no contract, memorandum or

Id.
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, 1 11.
100
Gregory Affidavit, at p. 4, 1 18.

98
99
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written document signed by Defendants which reflect any alleged terms of a contract.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' s [sic] Complaint should be dismissed. " 101
In light of the evidence in the record, it appears an oral agreement between
Gregory and the Stallings was formed.

Gregory alleges that he wanted to develop a

parcel of land for commercial purposes. 102 He alleges that he purchased two (2) of the
four (4) desired acres of land, but sought to acquire the other two acres to complete the
planned development. 103 He contends that Richard Stallings agreed to purchase the other
two acres of land for the purpose of going into partnership with Gregory to commercially
develop the entire four acres. 104
Richard Stallings concedes he did purchase the contiguous two-acre parcel. 105 In
his November 14, 2012 e-mail to Garrett Sandow, Stallings wrote:
The entire project was under John [sic] watch. I totally left everything up
to his disgression [sic]. I am very disappointed that we sold this property
under his advisment [sic] to some one who harrowed [sic] hard money on
it. This ruined potential profits thst [sic] would have been good for both
ofus.
My mistake was putting this in Johns [sic] hands. I feal [sic] if he would
have been more ascertive [sic] we would not be in this position. For this
reason I feal [sic] that !should [sic] at least get the money that I invested
into this property back. 106
Gregory alleges that Summit Development, also known as Pioneer Point LLC
became involved as the developers for the commercial venture. 107 Gregory transferred his

101

Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 4.
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 14.
103
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 15.
104
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2,116, 7.
105
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 1, 1 2.
106
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
107
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 18.
102
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interest in his two-acre parcel to Summit Development. 108 He asserts that the reason for
the transfer in interest was to allow Summit Mortgage to "complete their part of the
development. " 109
Gregory maintains that the real estate market crashed around 2007 and defeated
his (and Richard Stallings') mutual efforts to develop the properties, causing Gregory and
the Stallings to take efforts to sell the properties. 110 They ultimately sold the properties
for $1,086,438.89. 111 Gregory claims that the Stallings kept all of the proceeds of the
sale. 112 Richard Stallings' e-mails indicate that he initially planned to give some of the
property sale proceeds to Gregory, 113 but later determined to retain all of the proceeds for
himself. 114
In his answers to interrogatories, Gregory defined the agreement as: "The parties
were partners/a joint venture to share profits equally after consideration and repayment of
their original respective investments." 115 Garrett Sandow understood that he was to assist
Gregory in reviewing contracts and other matters relative to a mutual interest Gregory
and Richard Stallings had in certain real property. 116
Thus, the record reflects that Gregory and the Stallings formed an understanding
with regard to the commercial development of property in Rexburg, and took action in

108

Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, , 7.
Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2,, 5.
110
Gregory's Complaint, at pp. 3-4, ,, 14-18.
111
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
112
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4,, 25.
113
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
114
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
115
Affidavit of Jared M. Harris in Support of Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 14, 2018)
(hereinafter the "Harris Affidavit"), at Exhibit A.
116
Sandow Affidavit, at p. 1,, 2.
109
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furtherance of that end.

The Stallings contend that the property "got improved." 117

Although nothing in the record show what improvements were ultimately completed on
the property, the Stallings' Reply infers that indeed the nature of the parties' relationship
with regard to the two two-acre parcels of land in Rexburg had to do with improving the
property.
Furthermore, although the Stallings argue that any claim Gregory may have to the
proceeds should be against Pioneer Point LLC, 118 to whom Gregory transferred his parcel
before the parcel was transferred to Richard Stallings, 119 Richard Stallings specifically
stated that he planned to pay part of the proceeds from the property sale to Gregory. 120
Richard Stallings made no mention whatsoever of Pioneer Point LLC in his November
14, 2012 e-mail regarding the proceeds of the land sale. 121 Neither is Pioneer Point LLC
mentioned in Richard Stallings' August 27, 2013 e-mail (forwarded to Garrett Sandow on
September 9, 2013). 122 Richard Stallings never asserted, in either of his communications
regarding the payout from the land sale, that Gregory should look to Pioneer Point LLC
for his share of the sale proceeds. 123 Furthermore, on the "Seller's Final Settlement
Statement," which show the sale of the property to Rockwell Court Limited Partnership,
the "seller" is listed as Richard and Eileen Stallings. 124 Richard and Eileen Stallings

117

Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham
County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 14, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Reply").
118
Stallings' Reply, at p. 3.
119
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, ,r 5; and at Exhibit C.
120
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
121 Id.
122
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
123
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibits I, M.
124
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 1.
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signed the "Seller's Final Settlement Statement." 125 No place is included on the statement
for a signature by Pioneer Point LLC.
Instead, the record infers that the "agreement" upon which Gregory sues was
between Gregory and the Stallings. It appears that a number of complex interactions took
place in order to promote the land development project, but Richard Stallings ultimately
looked to Gregory, not any of the other third-party players, as the person to whom final
proceeds might be due.
In summary, the oral contract in this case was not a contract for the sale of land.
It was an agreement for the development of commercial property. The commercial loan

for construction of the development expected completion within seven (7) months. Thus,
the project could arguably have been performed within one year. The sale of the property
after the venture failed (or perhaps after the venture ran out of funding before ultimate
completion) was incidental to the overall agreement. 126
For these reasons, the Statute of Frauds has no bearing on this lawsuit and does
not form a basis for granting the Stallings' Motion.
D.

The Statute of Limitations for Oral Contracts Bars Gregory's Lawsuit.

The statute of limitations applicable to an oral contact is four (4) years. 127 The
Stallings argue, and the record reflects that if an agreement existed between the parties,
then the agreement was made orally. 128 Gregory counters that the parties had an express

125

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2.
See: Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho at 771, 890 P.2d at 722.
127
Idaho Code § 5-217.
128
Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 3.
126
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agreement that the parties would develop commercial and/or residential housing on the
two pieces of adjoining property purchased separately by the parties. 129
An express contract is defined as a "contract whose terms the parties have
explicitly set out." 130

On oral or parol contract, on the other hand, is defined as a

"contract or modification of a contract that is not in writing or is only partially in
writing." 131
Under Idaho law, the statute oflimitations for an action upon a contract in writing
is five years, 132 as opposed to the four-year limitation period on an oral contract. Since
the record does not reflect a written agreement between Gregory and the Stallings, the
four-year statute of limitations for oral contracts shall apply in this lawsuit.
The Stallings argue that the four-year statute of limitations upon an oral contract
would have begun to run on December 21, 2012, 133 the date both properties were sold to
Rockwell Court Limited Partnership. 134 The Stallings offer no authority for assigning the
date of sale of the properties as the start of the limitations period. 135 Gregory counters
that the four-year statute began to run on September 9, 2013, the date Gregory was made
aware that the Stallings were not going to pay or reimburse Gregory for any of his
contributions to the project out of the proceeds of the sale of the properties. 136
Assuming a contract existed between Gregory and Stallings, which is appropriate
for purposes of adjudicating the Stallings' Motion, Richard Stallings received the payout

129

Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 2-3.
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., at pp. 344-5.
131
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., at p. 347.
132
Idaho Code§ 5-216.
133
Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 3.
134
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
135
Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 3.
136
Gregory's Opposition, at p. 5.
130
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from the sale of the two properties on or about December 21, 2012. 137 On that date,
Gregory knew that the Stallings held funds, a portion of which Gregory expected to
recover.

He could have sued the Stallings on that date to recover the proceeds he

believed should have gone to him. That the Stallings might have paid Gregory in the
future would not toll or delay the running of the statute of limitations. 138
The record reflects Richard Stallings' e-mail of November 14, 2012, wherein
Stallings informed Garrett Sandow that some portion of the sale proceeds should be given
to Gregory. 139 If anything, this e-mail put Gregory on notice that, upon receipt of the
payout, Stallings should pay Gregory a portion of the proceeds.

Clearly, Richard

Stallings did not provide any portion of the proceeds to Gregory because, almost a year
later, on September 9, 2013, Mr. Sandow received notice that Stallings did not intend to
pay any part of the proceeds to Gregory. 140
As of September 9, 2013, Gregory still had over three (3) years in which to file
this lawsuit against the Stallings. He waited until September of 2017 to take action.
Unfortunately, given the fact that he could have filed suit against the Stallings as of
December 21, 2012, Gregory's failure to file his suit earlier ran afoul of the four-year
statute of limitations. His action is now barred as against the Stallings.
For these reasons, this lawsuit shall be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-217.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusions are
appropriate:

137

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396,400 (2002).
139
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
138
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1.

Portions of the Sandow Affidavit should be stricken from consideration on

summary judgment.
2.

Portions of the Gregory Affidavit should be stricken from consideration on

summary judgment.
3.

Gregory's breach of contract action is not barred by the Idaho Statute of

4.

Gregory's breach of contract action is barred by the applicable statute of

Frauds.

limitations.
VII.

ORDER

Accordingly, the Stallings' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Gregory
shall take nothing by his lawsuit against the Stallings.
A separate judgment shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 15th day of October 2018.

District Judge

140

Signed: 10/15/2018 03:30 PM

Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed by first class mail with
prepaid postage and/or hand delivered and/or sent by e-mail this 15th day of October
2018, to:
David N. Parmenter, Esq.
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
53 S. Shilling
P.O. Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Jared M. Harris, Esq.
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

□

US.Mail

D Courthouse Box

i..::J E-Mail
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US.Mail
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Filed:10/16/2018 09:48:55
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
)
and EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual, )
)
Defendants.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

CASE NO. CV-2017-1651
JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff Jon Gregory shall take nothing by his lawsuit against Defendants Richard
Stallings, an individual, and Eileen Stallings, an individual.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 15th day of October 2018.

!b~
District Judge

JUDGMENT

1
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Signed: 10/15/2018 03:33 PM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment
was mailed by first class mail with prepaid postage and/or hand delivered and/or sent by
e-mail this -1.filh__ day of October 2018, to:
David N. Parmenter, Esq.
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
53 S. Shilling
P.O. Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Jared M. Harris, Esq.
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

□

US.Mail

D Courthouse Box

✓ E-Mail

□

US.Mail

D Courthouse Box

✓

E-Mail

PAMELA W. ECKHARDT, Clerk of the Court
Signed: 10/16/2018 09:49 AM

Deputy Clerk
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Electronically Filed
10/22/2018 4:10 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.

MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY 'S FEES AND COSTS

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter
"Defendants" ) by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER
& HARRIS, and hereby moves this Court for an order awarding attorney's fees and costs incurred
in defending this matter.
Plaintiff asserted a breach of contract claim and sought attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho
Code§§ 12-120(1) and (3). As set forth in their Complaint this action was a commercial transaction
between the parties and that was the gravamen of the relationship between the parties. Therefore,
Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code§§ 12-120(1) and
(3). Further, Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY 'S FEES AND COSTS - 1

Page 158

This Motion is supported by an Affidavit and Memorandum of Costs and Fees .
./4<..

DATED this~da y of October, 2018.

BAKER & HARRIS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this _ _ day of October, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNE Y'S FEES AND COSTS
David N. Parmenter
PARMENT ER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
parlaw@gmail.com

( ) Mail
( ) Fax
( ) Hand Delivered
(/4Email
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Electronically Filed
10/22/2018 4:10 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: j harris@baker harrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,
v.
RICHARD STALLINGS , an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS , an individual,

MEMORANDUM AND
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

Defendants.
Jared M. Harris, deposes and says:
1.

That he is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, and is the attorney for
Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and has personal knowledge of the costs and attorney's
fees enumerated.
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

2.

That the following enumerated costs have been necessarily incurred in the representation of
Plaintiffs in said action and are claimed as a matter ofright pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(l)(C):
a.

Filing Fees for Answer (IRCP 54(d)(l)(C)(i) )

$ 136.00

TOTAL COSTS

$ 136.00
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ATTORNEY FEES
3.

That your I hav been engaged in the active practice of law since 1992 and is currently a
partner in the law firm of BAKER & HARRIS, Blackfoot, Idaho.

4.

That the hourly rates charged during the time period of representation of the Plaintiff
between February 14, 2018 and October 18, 2018 were as follows:
a.

5.

Jared M. Harris - $250.00 per hour.

That the hourly rate set forth in the foregoing paragraph is consistent with comparable
services and rates in southeastern Idaho during the time period involved.

6.

That the total amount of attorneys' fees is reasonable in consideration of the factors set forth
in IRCP 54(e)(3).

Description

Date
2/14/18

1

----

1

2.0

i!

375.00

$

500.00

I $
1.6
Research regarding service of complaint; Draft
$
notice of appearance; begin draftin~<1_~1_s""e_r_.- - - + - - - - - ~

1
; _

Office conference with R. Stallings regarding legal
I description issues; Telephone conference with R.
Stallings.

i

_

.5

--+-:

$

'.250.00

$

125.00

1
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400.00
150.00

6

_ ____ __-i• __ -1.0
__fe_r_en_c_e_w_i-th~R--.-S-ta_ll_in_g_s_;_ _____
1c_e_c_o_n
3_/_5_/1_8~-----+--E-x-te_n_d-ed-o-ffirequest.
Revise discovery
3/7/18

$

------j-------

Revise Answer; Research regarding statute of
frauds.

2/27/18

Amount

I

Telephone conference with R. Stallings; Draft
answer; Draft discovery request; Telephone calls to
T. Cobb; review legal descriptions.

2/27/18

I

1.5

Telephone conference with R. Stallings; Extended
office conference with R. Stallings regarding
: defense of lawsuit.

2/16/18

-

Hours

3/8/18

---------

3/13/18

Receipt and review of request for trial setting; Draft
response to request for trial setting; Draft letter to
Court; Receipt and review of Notice of hearing;
i Draft letter to R. Stallings.

-i

-

-------- -----~·

i Telephone call to and with R. Stallings.

Receipt and review of Exhibits; Draft letter to R.
Stallings.

3/20/18

-------+--

4/2/18
4/6/18

Receipt and review of answers to request form
admissions; Draft letter to R. Stallings.

i

$

100.00

.3

I

$

75.00

---+--- -~
o.oo

-----

Receipt and review of letter; Draft letter to
attorney.

.4

I;!>

- - .3T-

75.00

--------+

4/16/18

Extended office conference with R. Stallings
'. regarding status; Draft letter to attorney.

1.3

$

325.00

4/20/18

Receipt and review of discovery responses; Draft
letter to R. Stallings; Research; Draft motion for
• summary judgment, memorandum and affidavit.

2.8

$

700.00

4/23/18

; Attend pre-trial; draft letter to R. Stallings.

$

150.00

.6

$

150.00

.2

$

50.00

.6

$

150.00

3.0

$

750.00

$

75.00

2.5

$

625.00

6.0

$

1,500.00

--i

·--~

4/24/18

.6

I

-----

i

Receipt and review of Order; Draft letter to R.
• Stallings; Draft letter to attorney.

!

-·

I

5/2/18
5/10/18

I
I

• Telephone conference with R. Stalling.

!

-----·-

Receipt and review of letter; Draft notice; Draft
letter to Court.

6/4/18

Research; Revise motion for summary judgment
and memorandum,

6/6/18

Revise memorandum.

6/8/18

I

.3
--

Revise motion for summary judgment and
memorandum; Research; Extended office
. conference with R. and E. Stallings.
----~~--

6/11/18

Review documents and interplay between
documents; Conference with title company to
review legal descriptions and transactions;
Telephone conference with R. Stallings; Revise
memorandum; Office conference with R. Stalling s.
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r---- ------i $
.3
Revise memorandum.
$
Receipt a-nd-re_v_i-ew_o_f_d-is_c_o_v_ery_r_e_q_u-es_t_;D--ra-ft--~~-:~,

6/12/18
6/26/18

75.00
75 .00

letter to R. Stallings.
- -;;:~000

Extended office conference with R. Stallings;
Telephone call to and with creditor; Extended
telephone conference with title company.

6/28/18

-$----5-~~.0-0-

I,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --r--

1

Draft letter to creditor.

.3

$

75.00

7/2/18

Receipt and review of letter; Draft letter to R.
Stallings regarding mediation; Revise
memorandum, affidavit regarding motion for
summary judgment.

.6

$

150.00

7/3/18

Telephone conference with R. Stallings; Office
conference with R. Stallings to review and sign
affidavit and discuss status of case and arguments
to be presented.

.8

$

200.00

7/6/18

Research.

1.0

6/29/18

7/9/18
7/10/18

1

Research regarding statute of frauds.

$

50.00

I $

250.00

·-'$

300.00

$

100.00

.9

'$

225.00

2.0

$

500.00

.2

• Telephone conference with creditor.

-1

250.00
I

1.0

___

7/1 Vl-8~~eview judicial filings; Telephone conference witll . ----;:;attorney's office; Telephone conference with R.
Stallings.
I

I

-----i--

Draft discovery responses; Draft notice; Draft letter
to Court.

7/23/18
\

.4

'

Research regarding judgments.

7/16/18

---------

I
I

--------····-

7/24/18
1

Receipt and review of motions; Draft letter to R.
Stallings; Research; Prepare preliminary draft of
objection; prepare preliminary draft ofreply brief.

1.8_-=f-

Research; Revise brief.

7/27/18
8/8/18

Receipt and review of order; Draft letter to R.
i Stallings.

8/10/18

I Re~earch.

8/13/18

I

T
!

.3

---

Research; Revise brief.

$

75.00

200.00
~ $- - - - · 625.00
,$
2.5
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450.00

---- ~-------

8/14/18
8/20/18

Revise brief; Draft letter to Court; Telephone calls
to and with R. Stallings.

2.2

Conference with R. Stallings; Prepare for hearing.

1.8

----------·-~-----

550.00

$

--------

-------------------·

. Prepare for and attend hearing; Present argument;
: Conference with R. and E. Stallings.
9/14/18 ---r;~-~-ei_p_t~-nd-;~~-ie_w_oimi~~~-e_n_t;~-D-r~;t letter to

---

1.0

8/21/18

--- -

:$

450.00

f

250.00

.3

$

75.00

Conference with Court Clerk; Draft pretrial
memorandum; Draft motion to extend discovery
, cutoffs.

2.0

$

500.00

i Receipt and review of decision; Draft letter to R.

.4

$

100.00

R. Stallings.
10/9/18

----- -- T

~----- -··1
10/16/18

: Stallings.
10/17/18

I Prepare for and attend pretrial; Telephone

-~------+-- 1-.5--· $--;-7-5-.~~-

I conference with R. Stallings; Draft motion for
!

10/18/18

attorney's fees and costs; Draft affidavit.

I Prepare for and attend pretrial; Telephone
I conference with R. Stallings; Draft motion for
i
I

i

.6

attorney's fees and costs; Draft affidavit.

TOTAL ATTORNEY'S FEES:
7.

--~ 1----------150.00
$

I
I

53.2

I

$

13,300.00

1

To the best of my knowledge and belief the above enumerated costs and fees are correct, and
that the costs and fees claimed are in compliance with IRCP 54.

8.

That I have read the foregoing affidavit, and I hereby certify (or declare) under penalty of
perjury pursuant to the law of the State ofldaho that the foregoing is true and correct.
FURTHER your affiant saith not.
DATED this _lray of October, 2018.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
V

,,.,d.

I certify that on this __C_:-day of October, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
parlaw@gmail.com

( ) Mail
( ) Fax
( ) Hand Delivered
Email

('ji
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Electronically Filed
10/29/2018 3:55 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

DAYID N. PARMENTER
NATHAN D. RIVERA
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208)785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual and )
EILEEN STALLING, an individual
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV-2017-1651
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW the plaintiff, through counsel, David N. Parmenter, and moves the court
for reconsideration of the court's order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and
entering judgment on October 15, 2018, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11.2
(b)(1 ).

Said motion is made on the following grounds, for the following reasons:
First, even though Stallings refen-ed to a closing on or about December 21, 2012, there
was no reason for plaintiff to be at the sale, since he did not anticipate receiving funds for several
months thereafter. As set forth in the attached memorandum, or draws, the payments were to be
made to both patties in several draws, over a period of time following the actual closing.
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Second, as set forth in Exhibit N, payouts to Stallings and Gregory were to continue
through "Janumy or first part of February 2013". It is also unclear when the various investors
were paid back, but presumably that took place around or on the date of closing of December 21,
2012.
Third, based on Exhibit M, which also refe!1'ed to the first and second draw which would
be taken by Stallings, there was never any specification, as to when those draws would be
received. Mr. Stallings advised Gregory that he wonld pay off the investors fn·st, then would take
his cut, and then Gregory would be the last one to receive his shme of the funds. However, the
paTties anticipated and !mew that that would not be until sometime in 2013.
Fourth, because anticipated funds me not all paid out on the day of closing in late
December, 2012, but would rather be doled out in several draws over a period of time, Mr.
Gregory had no way of knowing when his funds would actually be received, or paid to him
during the first part of 2013. Delays in construction, which needed to be completed for payout of
the last $300,000 extended payout through the spring and summer of 2013. It was not until
Richard Stallings actually advised by email September 9, 2013, that he would not pay anything
that plaintiff became aware that he was not honoring his previous agreement. Plaintiff asserts
that at a minimum, there is a factual issue as to when the cause of action (and breach) accrued,
which still remains to be decided.
Lastly, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff has propounded discovery
request to defendants, which have not been fully or completely answered. (Exhibit 1).
Defendants have not answered plaintiffs inte1rngatories or request for production of documents.
Some of the most important documents would relate to a supposed closing, payouts, and other
funds received by defendants, or distributed by them to either themselves or to investors.
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A request for discovery was propounded to Stallings on June 21, 2018, including
inte1rngatories, request for admissions, and request for production of documents. (Exhibit A).
Stallings filed their motion for summary judgment on or about July 7, 2018 but failed to respond
to the inte1rngatories or requests for production-presumably because of the pendency of their
motion for summary judgment. They did answer the requests for admissions on July 23, 2018
(Exhibit 2).
However, they have still never provided any of the requested documents from closing, or
any information regarding the amounts or timing of draws-or communication or emails
between the parties and others----documents which may help clarify when the draws were
actually received and how much they were.
For these and other reasons, plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the court's ruling
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and entering judgment.

DAVID N. PARMENTER
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

day of

I HE~ Y CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on this Z5i' l_
t> ~ , 2018 upon the following:

Mail
~Fax
_ _ Hand Delivery

Jared M. Harris
Baker & Hanis
266 W. Bridge St.
Blackfoot, ID 83221

DAVID N. PARMENTER
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EXHIBIT A
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CENTURY MORTGAGE COMPANY
45 NORTH 300 EAST.
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84170

CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF TRUST ACCOtJN'.i'
THIS AGREEMENT, is made on December 10, 2008 by and between the undersigned Pioneer Point
LLC (Heath Johnston)and Richard and Eileen Stallings (borrower) and Century Mortgage, as
agent for. iE.vestors The Leland Alvin Laub Trust 6.78% interest: The Ludlow Trust 13.54% interest: Trrfa:n.y Metedifu .63%
interest; Laurine Meredifu 6.35% htterest: Ray Schmutz Family Trust 1.16% interest: David & Olive Esplin 2:12% interest: Howard
Bingham or Dale Bingham 2.12%: Peacock Revocable Trust 8.57% interest; Dona Randall 3.17% interest: Richard I Burch 10.58%
interest: Ray Schmutz Family Partnership 6:56% interest: Ronald A Ludlow 2.54% interest: Ea:rle Revocable Trust 1.27% interest;
Cleon & Joyce Davies 3.50% interest: Charles & Lorena Lambert 14.18% interest: Donald JLarldnLiving Trust 6.35% interest: Alan
& Dayle Baird 10.58% interest inconsideration of the granting of a loan PY lenders and iS!.S part of
said loan transaction, which loan is evidence by Note of the undersigned for $945,000."00
at 12%.interest dated December 10, 2008.

Attached hereto and by this reference made part thereof, in favor of the Lenders, and
secured by· a first Trust Deed ·on real property located in Washington County, State of
Utah, and.described as:
Property D'eiscriptio~: First Trust Deed . on• Parcel l. Rexburg, Idaho development with
student hous·ing and Parcel 3 Lot 2 Pioneer Village.
2nd Trust Deed position Parcel 2
Rexburg, ID.
The purpose of said loan is to finance a part of the cost of construction of certain
improvements upon the described premises in accordance with plans and specifications that
~ave been or will be.deposited by Borrower with the Lenders.
The parties ·aesire to set
forth the terms and conditions of this transaction, the agreement of the Parties, and the
rights and reffiedies of the Lenders, in connection with the disbursement of the proceeds
and construction of the improvements.
IT IS, THEREFORE, AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Upon the recordation of the Trust Deed, the
net proceeds of the loan will be available · to be disbursed by the Lenders to the
undersigned Borrower or others as hereinafter provided which shall be conclusively deemed
full consideration for the Note and that such consideration has fully passed and been paid
to the Borrower_
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, each of the undersign·ed
Borrower hereby irrevocably assigns to the lenders, as security for the obligation secured
by the Deed of Trust, all rights, title and interest of the Borrower i-n the undisbursed
balance. · Each of t'he undersigned Borrowers aclrnowledges that lie has no - right ·to the
moneys in the Undisbursed .!\.Ccount other than to have the same used by the :t,enders in
accordance with this Agreement, which, upon acceptance by Lenders· hereon, Lenders agrees
to do.
Borrower, jointly and severally, further agrees as follows~
1.

To commence actual construction work of the improvements to be constructed on the
property within forty-five (45) calendar days from the date of this Agreement, and
to complete the same, including all necessary utility connections, promptly· and in
any event within seven (7) calendar months from the date of this Agreement and in
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2.

accordance with the plans and specifications submitted by Borrower to and approved
by Lender, and in accordanCe with the requirements of all s·tate and local
authorities, laws and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration, Veterans
Administration, or other public authority having a futu~e interest in the long term
financing of said improVements in the finished Home.
To furnish to Lender, before any funds are.disbursed from the account, a pblicy of
title insurance satisfactory to Lender, insuring that the Trust Deed is a first lien
on t~e property. Should any work of any character be commenced on, or any materials
delivered upon or to, the real property or in connection with said improvements
prior .to the time the. Lender. approves the .title and records the Trust Deed, the
Lender, at his sole option, may apply so much of the fund in the Trust Account as
may be.required to satisfy in full all indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed and to
pay all expenses incurred in connection with the transaction and to be relieved from
any and all obl~g~tion to proceed with the loan.

3.

To make all payments '.of principal and interest in accordance with the terms of the
Note and Trnst Deed.
Interest during construction shall be computed on the full
amount· of the loan from the date of the note and such interest will be payable
,monthly by the Borrower with funds that have been set aside as a reserve for such
purpose, unless the lender shall otherwise agree in writing.
In such case, if such
interest payments are not made when due. and payable, the Lender is authorized, at
its election, to pay the same or itself from proceeds of the loan or has the option
to call 'the note due for non-payme~t of interest . .

4.

To use such funds from the net proceeds of the loan for the purposes in alicl for the
construction of said improvements which. funds are hereby assigned to the Lender for
such purpose.
To deposit in the Trust Account upon demand of Lender, such further
·sums estimated by Lender as being necessary to cover all items provided or
contemplated to be paid or expended under this Agreement.

5.

That·no materials, equipment, fixtures or any other part of the improvements shall
be purch~sed or installed under conditional sales agreement or other· arrangements
wher~tn the right is res·erved or accrues to anyone to remove or repossess· any ·such
item or to consider them as personal property.

6.

That subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the loan is to be disRursed by the
Lender to provide funds :for construction of the c·ontempiated improvements and may be
paid to any of the undersigned, or, at the option of the Lender, may .be paid to
contractors, material men a..11.d laborers, or any of them, and if. a:hy of the
undersigned are to receive a disbursement, they must furnish a signed waiver from
subcontractor who performed the work.

7.

That before requesting any payments or advances, the Borrower agrees to furnish the
Lender, if requested, lien waivers or lien subordination receipts in :Eorm and
substances satisfactory to the Lender, covering work done or materials furnished for
the-improvements.
Said documents shall show the expenditure of an amount equal to
the.amount .proposed ta be disbursed from the Account •. The Eorrower agxees.that all.
funds disbursed to any of the undersigned will be immediately used to pay bills and
charges for the labor and materials and not to use the money for any other purposes.
Borrower further agrees to keep records satisfactory to and open to the inspection
of the Lender showing that funds advanced by the Lender are used only in said
construction as ~erein specified.
Any written order, receipt or other document
sign~d by any of the undersigned shall be binding upon all of the undersigned and
the Lender shall be fully protected in acting thereupon.

8.

Not to alter in any way the construction of the improvement as shown on the plans
and specifications herein referred to.
Provided however, that in the event extras
or additions not called for in said plans and specifications are contemplated,
2
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Borrower agrees that, before any such changes, ·extras or additions are ordered or
placed into effect, he will immedi.ately notify the Lender in writing of. such
contemplated changes .
If Lender does not approve such changes Borrower hereby
agrees to immediately deposit to the Trust Account, a sum of money requested to
cover the. cost of said alterations, additions or extras.

9.

To pay all loan expenses.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such
expenses shall include all recording charges, title insurance charges, cost of
surveysJ cash deposits required to he made with.the title insurance company issuing
the title insurance policy, and cost of premiums of surety company bonds required· by
said title insurance company in connectio~ with the insurance of preliminary reports
of title, and title insurance policy or removal of title exceptions there from, fees
o:E o:i-itside appraisers, if any, Lender•s service £ee, and coSt of recordatio:tl.
Lender may also set aside reasonable reserve for estimated future loan- expenses and
foi- interest, insurance, and taxes to accrue during the period of· construc~ion,
offsite improvements, and initial tax and insurance deposits to be set aside UD.der
the terms of the Deed of Trust and for other contingencies.

10.

That anything in this Agreement contained to the contrary notwithstanding, it is
expressly understood and agreed that the loan hereunder · shall at all times be in
balance.
The loan shall be deemed to be in balance only when the Un-disbursed
proceeds of the loan, after ~revisions for all reserves ·authorized by this
Agreement,
shall equal or exceed the amount necessary, based upon Lender's
estimation of construction costs and loan expen~es, to pay for all work done or to
be done for completion of the construction of the improvements including the
installation· of fixtures and equipment.
If for any. reason, the loan should at any
· time after commencement of disbursements of the proceeds become out of bal~ce,
Borrower will, within five (5) days after written request by Lender, deposit with
the Lender an amount of cash sufficient to correct the deficiency, which deposits
shall first be exhausted before any further disbursements of the proceeds of the
Loan shall be made.

11.

That lender shall not be obligated to make advances except during the prggress of
construction, said advance-a to be made on the basis of Lender I s estimate of the
value of the work and improvements in place of the cost of completion of
construction, and of the amount of reserves required to be retained by Lender for
its protection.
Lender may retain, in addition to • all reserves, an amount
sufficient, in Lender's sole judgment, to insure that there will be proper retainage
from contractors, subcontractors, and· material man to assure their perfo:tmance Of
their contractors and to cover the contingency of insufficiency of cost estimated or
of additional expenses being incurred in relation to contracts or subcontractors.
In any event, Lender may provide a reserve for contingencies of ten (10) percent of
the estimated cost of construction.

12.

That lender shall have no responsibility, beyond the exercise of good faith, for the
character or value of any work for which payments may be made or for any claims for
mechanic! s .. liens or for extr.as that.·may. be. .asser.ted. by_ and r:la:i.me.d .. :i.Jl . .co=eQtio;n.
with any of the work performed or to be performed.
Lenders may, in its discretion,
make payments for labor and materials directly to any contractor or subcontractors
without prior approval by Borrower, and shall be held harmless by Borrower for any
payments so made by Lender in good faith.

13.

That the Lender shall have the right to inspect said property at any reasonable
time, but such inspection is for its protection only.
It is agreed that the
undersigned Borrower has or will, at its own responsibility, select all architects,
builders, contractors, subcontractors, material man, laborers, materials, equipment,
and appliances, and that Lender has no responsibility therefore.

3
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14.

That in the event· any liens or claims of lien are a~serted or filed against the
property, the Lender,. after five (5) days notice to the undersigned of its intention
so t6 do, may pay any or all of such liens or claims, •or purchase assignments
thereof, or may contest the validity of any □-f them, paying all costs and expenses
of contesting the same, including reasonable attorney's fees and all payments to be
made.out of the Trust Account, then such additional amounts may be expended by the
Lender at its option, and all funds paid or expanded by the Lender, tog-ether with
interest thereon at the rate· of sixteen percent (16%} .per annum from the date of
advance, shall be secured by the Trust Deed and shall be due and payable without
notice·on demand.

15.

That should any of the m,dersigned Borrowers default in the performance of any
agreement h~reunder; or should ~ark cease on the improvements, especially including
stoppage by the Lender under the terms of this Agreement, or for any reason
.whatsoever, for fifteen (15) calendar days; or if the improvements shall be damaged
or destroyed ·by fire or other: casualty; or in the case of death of any o:i: the
undersigned; or if a petition in bankruptcy or.under any debtor's relief law shall
be filed by or against any of the undersigned; or if any of the premises covered by
the· Trust . Deed· without the written consent of the Lender, or if any of the
undersigned makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or the filing of a lis
pendens naming any of the under~igned or any action affecting the title bf the real
property described in the Trust Deed, or if any of the undersigned have judgments
entered against them, or should any lien be asserted, filed, or recorded against the
.property; or should the Lender, in its sole discretion ·decide that the funds in the
Trust Account are insufficient to complete the construction of said improvements and
pay all charges and bills for labor and materials used in ·connection therewith; or
if it .would be imprudent to disburse funds from said Trust Account or any part
thereof, or should any condition or circumstance arise or exist at any . tiine by
reason of any governmental order, decree or . regulation, shortage of material or
labor, or for any reason whatsoever whicli:·Would pi-event or preclude· the construction
and completion of the improvement in compliance with the plans and specifications
therefore in an orderly and expeditious manner without delay, or in the e✓ent of any
other default of any nature or kind not specified herein, then in any. of such
events, at its option, the Lender may, without notice:

(a}

Declare all indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed immediately due and payable and
thereupon the Lender shall be released from all obligations to the undersigned under
this Agreement; such application shall not operate to waive or cure any default
existing under the Note or Trust Dee~, nor to invalidate any notice of Default or
any act done pursuant to such notice and shall not prejudice any rights of the
Lender uhder the Trust Deed or Note; or,

(b}

16.

Lender may take possession of the premises and let contracts for or proceed with the
finishing of the improvements, and to commence or appear in any action or
proceedings to enforce any contracts made by the undersigned in connection with or
:Eor the construction of the building as aforesai~, as the agent of the undersigned,
___and .all _sJJJTis _paid .. or __ e:,cpende.d . lly..the_J:,__ends>r _,;q;J.ds,r j:_hs,. t!?Pllfl __q_f . J:h:u! _Ag.r"'eme_µJ::, in ..
excess of the Trust Deed amount shall be considered and be an additional loan to the
undersigned and the repayment thereof, together with interest thereon at the rate of
sixteen percent (16%} per annum and shall be secured by the Trust Deed and shall be
due and payable without notice on demand.
That. the undersigned do hereby irrevocably appoint and
agent to execute and file or record any Notice which the
advisable· to protect the interest of the Lender under this
of the Trust Deed.
This appointment is hereby expressly
agent coupled with an interest and therefore irrevocable~

4
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authorize the Lender, as
Lender deems necessary or
Agreement or the security
declared or be that of an

17.

That ·no waiver or any default or breach by Borrower hereunder shall be implied from
any omission by Lender to take action on account of such default if such default
persists or is repeated and no eJ<Pres,s waiver shall affect any default other than
the default-specified in the waiver and it shall be operative only for the time and
to the extent therein stated~ Waivers of any covenant, term or condition contained
herein shall not ·be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach of the same
covenant, terms or conditions.
The consent or approval by Lender to or of any act by Borrower requiring further
consent or approval shall not be deemed to waive or render unneces~ary the consent
or approval to or of·any subsequent similar act.

18.

That the Lender shall have the right to commence, appear in, or to defend any action
or proceeding purporting to affect the right or duties of the parties hereunder, or
the _security of Lender in the ·subject property, or the payment of any funds in ·the
Trust Account and in ~onnection therewith pay necessary expenses, employ counsel ab.d
. pay his reasonable fee.- All sums paid or expended by the lender under the teri:ns of
this Agreement in additional loan to the Borrower and the repayment· thereof,
together with ·i~terest thereto as set forth herein, shall be secured by the Trust'
Deed and shall be due and payable without notice, on demand, and the undersigned
·jointly and severally agree to pay the same.

19.

That this Agreement is made and entered into for the sole protection and benefit of
Lender and Borrower, the successors and assigns of Lender and, the successor and
permitted assigns of Borrower, and no· other person or persons shall have any right
of action on this Agreement or right to the funds at any time on deposit in the
Trust Account. The un-disbursed "balance of the loan shall be property of· and under
the exclusive control of the Lender up to the time'of disbursements, and snall,not
be subject to attachment or garnish by Borrower's creditors.
20. It is h1tended that' the provisions of this Agreement are supplemental to the
provisions of the Trust Deed, and that the two documents be constructed together in
all respects.
In the event that an inconsistency between the two · documenta is
found, so that the provisions of both cannot be given effect, i t is intended that ,
the Trust Deed shall be the controlling instrument.

21.The principal amount of the loan and accrued interest thereon shall be due and
payable, if not sooner paid as set forth in the note.
If any dwelling securing· the
loan is not sold,

the loan closed to the permanent buyer,

and the release price

applied to the loan balance by the date full payment is due, Borrower will have the
option to.

22. Pay the loan in full.

_ 23 .. Must. approaclL Lender_ :to..s.ee. iL.Inve.stor. will c.onsider--all.awing Borxowex. .t:o .p.a.y. t:.o Lender a minimum extension fee equal to 1 percent of the loan amount to extend the
loan tern for a period of two months.

24. The Lender may require a reserve up to 5% of the loan amount to be held back. This
amount may be used to cover accrued interest and other expenses that may be incurred
prior to payoff.
After 30 days from end of construction, when all lien releases
become.unconditional, all outstanding obligations will be paid.

25. Borrower/Buyer may not and must not occupy home until loan is paid in full
5
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or

written approval is obtained from Lender.

26. A complete insui-ance policy of fire, liability, etc., must be taken out on· the·
project in an amount at least equal to the construction loan principal, before
construction begins and before any funds are distributed after purchase of land.
Century Mortgage should be named as loss payee and shall receive a copy of. the
policy naming Century Mortgage as loss payee.

27. Borrower to provide HWaiver of Lien'' on all ~aY!llents to subcontractors if lender
requests-

EXECUTED at

s~. GEORGE, UTl\H, this

10 th

day of

December 2008

Pioneer Point LLC
Heath Jay Johnston {Managing Member)

Heath Jay Johnston (Personally)

Richard Stallings

Eileen Stallings

ACCCEPTED

20·09 for Century Mortgage

By
Title ____________________
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Page 1 of 1
Subj:
Rexburg Property
,
Date:
11/14/2012 10:24:26 A.M. Mountain Standard Time
From:
staterecovery@hotmail.com
To:
Gsandowlaw@aol.com
Garrett Sandow
The following facts are the reasons why the.payoff on the Rexburg property should be alocated as
stated.
·
·'
1. My principle and interest paid out at the time my bank went broke was 287,000.
2. When my bank, America West closed down I had the F.D.I.C. come after me threatoning to go after
everything that I have. Niether Larkins or John had any interest or financial responsability in helping me
at all. Just because Iwas able to get out of that problem does not mean that I share that risk with
John.
·
3. Tim Cobb told me he was really disappionted in dJaling with John because he could not get him to
follow through in a promptly time. He commended m'e for getting things back in a efficient time. Tim
Cobb told me that he would not have any future dealirgs with John.
1·
;
4. This entire project was under John watch. I totally; left everything up to his disgression. I am very
disappointed that we sold this property under his advlsment to some one who barrowed hard money on
it. This ruined potential profits thst would have been good for both of us.

I

5. Since this property has drug on. I have been forced to sell some other property at a discount for
need capital on a project in Caldwell.
I
Conclusion
My mistake was putting this in Johns hands. I feal if he would have been more ascertive we would not
be in this position. For this reason I feal that Ishould at least get the mane that I invested into this

.ll g fo '- eo-o •U-0 \

property back.
Investment

.. 286,000.

$1

;LbC>1t iO~

-

30,000. ,_
:'.> 0 1 'u 0-D
r--~b:a1:an:.'.'.c::e:'.d~le::ft:__ _ _ _ _ _~2~S6 ~,:o~o o:'.:._- -j------ -------- '
I recieved a draw

I plan on taking the following amounts and then givinb the balance of each draw to Garret Sandow for
Johns disperse!:
First draw
106,000
second draw 150,000
loo

i

,

I
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Monday, November 19, 2012 AOL: Gsandowla w
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DAVID N. PARMENTER, ISB # 2441
NATHAN D. RIVERA, ISB # 8339
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, ID 83221
(208)785-5618
(208)785-4858 (fax)
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
Case No. CV-2017-1651

JON GREGORY, an individual,
Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO
DEFENDANTS

Defendants.
TO:

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and EILEEN ST ALLIN GS, an individual, by
and through his attorney of record JARED M. HARRIS of the firm BAKER &
HARRIS.
Under authority of Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Jon Gregmy

requests that the Defendants Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings answer in writing and under
oath, within thitty (30) days from the receipt hereof, the following interrogatories; pursuant to Rule
34(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Jon Gregroy requests that the Defendants
Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings produce the following documents or things for inspection or
copying at the offices of Parmenter Rivera, LLP, 53 South Shilling Street, Blackfoot, Idaho 83221,

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 1
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within thitiy (30) days hereof; and pursuant to Rule 36(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiff Jon Gregroy requests that the Defendants Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings answer in
writing and under oath by admitting or denying the following facts within thitiy (30) days from the
receipt hereof.
INTRODUCTION

In responding to these discovery requests make a diligent search of your records and furnish
all information available to you, or subject to your reasonable inquiry, including infmmation in the
possession of your attorneys, investigators, employees, agents, consultants, experts, or any other
person or persons acting on your behalf or retained by either you or your attorney.
If you cannot answer the following discovety requests in full, after exercising due diligence

to secure the infmmation to do so, so state, and answer to the extent possible, specifying your
inability to answer the remainder, and stating whatever information and lmowledge you have
concerning the unanswered portion.
These discove1y requests are deemed continuing and your answers thereto are to be
supplemented as additional information and knowledge become available to you.
INTERROGATORIES

INTERROGATORY NO. I: With respect to all witnesses who you intend or expect to call
at the trial of this action, please provide the name of the witness; the address and telephone number
of the witness; the current occupation of the witness; and a summary of the substance of the
respective expected testimony of each witness.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 2
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INTERROGATORY NO. 2: You are hereby requested to provide a list of all exhibits which
you intend or expect to utilize at the trial of this cause, giving a description of each exhibit and a
summary of the exhibits' expected relevance to the cause.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: With respect to any and all individuals not intended or expected
to be witnesses at the trial of this action, and known to you or your attorneys who have any
lmowledge regarding the particular facts and matters in dispute in this action, please provide the
name of the individual; the address and telephone number of the individual; the cunent occupation
of the individual; and a summaiy of the paiiiculai· lmowledge which each individual has pertaining
to the facts and issues involved in this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Describe each and every document or other writing in your
possession, including any written notes, memoranda or written statements of any kind, whether in
your possession, or your attorney's, which in any way pe1iain to the facts and circumstances at issue
in this paiiiculai· action.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name and address of each person whom you
expect to call as an expe1i witness at trial. For each person please provide:
(a)

A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefore;

(b)

A description of the data or other information considered by the witness in forming
the opinions;

(c)

A description of any exhibits to be used as a summaiy of or suppmi for the opinions;

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FORPRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 3
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(d)

A description of any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years;

(e)

A statement of the compensation to be paid for the testimony; and

(f)

A listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or
by deposition within the preceding four years.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please set fo1th with patticularity each and every fact upon
which you assert any of your defenses or claims and for each fact indicate the source of the fact and
how evidence will be introduced regat"ding the alleged fact.
INTERROGATORYNO. 7: For each written or verbal communications with Plaintiff or other
individuals relative to the Beck transaction and property purchase of development, please describe
the following:
a. The substance of the communication.
b. The party or patties in the communication.
c. When and where such communications took place.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please describe in detail any understanding you had with Plaintiff
in this matter, and set fmih the te1ms of any agreement, arrangement, or understanding with Plaintiff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please set fmih all terms of any arrangement of agreement with
Plaintiff, including the date it was entered into, its terms, and any alleged breach of said contract.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Have you ever been convicted of a felony? If so, please state:
(a)

The case number and Comi;

(b)

Each crime to which a guilty plea or verdict was entered;

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FORPRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 4
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(c)

The sentence enforced for each crime to which a guilty plea or verdict was entered.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11: For each of the Requests for Admissions set forth below, in
which your answer is anything but an unqualified admission, please describe in full and complete
detail the factual basis upon which said Request for Admission was answered.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Describe in detail the initial contact with Plaintiff regarding this
matter, the nature of the conversation or conversations, and what action each party took following
such cmmnunications.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Describe how and what amounts you raised to purchase and
othe1wise develop the property in question.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Describe who developed the property, and what the relationship
and duties were of each of the respective parties, as well as any third parties.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Describe what security was provided by you or any other party
to proceed with purchase, development, or constrnction on the properties, including your two acres.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Describe any and all amounts borrowed by you, including the
amounts, lenders, and timing for such loans.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Please set fmth each and eve1y fact upon which you rely in
denying that Plaintiff fu1ther sold his prope1ty !mown as G's Daily Delights LLC, and took the
proceeds from the sale and invested them in the Marian Beck prope1ty and project.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Describe each and eve1y fact upon which you deny that the
funds from G's Daily Delights LLC, were $292,629.43.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FORPRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 5
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INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Describe in detail what effmis were made to sell or liquidate
the Mary Beck prope1iy, or otherwise recoup any losses from the project, and specify who patiicipated
in those efforts.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Describe in detail the role of Rockwell Comi Limited
Patinership and any other participants, including Smnmit Development, Century Mo1igage in the
process or project.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Describe in detail you role, as well as Plaintiffs role in this
process and dividing up any respective interests that you had in the process.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Please set forth fully all facts and circumstances upon which
you asse1i that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of frauds.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Please set f01ih fully all facts and circumstances upon which
you asse1i that Plaintiffs claim is batTed by the applicable statutes oflimitations.
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Please set forth fully all facts and circU!Ilstances upon which
you assert that Defendants are not the real parties in interest. Please specify who you believe are the
real patties in interest and why.
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: Please set forth fully all facts and circumstances upon which
you asse1i that Plaintiffs have failed to join one or more persons or entities necessary for a just
adjudication.
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: Please set fmih fully all facts and circumstances upon which
you asse1i that Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FORPRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 6
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INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Please set forth fully all facts and circumstances upon which
you assert that Plaintiffs claim was caused by a fellow servant.
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Please set forth fully all facts and circumstances upon which
you assert that the contract is unenforceable for lack of or due to failure of consideration.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that you executed a Construction Loan
Agreement and Assignment of Trust. (Exhibit A)
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that you executed a Promissmy Note. (Exhibit
B).

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that you forwarded a proposal to Plaintiff,
proposing to pay the sum of $256,000.00 from the sale proceeds. (Exhibit C)
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that you forwarded a second proposal,
proposing to pay Plaintiff the sum of $155,482.28, and yourselves $144,517.72 from the sale
proceeds. (Exhibit D)
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admitthat Plaintiff had a greater financial investment
in the purchase and project than you did.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce a tme and correct copy of any letter,
memorandum, contract, exhibit, wan-anty, statement, advertisement, brochure, pamphlet, invoice,
receipt, or other document which you intend to introduce as an exhibit at trial.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 7
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Please produce correct, complete and legible

copies of every document, record or other writing identified by you in response to any of the above
Inte1rngatories. For each document produced, please state the Interrogatmy to which the document
relates.
REQUESTFORPRODUCTIONNO. 3: Please produce a true and correct copy of any letter,
e-mail, deleted e-mail, memorandum, contract, or other document which relates to the subject of this
action, or to the relationship of Plaintiff and Defendants and/or purchase or development of the Beck
Property.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce a true and correct copy of any letter,
e-mail, deleted e-mail, memorandum, warranty, statement, advertisement, brochure, invoice, receipt
or other document which relates to the purchase of development of the Beck Property or the subject
of this action.
REQUESTFORPRODUCTIONNO. 5: For each communication referred to inlnterrogatmy
No. 7, please provide a true and correct copy of any such letter, email, deleted email, memorandum,
note, or other such document.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce a copy of any and all closing or loan
documents, title reports, settlement statements, deeds, or other information from the purchase by
Defendant's of the property in question, including title company, bank, or other funding, or financial
institution documents.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce true and correct copies of any deeds
showing your ownership interest in the subject property.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 8
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce a true and correct copy of any
document showing your alleged ownership interest in the two acre parcel.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.

9: Please produce all documents regarding any

financing or loan you obtained pertaining to the property in question, including any improvements,
development or purchase therof.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce any subordination agreement you
entered into regarding the two or four acre parcels of property.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce your tax returns for years 2008
through 2015.
These requests are deemed continuing, and your answers thereto are to be supplemented as
additional infotmation, knowledge or documents become available or !mown to you.
DATED this _jJ/_ day of~2018.

JA--DAYID N. PARMENTER
Attorney for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FORPRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 9
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Si

8, I served a true and correct copy of the followingI certify that on this_ ?..,1-_day of
described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person( s) Served:

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS
( ) Mail
()() Fax
( ) Hand Delivered

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-6749

DAVID N. PARMENTER

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS - 10
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07/23/2018

MON

15,22

FAX

lil]00l/006

Law O!ffo:!Jlj Qf

BAKER & HARRIS
266 W. BRIDGE STREET
BLACKFOOT, ID 83221
Telephone (208) 785-2310
Facsimile (208) 785,6749
EwMail-jiuuris@bakerha1·rislaw.com

•)wight E. Baker, of counsel
Juod M. Harris •
Jonnthan W, Hnrris
' Al!}O Admitted in Ulnh

Web-www.bakerhorrislt1W.OOIH

July 23, 2018

Bingham County District Court
Bingham County Courthouse
501 NMaple
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Re:

Jon Gregory v. Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings
Case No. CV-2017-1651
B&H File No. 11248

Dear Madam Clerk:
Enclosed please find the following for filing in the above-entitled matl:er:
1)

Notice of Compliance.

We thank you in advance for your usual courtesy. If you have any question or concern, please do
not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,

J red M. Harris
JM8/cb

Elnolosutes
cc:
David Parmenter, via facslrt1ile (Z08) 785-4858
Richard Slullings

J;\S1td\ll1gB,
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Richttrd\Greg□ ry,

Jon\LDFI\Courl 6.wpd

07/23/2018 MON 15022

FAX

~002/006

Jared M, Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw ,com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVBNTIJ: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
l>laintiffs,

v.

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Rule 36(c)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
l'rocedure, that Defendants' answers and responses to l'laintiff s First Set of Requests for
Admissions were served upon Plaintiff, by and through his attorney of record, David N, Parmenter,
'

'

of the law firm of PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP .
'
~
DATED this 'J, '3 day of July, 2018.
BAKER & HARRtS

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE - 1

Page 192

07/23/201 8 MON 15!22

FAX

ljID003/006

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

..,.,;A'.

I certify that on this Q
aay of July, 20l8, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served;
Person(s) Served:

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCli:
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, UP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No, (208) 785-4858

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE . 2
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( ) Mail

( ,j) Fax .
(') Hand Delivered

07/23/2018 MON 15!22

FAX

lj!J004/006

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRlS

266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No, CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,
v.
i

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

DEF:ENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

Defendants.
COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through their counsel ofrecord Jared M. Harris of the
firm of BAKER & HARRIS, and pursuant to Rule 36, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, responds to
l>laintiffs First Set of Requests for Admissions to Defendants as follows:

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REOlJEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that you executed a Construction Loan
Agreement and A~signment of Trust, (Exhibit A)
RESJ.'ONSE: No Exhibit A was attached, accordingly deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that you executed a Promissory Note, (Exhibit
B),

D:EFENDANTS'' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS . 1
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07/23/2018 MON 15022

~005/006

FAX

RESPONSE: No Exhibit B was attached, accordingly deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NQ. 3; Admit that you forwarded a proposal to Plaintiff,
proposing to pay the sum of $256,000.00 from the sale proceeds. (Exhibit C)
RESPONSE: No Exhibit C was attached, accordingly deny.
REQUEST

FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that you forwarded a second proposal,

proposing to pay Plaintiff the sum of $155,482.28, and yourselves $144,517.72 from the sale
proceeds. (Exhibit D)
RESPONSE: No Exhibit D was attached, accordingly deny.
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that Plaintiff had a greater financial investment
in the purchase and project than you did.

RESPONSE; Defendant does not know the extent of Plaintiff's financial investment.
Defendant has made reasonable inquiry and only knows what Defendant paid for his property.
Information that he knows or can easily be obtained is insufficient to enable him to more fully admit
or deny this allegation .
...a-

DATED tliis ~ day of July, 2018,
BAKER & HARRIS

DEFENDANTS'' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FlRST SET OF Rll:QUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS - Z
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FAX

~006/006

CERTIFlCATE OF SERVlCE
I certify t4at on this g,;f~ of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Pcrson(s) Served:

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO Pl,AINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
David N. l'armenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

Mail
(

Fal(

~ ) Hand Delivered

DEFENDANTS' llESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS - 3
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Electronically Filed
10/29/2018 3:55 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

DAYID N. PARMENTER
NATHAN D. RIVERA
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208)785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

CaseNo. CV-2017-1651

)
vs.

)
)
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual and )
EILEEN STALLING, an individual
)
Defendants.
)
_______________)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW the plaintiff, through counsel, David N. Parmenter, and submits the
following memorandum, in support of his motion for reconsideration.

I. Statute of Limitations.
Both parties recognize this case hinges upon the application of the four-year statute of
limitations for oral contracts, LC.§ 5-217. The generally accepted rnle is the statute of
limitations begins to run when a breach of the contract occurs, or a party reasonably should have
known a breach occurred.
In addressing this issue, the Court stated as follows:
Assuming a contract existed between Gregory and Stallings, which is appropriate
for purposes of adjudicating the Stallings' Motion, Richard Stallings received the
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payout from the sale of the two prope1iies on or about December 21, 2012. On
that date, Gregory knew that Stallings held funds, a portion of which Gregory
expected to recover. He could have sued the Stallings on that date to recover the
proceeds he believed should have gone to him. Order Granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, page 22, 23.
Based upon this paragraph, we believe the Comi dete1mined that all funds were paid to
Stallings at closing on December 21, 2012. This factual finding is in enor. Neither paiiy to this
suit was paid in full on December 21, 2017. Only a p01iion of the proceeds was paid to Stallings
on December 21, 2012. Based upon Exhibit "N," it appears the sum of $93,697.01 was paid to
Stallings on that date. (See line entitled "First payment" on Exhibit N). Exhibit M also alluded to
at least two draws, which is what the parties had anticipated.
However, and this is absolutely critical to this lawsuit, the remaining $300,000.00 was
paid over time, after the date of closing referred to as December 21, 2018 .. The remaining
$300,000.00 was paid over the course of several draws in 2013, pursuant to the Real Estate
Option Agreement with the purchaser, Memphis Development Group. Pursuant to the Real
Estate Purchase Agreement these funds were to be paid as the development progressed to
completion.
If the Corui looks closely at Exhibit "N," Richai·d Stallings indicates in his "Statement"
(which was dated December 27, 2012 - after the closing date) that the remaining $300,000.00
was anticipated in January or February, 2013. It was a portion of those funds that were to be paid
to Gregory. Stallings even sets out his proposed distribution to each paiiy to happen when the
rest of the money is paid - later in 2013-in Exhibit N ..
Unfortunately, as many construction projects experience, delays caused the draws to be
extended through the summer of 2013. At all times, Mr. Gregory was assured he would get a
p01iion of the final draw received.
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Around the date of August 27, 2013, Stallings was to receive the final draw. (We are
unsure as to the exact date, as discovery responses for intenogatories and request for production
of documents from Defendants were severely overdue and never answered). It was at this time
Stallings sent an email to Tim Cobb, a representative of the Buyer making payments to Stallings,
which finally indicated he would not pay any portion to Gregory. (Exhibit I) This email was
forwarded to Ganett Sandow on September 9, 2013, and received by Gregmy on September 12,
2013. This was the first time Stallings declined to pay a portion of the draws to Gregory.
As cited by this Court, the question of when a breach occuned is a factual one. Spence v.
Howell, 126 Idaho at 770, 890 P.2d at 721. The record before this Court establishes that a
substantial portion of the funds were paid through 2013. As late as August 27, 2013, Stallings
was receiving funds from the sale. This was not communicated to Gregory until at least
September 9, 2013 (the date of the email to Ganett Sandow), or a few days later when it was
delivered to Gregory on September 12, 2013. Either way, this lawsuit was filed within the fouryear statute oflimitations, based on the breach occuning when Gregory learned of it, or
reasonably should have learned of it.
At a minimum, there is a factual issue to be determined on when the cause of action
accrued. With factual issues remaining, we respectfully request the District Court reconsider its
decision and deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
DATED this Z1Jay of

!}<ZfD,¼IL , 2018

~
DAYID N. PARMENTER
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HE~Y CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on this~'{ L,
day of
(},
2018 upon the following:

N- ,

Mail
_.::::_Fax
_ _ Hand Delivery

Jared M. Hanis
Balcer & Harris
266 W. Bridge St.
Blackfoot, ID 83221

DAVID N. PARMENTER
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rage 1 or 1
From: Tim Cobb <tim@Constructionenhancement.com>
To,: <;l~andowlaw <Gsandow/aw@aol.com>
Subject: Fwd: Rexburg Property
Date: Mon, Sep 9, 2013 5:26 pm

:r.

GarrettHope you are doing well... I received the below from Richard Stalling
s in the past few weeks,, and then
followed up with a call to him and conversation, in which he mentioned
some of the items that W'iJnl Wrong in·
this deal.
Give me a call when you get a moment.
509-990-2324
Sent from Tim's iPad
Begin forwarded message: _
From: "State Recovery, Inc.. " <staterecovery@hotmail.com:>

Date:.August27, 2013, 2:01:42 PM PDT
To: Tim Cobb <tim@Constructionenhan'cement.com>

Subject: Rexburg Property

Tim I have been_ doing a lot of thinking i~ reference to John Gregory
and the sale of the Rexburg
property. When John had the IRS-call me it really caught me_ off guard.
In that they asked nie if I
had anything to do with John Gregory alid I assured them that we had
no partnership and· that I
owed him no money in this transaction. Then shortly after that John
told me that in selling of th·e
property that the buyer only wanted to deal with one person not two,
I thought that was strange .
but said nothing at that lime. Latter I learned that the whole reason
for this is because the IRS is
after John for past taxes. I am very unhappy with John in trying to put
me in the middle· of his
problems .. As 1· review this entire project' I was no more than an investo
r in that John made all the
decisions on this property. The only-thing I did is purchase my ground
and John thought he.could
market it. About two years ago John called up and said for us to go
up to Rexburg and sign some
papers. We tliought we· WE;lre selling theI property and when we got
up to Rexburg they had us
sign a guarantee for 950,000.-00. The closing agent said we were in
good shape anc( it was a
normal procedure. John should have said something to me-. I am upset
that John allowed this
project.to borrow hard money that took all the profits .. I look at the opportu
nity cost of this project
that was given away through Johns poor management of this-property,
I feel that I should get the·
full opportunity cost back on my risk of my investment. Beside the opport
unity cost, by John ..
having_ me talk to the IRS put me in a position that I am very uncom
fortable with, I feel John is .
way out of line in putting me in any position that could threaten my financia
l position. In
.
conclusion I feel in order for me to get a return on my Investment there
is no money owed to John
from the current sell.
·

Thank you
Richard Stallings

STATE RECOVERY
!00MA RKLN

BLACKFOOT, ID 83221
208-78 5-659]

http://mail.aol.com/3 8022-111/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.aspx
Page 202

9/10/2013

EXHIBITM

Page 203

Page I of I
Subj:
Rexburg Property
,
Date:
11/14/2012 10:24:26 A.M. Mountain Standard Time
From:
staterecovery@hotmail.com
To:
Gsandowlaw@aol.com
Garrett Sandow
The following facts are the reasons why the.payoff op the Rexburg property should be alocated as
stated.
·
·
1. My principle and interest paid out at the time my bank went broke was 287,000.
2. When my bank, America West closed down I had the F.D.I.C. come after me threatening to go after
everything that I have. Niether Larkins or John had any interest or financial responsability In helping me
at all. Just because Iwas able to get out of that problem does not mean that I share that risk with
John.
·
3. Tim Cobb told me he was really disappionted in dJaling with John because he could not get him to
follow through in a promptly time. He commended m'e for getting things back in a efficient time. Tim
Cobb told me that he would not have any future dealirigs with John.

,.

'

4. This entire project was under John watch. I totallYi left everything up to his disgression. I am very
disappointed that we sold this property under his advisment to some one who barrowed hard money on
it. This ruined potential profits thst would have beeri good for both of us.

I

5. Since this property has drug on. I have been forced to sell some other property at a discount for
need capital on a project in Caldwell.
I
Conclusion
My mistake was putting this in Johns hands. I feal if he would have been more ascertive we would not
be In this position. For this reason I feal that Ishould at least get the mane, that I invested into this

,on\
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property back.
Investment

.. 286,000.

I recieved a draw

30,000. ,_
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I plan on taking the following amounts and then givinb the balance of each draw to Garret Sandow for
Johns disperse!:
j
•
First draw
106,000
second draw 150,000
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STATEMENT
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Electronically Filed
10/29/2018 3:55 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

DAYID N. PARMENTER
NATHAN D. RIVERA
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208)785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual

)

)
Plaintiff,

)
)
vs.
)
)
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual and )
EILEEN STALLING, an individual
)
Defendants.
)

CaseNo. CV-2017-1651
AFFIDAVIT OF JON GREGORY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Jon Gregory being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1. I am the plaintiff in this matter.
2. I was aware of the closing scheduled on December 21, 2012, but knew that I had no
money due at that time, because of further conditions, development, and draws. The agreement
under the Real Estate Option Agreement with Memphis Development Group (Exhibit X),
provided for a purchase price of $800,000, as well as reimbursement to me and Stallings for
reimbursement of engineering costs and existing infrastructure in the snm of $300,000, which
"cost shall be paid no later than 50% completion of the final development."
3. Exhibit N specifies that Stallings did receive some payment and credits around the
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time of closing-but further specifies that we would be receiving draws in January or early
Febrnary 2013.
4. The constrnction project took longer to complete than anticipated, thus delaying the
payouts or draws to me and Stallings for several months, well into 2013. The draws were sent
directly to Stallings, but it was my understanding that there were several smaller draws paid out
over the spring and summer of 2013. Further, Stallings had advised me that I would receive my
money last-from the final draw or draws.

5. I continued to receive information regarding the progress of the development and
assurances that the draws would be forthcoming through 2013, until I actually received
information by email from Stallings to Tim Cobb and forwarded to Mr. Sandow (as of
September 9, 2018) that he did not intend to pay me, as he previously had agreed (Exhibit I).
FURTHERAFFIANT SAYETHNOT.
1

Dated thisa day of_0_ _ _PJ_t~/2-., 2018.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
Countyof~~ )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

Mycmnexprs:

'.Z3_ day of De,,~w

11-/11ci/z.1..
State of Idto, residing at:;:?"
therein

-::VOc d-\fJ.o
MARITZA WHITE
·-,·
NOTARY PUBLIC· STATE OF IDAI 10
COMMISSION NUMBER 60029
'
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 12·16-2Ull.
!.

s.r---------=·--~. .;
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rage 1 or

From: Tim Cobb <tim@Con~tructionenhancement.com>
To,: C3sandowlaw <Gsandowlaw@aol.com>
Subject: Fwd: Rexburg Property
Date: Mon, Sep 9, 2013 5:26 pm
GarrettHope you are doing well... I received the below from Richard
Stallings in the past few weeki,, and then
followed up with a call to him and conversation, in which he mentio
ned some of the items that WE'lnt wrong in·
this deal.
Give me a call when you get a moment.
509-990-2324
Sent from Tim's iPad
Begin forwarded message: .
From: "Slate Recovery, Inc.. " <staterecovery@hotmail.c
om:>
Date:.August27, 2013, 2:01:42 PM PDT
To: Tim Cobb <tim@Constructionenharicement.com>

Subject: Rexburg Property

Tim I have been_ doing a lot of thinking i~ reference to John Grego
ry and the sale of the Rexburg
property. When John had fhe IRS-call me it really caught me_
off guard. In that they asked me if I
had anything to do with John Gregory a~d I assured them that
we had no partnership and· that I
owed him no money in this transaction. Then shortly after that
John told me that in selllng of the
property that the buyer only wanted to deal with one person not
two, I
but said nothing at that time. Latter I learned that the whole reason thought th·at was strange .
for this is because the IRS is
after John for past taxes. I am very unhappy with John in trying
to put rne in the middle· of his
problems .. As I-review this entire projec flwas no more than
an investor in that John made all the
decisions on this property. The only·thing I did is purchase my
ground and John thought he .could
market it. About two years ago John called up and said for us
to go up to Rexburg and sign some
papers. We thought we WE;!re selling the' property and when we
got up to Rexburg they had us
sign a guarantee for 950,000.00. The closing agent said we were
in good shape and it was a
normal procedure. John should have said something lo me.
I am upset that John allowed this
project.to borrow hard money that took all the profrts .. I look al
the opportunity cost of this project
that was given away through Johns poor management of this-pr
operty, I feel that I should get the·
full opportunity cost back on my risk of my Investment. Beside
the opportunity cost, by John .
having. me talk to the IRS put me in a position that I am very
uncomfortable with. I feel John is .
way out of line in putting me in any position that could threate
n my financial position. In
conclusion I feel in order for rne to get a return on my Investment
there ls no money owed to John
from the current sell. ·
·

Thank you
Richard Stalliugs

STATE RECOVERY
I00MA RKLN
BLACKFOOT, ID 83221
208-785-6591
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X
REAL ESTATE OPTION AGREEMENT
Contract ID #VP1108

THIS REAL ESTATE OPTION AGREEMENT (the "Option Agreement") is entered
into as of July 19. 2011 by and between John Gregory and or Assigns ("Seller'') located at
P.O .. Box 1296 Blackfoot. ID 8322, and Memphis Development Group. its successors
and/or assigns ("Purchaser''), located at 411 O Eaton Avenue. Suite A. Caldwell. Idaho.
83607.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and
other valuable consideration received, Seller is willing to grant Purchaser an Option to
purchase the Option Property on the terms and conditions set forth herein:
1.

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION:
The property is located at and is described as Four (4) + acres on the North side of
west J1h South commonly known as Pioneer Pointe in Rexburg, Idaho (full legal
description to be included in final closing documents agreeable to Purchaser). an
recorded plat, see 'Exhibit A', together with all of Seller'.s right, title, and interest in all
common areas, amenities, appurtenances, fixtures, chattels, mineral rights and the
underlying fee land (collectively referred to as the "Option Property").

2.

GRANT OF OPTION:
Seller hereby grants to Purchaser the exclusive right and option to purchase. the
Option Property on the terms and conditions set forth herein ("the Option").

3.

PURCHASE PRICE:
The purchase price shall be Eight Hundred Thousand ($800,000.00) Dollars. In
addition Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for c_ost of engineering plans and existing
infrastructure a sum of Three Hundred Thousand ($300,000.00) Dollars, said cost
shall be paid no later than 50% completion of the final development. Third party
verification of percentage completion shafl be approved by both Purchaser and Seller.
In addition said cost shall be carried out under the terms of an AIA contract between
the Purchaser and Seller to be completed at land closing.

4.

EXERCISE OF OPTION:
The Purchaser may exercise the Option at any time after the execution of this Option
Agreement and prior to the expiration of the Option Term by notifying Seller of its
intent to exercise the Option.

5.

OPTION TERM:
The term of the Option shafl commence upon execution of this Option Agreement and
automatically expire if the Option' is not exercised by December 31"1, 2011 or extended
· as provided in Section 11 herein.

COi Option Agreement 1
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6.

OPTION PAYMENT:
A Five thousand ($5,000.00) Dollar Option Payment shall be placed in Purchaser's
agent's trust account in the form of a note upon execution of the Option Agreement by
Seller and Purchaser. Upon Purchaser's acceptance and approval of all items listed
under "Initial Due Diligence Items" in Section 8 and upon receipt of approvals for
financing and other items as listed in Section 9, "Conditions Precedent to Option
Payment," the Option Payment shall be deemed nonrefundable, Said time to meet
these requirements not to exceed December 151h 2011. Purchaser shall notify Seller in
writing indicating the election to proceed and will release the Five Thousand
($5,000.00) Dollar note Option Payment (the "Option Payment") to the Seller. The
Option Payment shall be applied against the Purchase price as of the Closing Date.

7.

INITIAL DUE DILIGENCE PERIOD:
Purchaser shall have one hundred fifty (145) days following the receipt from Seller of
the "Initial Due Diligence Items" listed below to review said items and notify the Seller
in writing of (a) its approval and acceptance of the Initial Due Diligence items, which
approval and acceptance shall not be unreasonably withheld, and its election to
proceed, or (b) if one or more of the Initial Due Diligence Items are not unacceptable,
the reason(s) for not approving such item(s). In the event any such items are
unacceptable to Purchaser, Seller shall have 10 business days following receipt of
Purchaser's notificiation to notify Purchaser of any actions it intends to take to address
the unapproved item to Purchaser's satisfaction. If any such item remains unapproved
by Purchaser for any reason, Purchaser shall have the option of waiving the item and
electing to proceed, or terminating this Option Agreement. In the event Purchaser
elects not to continue this transaction during the initial Due Diligence Period, then this
Option Agreement shall be null and void and all option notes or payments shall be
returned to the Purchaser and neither party shall have any further liability or
responsibility related to this transaction.

8.

INITIAL DUE DILIGENCE:
No later than 15 business days following execution of this Option Agreement Seller
shall provide Purchaser with:

A. A preliminary title commitment including copies of all easements and other
agreements in effect with respect to all or a portion of the Property, all permits, all
tax statements and notices of actual or proposed adjustment of tax valuations,
and all appraisals, topographical maps, geotechnical or soil studies, feasibility
studies, engineering studies, utility locations, environmental and Hazardous
Materials reports and studies and other reports and studies relative to the Option
Property or its use or development in Seller's possession and/or control;
B.

Copies of all correspondence in Seller's possession and/or control with all
· governmental entities relative to the Option Property;
·

COi Option Agreement 2
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C. A copy of all current leases, maintenance/service contracts and agreements, and
any other contracts relating to the ownership, operation and maintenance of the
Option Property, if any;
D.

9.

Evidence as to local improvement districts and governmental assessments
affecting the Option Property and proposed assessments and easements.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO OPTION PAYMENT:
Conditions precedent to making the Option Payment non-refundable shall include:

A. Zoning:
The Option Property is currently zoned {Medium Residential 2). Purchaser wishes
to develop the Option Property as Multi-Family Apartments. The Purchaser's
proposed development shall consist of a minimum of ~(60) units of residential
apartment housing units. This Option Agreement is contingent upon the
completion of all planning and zoning approvals required by the City of Rexburg
and all other government entities having jurisdiction over the proposed
development for said density requirement, Seller to support the proposed use.
Purchaser's application for such approvals shall not be unnecessarily delayed.
B.

Entitlements:
All federal, state, county and city permits, approvals and licenses necessary for
Purchaser's intended development of the Property including any zoning changes,
annexations, site plan approvals, variances or platting required (including legal
access to the parcel). This shall be deemed to include confirmation of the
availability to the Option Property at reasonable expense of water, sewer, gas,
power, telephone, cable and all other necessary utilities, but does not include the
building permits required for construction of the proposed development.

C. Financing:
Commitments for all financing including but not limited to Low Income Housing
Tax Credits, Federal HOME funds, other HUD or USDA funding, Federal Home
Loan Bank loans and/or grants, construction and permanent loans, and
investment partnership approvals. It is expressly understood that said
commitments will be contingent upon completion and approval of a Phase 1
Environmental Site Assessment and, if direct federal funding is involved, a federal
environmental review conducted in accordance with the National Environmental
Policies Act of 1969 (NEPA).
10. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR CLOSING:
In addition to the conditions described in Section 9, which shall be conditions
precedent for closing as well as conditions precedent for making the Option Payment
non-refundable, the following conditions shall be additional conditions for closing:
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A.

SuNey:
Purchaser's receipt and review, at Purchaser's expense, of an acceptable
ALTA suNey of the Option Property from a licensed suNeyor, and
Purchaser's approval of the same, which shall not be unreasonably withheld.

B.

Deed:
Purchaser's receipt and appoval, which shall not be unreasonably withheld, of a
good arid sufficient warranty, free of all liens and encumbrances not previously
approved by Purchaser, except: for:
1. All easements, rights of way, covenants and restrictions of record approved by
Purchaser.
2. Current and future year's real estate taxes.
3. Assessments existing as of the date of this Option Agreement.
4. Zoning and other governmental laws and regulations provided none of the
foregoing interfere with the intended use of the Option Property by Purchaser.

C. Status of Property:
As of ttie closing date, the Subject Property shall be free of all occupants. tenants
and personal possessions of Seller.
D. Condition of Property:
Purchaser's acceptance of the physical condition of all improvements located on
the Option Property; if any exist. Seller agrees to allow Purchaser reasonable
access to all improvements for the purpose of a physical inspection by Purchas1;ir
and Purchaser's representatives. In the event Seller cannot deliver to Purchaser
good and marketable title to the Option Property, or the conditions of
improvements on the Option Property; if any exist, do not meet Purchaser's
approval upon final inspection, Purchaser shall have the option of waiving the item
and electing to proceed, or terminating this Option Agreement. In the event
Purchaser notifies Seller that Purchaser will not continue this transaction, then this
Option Agreement shall be null and void and all option notes and payments shall
be returned to the Purchaser and neither party shall have any further liability or
responsibility related to this transaction.
11. EXTENSION OF OPTION:
Purchaser shall be granted up to two (2) extensions of Sixty (60) days each to close
the transaction upon the deposit of an additional Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollar
cash Option Payment for each extension (the "Extension Payment''). Said Extension
Payment(s) shall be released to seller on the first of each extension month to be
deemed nonrefundable at that time. These option payments shall also be applied
against the Purchase price as of the Closing Date.
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12. ASSIGNMENT:
Purchaser shall have the right, after giving written notice to Seller, to assign its rights
under this Option Agreement to any entity controlled by, or under common control of
the Purchaser. Should the proposed use change from multifamily apartments, Sellers
written approval shall be required.
13. RIGHT TO ENTER:
Seller agrees to provide access to the Property to Purchaser, Purchaser's agents,
inspectors and engineers or surveyors for the purpose of determining the suitability of
the Property for the Purchaser's purposes. Purchaser shall be allowed to perform
surveys, environmental and geotechnical testing, water and soils testing or any other
studies or testing deemed necessary on the Property, with Seller's standard form of
indemnity as addressed in the Option Agreement. Purchaser shall in no event allow
liens to be placed on the property prior to closing and shall be responsible for insuring
their own contractors and employees.
14. TITLE COMPANY:
Title and escrow shall be handled by Pioneer Title Company.
15. CLOSING:
Closing shall occur according to the usual and customary closing procedures in effect
in Madison County, Idaho, within 30 days of the date that Purchaser notifies Seller of
its intent to close, however; no later than January 15th, 2012 (unless extended as
indicated in Section 11 herein).
16. CLOSING COSTS:
Seller shall pay the costs of a standard coverage title insurance policy, transfer or sale
taxes, and any title curative work it elects to undertake and all real estate sales
commissions. Purchaser shall pay recording fees, cost of additional title insurance
required by lenders and/or investors and all costs in connection with physical
inspections, and any other investigations made in connection with Purchaser's Due
Diligence Review, including additional Engineering Fees required by the development
only agreed upon in advance in writing. The Purchaser and Seller shall pay for their
own respective attorney fees. All escrow fees shall be paid equally by Purchaser and
Seller, except as otherwise provided in the Option Agreement.
17. NOTICES:
All notices and other communications provided for in this Option Agreement shall be in
writing, effective on the date hand delivered, sent by facsimile, or mailed by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed as below, or to
such other address as the parties may designate to the other parties in writing.
PURCHASER:

SELLER:

Community Development, Inc.

Jon C Gregory
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P.O. Box 1296
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Attn: Jon C Gregory

4110 Eaton Avenue, Suite A
Caldwell, Idaho 83607
Attn: C. Fred Cornforth, CEO

18. BROKER COMMISSION/ MULTI STATE REFFERAL FEE:
Seller agrees to pay a Three (3%) percent commission of the final sales price, NOT
including any reimbursable items as stated in section 3 herein, payable at closing, to
Tim Cobb Broker of Vantage Partners LLC.

19. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: NO WAIVER:
Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Option Agreement. Any
extensions of deadlines set forth in this Option Agreement must be agreed to in writing
by both parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Option Agreement:
(a) performance under each paragraph of this Option Agreement which references a
date shall be required by 5:00 p.m. Mountain Time on the stated date; and
(b) the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the
day following the event which triggers the time requirement.
In the event that the date upon which any action is to be taken pursuant to this Option
Agreement is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the action may be taken upon the
next business day. No waiver of the breach of any provision of this Option Agreement
shall be construed as a waiver of any preceding or succeeding breach of the same or
any other provision of this Option Agreement.
20. PURCHASER'S DEFAULT:
Upon default by Purchaser and subsequent termination of this Option Agreement by
Seller, Seller may, as its sole remedy, retain any non-refundable Option Payment and
any additional cash Extension Payments deposited by Purchaser as liquidated
damages.
21. SELLER'S DEFAULT:
Upon default by Seifer, Purchaser may enforce this Option Agreement and pursue any
and all remedies available at law or equity, including taking action for specific
performance and damages.
22. FEDERAL FUNDS:
Purchaser hereby informs Seller that Purchaser or Purchaser's successor or assignee
may utilize federal funds with respect to the acquisition of the Option Property.
Because federal funds may be so used, Purchaser discloses to Seller as follows:
A.

This sale is voluntary. The Purchaser, or its successor or assignee, is not a
governmental entity and does not possess the power of eminent domain.
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B.

Purchaser estimates the fair market value of the Option Property to be
Purchaser's proposed purchase price of Eight Hundred Thousand ($800,000.00)
Dollars.

23. SELLER'S WARRANTIES: INDEMNITY:
A If, prior to closing, Seller becomes aware of any fact or circumstance which would
materially change a representation, then Seller will immediately give notice of
such changed fact or circumstance to Purchaser, but such notice shall not relieve
the Seller of its liabilities or obligations hereunder.
B.

Seller shall issue a certificate at the closing stating that all of Seller's
representations and warranties are true and correct as of said date, except as to
facts, if any, concerning which Purchaser was previously notified in writing.

C. If Seller gives notice of a material change prior to closing, Purchaser shall have
the right without penalties to terminate the Option Agreement and have the
deposited promissory note and Option Payment and all interest thereon
immediately returned w[thout further liability. Seller shall reimburse Purchaser for
its due diligence costs incurred in connection with this Option Agreement within
ten (10) days after presentment o(a schedule thereof to Seller.
D. Seller shall indemnify, defend, and hold Purchaser harmless from and against any
and all losses, claims, fines, penalties, causes of action, suits, losses, costs,
expenses (including attorneys' fees), and damages arising from or out of the
inaccuracy of Seller's representations or warranties herein or a breach of its
covenants hereunder and shall pay all of Purchaser's costs and expenses,
including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing this duty to indemnify
and hold harmless, up until closing and recording of the property in Canyon
County.

E.

Seller shall provide Purchaser at closfng any and all building plans, specifications
and inspection reports pertaining to this sale not already provided hereunder.

24. SELLER REPRESENTATION TO PURCHASER:
As an inducement to Purchaser to enter this transaction, Seller makes the following
representations, warranties and agreements.

A

The Opt[on Property and Seller's use and occupancy thereof do not, to the best of
Seller's knowledge, and will not at closing, violate any applicable covenant,
condition or restriction or any applicable statute, ordinance, regulation, order,
permit, rule, agreement or law, including, without limitation, any building, zoning,
hazardous or toxic waste, health or environmental restriction or any governmental
requirement concerning fill, use, construction, maintenance, repair, replacement,
operation or occupancy of the Option Property.
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To the best of Seller's knowledge, no hazardous or toxic waste or other hazardous
or toxic material or substance has been deposited or spilled on or under or
released from the Option Property or exists on or under the Option Property. Any
Hazardous Wastes removed from the property by the previous or current owner
have been properly disposed of and are not or will not become the responsibility
of any Purchaser. Seller hereby indemnifies Purchaser from any claim arising
from the disposal of any Hazardous Materials in the past.
B.

Seller has not received any notice of the existence of any current violation of any
applicable covenant, condition or restriction or any applicable statute, ordinance,
regulation, order, permit, rule or law, including, without limitation, any building,
zoning or environmental restriction or requirement concerning filling, use,
construction, maintenance, repair, replacement, operation or occupancy of the
Option Property which has not been disclosed to Purchaser and will not have
been resolved to Purchaser's satisfaction.

C. There are no obligations in connection with the Option Property which will be
binding upon Purchaser after closing, except the leases, loan obligations and
those other agreements relative to the Option Property which Purchaser elects in
writing to assume at closing.
D. To the best of Seller's knowledge, there is no plan, study or effort being made by
any governmental or quasi-governmental authority or agency or any nongovernmental person.
E. There is no written or oral agreement which will prevent or impede Seller's timely
and full performance of all of Seller's obligations under this Option Agreement.
F.

There are no assessments for public improvements or other governmental or
quasi-governmental fees, charges or assessments, except real property taxes,
levied against or, to the best of Seller's knowledge, threatened with respect to the
Option Property or its use.

G. All permits and approvals required for the Option Property's present use and
status have been obtained and all conditions contained therein have been
satisfied, except as set forth in paragraph (A) above.
H. There are no claims, actions, suits or governmental investigations or proceedings
existing or, to the best of Seller's knowledge, threatened against or involving the
Option Property (including, without limitation any condemnation or eminent
domain proceeding or matter related to the formation of or assessment by a local
improvement district), except as set forth in paragraph (A) above.

I.

Any and all agreements with third parties with respect to the Option Property,
. including, but not limited to, brokerage agreements, management agreements,
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maintenance agreements and janitorial agreements will be canceled by Seller
upon closing without cost, penalty or expense to Purchaser, unless otherwise
specifically authorized by Purchaser in writing.
J.

To Seller's knowledge, there are no attachments, executions, or assignments for
the benefit of creditors, or voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy or under any other
debtor relief laws contemplated by or pending or threatened by or against Seller or
the Option Property that could affect the Option Property or Seller's transfer of the
Option Property.

K. All insurance policies now maintained c;m the Option Property will be kept in effect,
up to and including the closing. Seller has received no notice from any insurance
company or rating organization of any defects in the condition of the Option
Property, or of conditions that would prevent the continuation of existing coverage
or would increase the present rate of premium.

L. All documentation heretofore or hereafter furnished to the Purchaser relative to
the Option Property is true, complete and correct, contains no factual inaccuracies
and accurately represents all factual matters stated therein.
M. No representation made by Seller contains any untrue statement of material fact
or fails to state a material fact necessary in order to make statements contained
therein not misleading or necessary in order to provide a prospective Purchaser of
the Option Property with adequate information as to the Option Property.
25. ATTORNEY'S FEES:
In the event of any litigation, both parties agree to submit to binding mediation as a
means of conflict resolution between the parties relating to this Option Agreement.
The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses incurred,
including reasonable attorney's fees, if any.
26. ENTIRE AGREEMENT:
This Agreement contains the entire Option Agreement and understanding between the
parties and is subject to no understandings, conditions or representations that are not
set forth herein. This Option Agreement may only be amended in writing and signed
by both parties. Time is of the essence in the performance of this Option Agreement.
27. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY:
Each individual, corporation or agency signing this Option Agreement as Seller and
Purchaser shall be jointly and severally liable for the performance of every term and
condition of this Option Agreement.
28. INVALID PROVISION:
If any provision of this Option Agreement shall be invalid or unenforceable, the
remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect.
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29. PARTIES BOUND:
This Option Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the
parties and their respective heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
30. GOVERNING LAW:
This Option Agreement shall be governed by and enforced in accordance with the
laws of the State of Idaho.

31. CAPTIONS:
The captions in this Option Agreement are inserted only for convenience and in no
way construe or interpret the provisions hereof or affect their scope or intent.

32. RIDERS:
The riders and exhibits or addendums, if any, attached hereto, signed and initialed by
the parties are made a part of this Option Agreement hereof.
33. MULTIPLE ORIGINALS:
This Option Agreement may be executed as facsimile originals and each copy of this
Option Agreement bearing the facsimile transmitted signature of any party's
authorized representative shall be deemed to be an original. Notwithstanding the
validity of the facsimile originals, it is intended that this Option Agreement be manually
executed in two originals and that each party shall receive a fully executed original.

34. ACCEPTANCE: This Option agreement is made subject to the acceptance of Seller
and Buyer on or before (Date) August 1ih 2011 at 5:00 pm (MST). If acceptance of
this Option agreement is no received within the time specified, the offer is withdrawn
and the entire Earnest/ Option Money, if any, shall be refunded to Buyer on demand.
Seller acknowledges receipt of a completely filled in copy of the option agreement which
the Seller has fully read and has had all desired opportunity to review with an attorney of
his/her/its choosing. In the event that the Purchaser fails to complete the Purchase as
herein provided, the Option Payment shall be distributed as follows: After deduction of any
title insurance and escrow cancellation charges, the Option Payment shall be distributed
100% to Seller.
PURCHASER:

SELLER:

Memphis Development Group

A
By:----------Its:

-----------

if= Z/~:r

By:
Its:

:Jo10 q"Rt;:qv ~y
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Electronically Filed
11/5/2018 4:12 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

DAVID N. PARMENTER, ISB # 2441
NATHAN D. RIVERA, ISB # 8339
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208) 785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual
Plaintiff,
vs
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual and
EILEEN STALLING, an individual
Defendants.

)
)
) Case No. CV-2017-1651
)
) OBJECTION TO ATTORNEYS FEES
) AND COSTS
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and tln·ough his attorney, DAVID N. PARMENTER,
and hereby objects to an award of attorneys fees and costs incun·ed in the above entitled matter,
pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120, and Idaho Code§ 12-121, and LR. CP 54 (E)(6).
Plaintiff objects to the motion for award of attorneys fees, in patt because he has filed
amotion for reconsideration, which has not yet been ruled upon by the Comt. If the court rules in
plaintiffs favor, in the pending motion for reconsideration, and if it asserts that defendant would
not be the prevailing patty, so the award of attorneys fees is contingent upon the ruling on the
outstanding motion.
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Plaintiff further objects to the attorneys fees requested as being unreasonable and
excessive, under the facts and circumstances of the case.
Finally, plaintiff reserves the right to check on such further basis as may be appropriate,
as the court rnles on any additional matters, including whether defendants are entitled to
attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120 and 12-121.
DATEDthis.,Ji._.dayof

Y~ol8

DAVID N. PARMENTER
Attorney for Plaintiff

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

I H~BY CERTIFY that a true and conect copy of the foregoing was served on this_§_·
J//81,,<.ffey, 2018 upon the following:
day of
Jared M. HaiTis
Balcer & Hmis
266 W. Bridge St.
Blackfoot, ID 83221

Mail
Fax
_ _ Hand Delivery

DAVID N. PARMENTER

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
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Electronically Filed
11/16/2018 4:56 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: j harris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.

OBJECTION AND RESPONSE
TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter
"Defendants") by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER
& HARRIS, and ,hereby objects and responds to the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER
This Court properly ruled that this matter is barred by the statute of limitations. This Court
correctly stated:
Assuming a contract existed between Gregory and Stallings, which is appropriate for
purposes of adjudicating the Stallings Motion, Richard Stallings received the payout
from the sale of the two properties on or about December 21, 2012. On that date,
Gregory knew that the Stallings held the funds, a portion of which Gregory expected
to recover. He could have sued the Stallings on that date to recover the proceeds he
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believed should have gone to him. That the Stallings might have paid Gregory in the
future would not toll or delay the running of the statute of limitations.
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summay Judgment at page 22-23.
In this matter the statute of limitations begins to run when a breach occurred. This statement
of law is acknowledged by Gregory. "The generally accepted rule is the statute of limitations begins
to run when a breach of the contract occurs ... " Memorandum in support of Motion for
Reconsideration, page 1. Case law clearly supports this conclusion: "A cause of action for breach
of contract accrues upon a breach even though no damage may incur until later." Mason v. Tucker
& Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436, 871 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1994) see also McCormack v.
Cadwell 152 Idaho 15, 20, 266 P.3d 490,495 (2011) (Ct. App. rev. den) ("[A] cause of action
generally accrues 'when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another."') (quoting Western Corp.
v. Vanek 144 Idaho 150, 151, 158 P.3d 313,314 (Ct. App. 2008)); Peterson v. Gentillon, 154 Idaho
184, 189, 296 P.3d 390, 395 (2013) (quoting Singleton v. Pitchon, 102 Idaho 588, 590, 635 P.2d
254,256 (1982)) ("The statute of limitations also begins to run Following the accrual of a cause of
action and statute of limitations may only be asserted as a bar after the expiration of the statutory
period following the accrual of the cause of action.")
In this matter ( assuming that an agreement was reached) the agreement was that the parties
were to "share profits equally after consideration repayment oftheir original respective investments."
See Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jared M. Harris in support of Reply Brief in support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. That agreement would have been breached on December 21, 2012
when Stallings received funds and did not pay Gregory. This is when the cause of action accrued.
Nowhere in that "agreement" was there an agreement that Stallings would receive all of their funds
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first and that only after Stallings was completely paid was Gregory to receive any monies. Gregory
could have brought this lawsuit immediately after December 21, 2012 when Stallings received any
funds from the sale of this property. Under Gregory's analysis, Stallings apparently had the ultimate
right to determine when or if Gregory was to receive any monies. This is contrary to the alleged
agreement.
Gregory had the right to bring the lawsuit on December 21, 2012 and simply waited too long
to do so. This Court's conclusion that as of December 21, 2012 "Gregory knew that Stallings held
funds, a portion of which Gregory expected to recover. He could have sued the Stallings on that date
to recover the proceeds he believed should have gone to him. That the Stallings might have paid
Gregory in the future would not toll or delay the running of the statute of limitations." is accurate
and should not be reconsidered.
Counsel for Gregory implies that this matter should have been delayed to allow discovery
to be completed. However, counsel for Gregory obtained a continuance of the hearing to
accommodate counsel's schedule, and at no time did Plaintiff ask this Court for additional time to
obtain facts. Further, counsel for Gregory expressly agreed to defer Stallings' response to discovery
pending the summary judgement. See Affidavit of Jared M. Harris submitted herewith. It is
disingenuous at best for counsel to now assert that responses were supposed to have been made. In
Stapleton v. Cushman Drillin~ & Pump Company. 153 Idaho 735, 742, 291 P.3d 418, 425 (2012)
the Court stated:
Nevertheless he did not ask the district court for a continuance under rule 56(f) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is therefore too late to assert that he needed
more time to respond to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
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Plaintiff additionally implies, without citing any authority, that there should be a discovery
rule in connection with the breach of contract. This bold assertion is contrary to the law.
However, McCormick does not point to us, and we have not found, any Idaho
authority allowing discovery exceptions for the running of the statute of limitation
other than those authorized by Idaho Code §§ 5-218(4) and 5-219(4) which are
inapplicable here. In deference to the authority of the Idaho Legislature to draft
discovery exceptions onto to statute of limitations when it elects to do so, the Idaho
Supreme Court has declined to recognize additional discovery exceptions.
McCormack v. Cadwell 152 Idaho 15, 20,266 P.3d 490,495 (Ct. App. (2011) rev. den)
Accordingly, this motion should be denied.
DATED this /57':cday of November, 2018.

fed M. Ha'rris
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

}L

I certify that on this
~ay of November, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

OBJECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER
David N .. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
parlaw@gmail.com

( ) Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
~ iCourt Email
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Electronically Filed
11/16/2018 4:56 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED M.
HARRIS IN SUPPORT
OBJECTION AND RESPONSE
TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Defendants.
Jared M. Harris, deposes and says:
1.

That he is now the attorney for the Defendants Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, and
makes this Affidavit based on personal knowledge.

2.

That after receiving the discovery requests from Plaintiff on or about June 21, 2018, I had
a conversation with counsel for Plaintiff. In that discussion it was expressly agreed that
Defendant would not have to answer the discovery until the Motion for Summary Judgment
was resolved.

3.

That I have read the foregoing affidavit, and I hereby certify (or declare) under penalty of
perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct.

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED M. HARRIS IN SUPPORT OBJECTION AND RESPONSE TO
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Page 231

FURTHER your affiant saith not.
~-

DATED this / c; day of November, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,t,,
I certify that on this ~ day of November, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED M. HARRIS IN SUPPORT OBJECTION AND
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858

( ) Mail

0() Fax

_:1;µ

( ) Hand Delivered

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED M. HARRIS IN SUPPORT OBJECTION AND RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 2
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Electronically Filed
11/16/2018 4:56 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

MOTION TO STRIKE

V.

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter
"Defendants") by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER
& HARRIS, and hereby moves this Court to strike the references to a August 27, 2013 payment.
Plaintiff on the last page of memorandum states: "Around the date of August 27, 2013,
Stallings was to receive the final draw." Plaintiff additionally asserts on the last page of his
memorandum, "As late as August 27, 2013, Stallings was receiving funds from the sale." Neither
statement is supported by any authority. There are no admissible facts supporting these statements
and the same should be stricken.
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4

DATED this /Sc::.day of November, 2018.
BAKER & HARRIS
/,//

"I

, ../

W@vru
Jrect M. Harris

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,-e(

I certify that on this £.day of November, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

MOTION TO STRIKE
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
parlaw@gmail.com
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( ) Mail
( )Fax
( ) Hand Delivered
(V) Email

Electronically Filed
11/16/2018 4:56 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,

v.

OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF
JON GREGORY

RICHARD STALLIN GS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter
"Defendants") by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER
& HARRIS, and hereby objects to portions of the Affidavit of Jon Gregory.
Defendants object to Exhibit X referenced in the Affidavit of Jon Gregory for lack of
foundation. The affidavit does not say what Exhibit X is. Exhibit X is not signed by both parties.
There was no statement or indication that it is the agreement that resulted in the sale of Defendant's
property. In fact, the purchaser shown in Exhibit X is the Memphis Development Group. The actual
purchaser as evidenced by Exhibit D previously attached to the Affidavit of Richard Stallings is
Rockwell Corp Limited Partnership. Further, Exhibit Xis signed by Jon Gregory as the seller as of
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July 19, 2011. However, Jon had no ownership interest in the property as of February 11, 2009 (See
Exhibit B attached to the Affidavit of Richard Stallings previously submitted.) The purchase price
in Exhibit X and the actual purchase price are not the same. Further, according to Exhibit X, the
option has to be exercised by December 31, 2011 unless extended for possible 120 days more
(Exhibit X 1 5 and 11 ).
Defendants also object to ,I 4 for lack of foundation. There is no statement as to how Mr.
Gregory knows the alleged facts asserted there. Further, the allegation contain hearsay as to how Mr.
Gregory has an understanding as to how the draws were to be paid .
. '""':<

DATED this

J_f__ d;y of November, 2018.
BAKER & HARRIS

w~
.,..1"

,//

/cued M. Harris

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
It:,·~
I certify that on this ~-day of November, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.

Document Served:
Person(s) Served:

OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF JON GREGORY

David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
parlaw@gmail.com
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( ) Mail
( ) Fax
( ) Hand Delivered
~ ) iCourt Email

From: David Parmenter

Fax: 12087854858

To:

From:BAKE R & HARRIS LAW

Fax: (208) 785-6749

2087866179

Page: 2 of 2

12/11/2018 3:23 PM

Electronically Filed
12/12/2018
4:51P.002/002
PM
12/07/2018 16:68
#388
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bak erharrislaw. com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-16 51
Plaintiffs,

v.

STIPULAT ION TO SUBMIT ON
BRIEFING

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLIN GS, an individual,
Defendants.
COMES NOW, Defendants, Richard Stalling and Eileen Stalings, by and through counsel,

Jared M. Harris, of BAKER & HARRIS and Plaintiff, Jon Gergory, by and through counsel, David

N. Parmenter, of PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP and hereby stipulate and agree that the parties
are waiving their oral argument on the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Defendant's Motion to

Strike and stipulate that the matter is submitted on briefing and that the hearing scheduled for
December 17, 2018 be vacated.

PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP

David N. Parmenter

Date

}/ Jared M. Harris

STIPULATION TO SUBMIT ON BRIEFING . 1
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Date

Filed:12/14/2018 13:11:23
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Cammack, Brandee

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jhaiTis@bakerharrislaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,
V.

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

ORDER TO SUBMIT ON
BRIEFING AND NOTICE
VACA TING HEARING

Defendants.
HAVING CONSIDERED THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES and otherwise being
advised in the law and the premises;
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

and Defendant's Motion to Strike is submitted on briefing and that the hearing scheduled for
Monday, December 17, 2018 at 9:45 a.m. is vacated.

12-14-2018
DATED _ _
_ _ _ __

Signed: 12/14/2018 10:47 AM
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CLERK'S CERTIFICAT E OF SERVICE

14th
I certify that on this _
_ day of December, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

ORDER TO SUBMIT ON BRIEFING AND NOTICE VACATING
HEARING
Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
jharris@bake rharrislaw.co m
cblackbum@ bakerhaffisla w.com
PARMENTE R & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
parlaw@gma il.com

( ) Mail
1/) iCourt E-Mail

( ) Hand Delivered

( ) Mail
( ✓ -) iCourt E-Mail
( ) Hand Delivered

Pamela W. Eckhardt

By:
Signed: 12/14/2018 01:11 PM
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Filed:01/18/2019 16:39:29
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual,

)

CASE NO. CV-2017-1651

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
and EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

)
)

Defendants.

)

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)

)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Jon Gregory (hereinafter "Gregory") filed the above-numbered lawsuit
against Defendants Richard Stallings, an individual, and Eileen Stallings, an individual
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Stallings") and claimed breach of contract,
breach of implied contract, and quantum meruit. 1 The Stallings summarily prevailed
against Gregory based upon the applicable statute of limitations. 2
Gregory now moves for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.2(b)(l). 3 The Stallings object to Gregory's Motion. 4

1

Verified Complaint, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed September 6,
2017) (hereinafter "Gregory's Complaint").
2
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case
no. CV-2017-1651 (filed October 15, 2018) (hereinafter the "Summary Judgment Order").
3
Motion for Reconsideration, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed
October 29, 2018) (hereinafter "Gregory's Motion").
4
Objection and Response to Motion to Reconsider, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV2017-1651 (filed November 16, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Objection").
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The parties stipulated to submit Gregory's Motion on the briefing. 5 Based upon
the record, the parties' arguments, and the relevant authorities, Gregory's Motion shall be
denied.
II.

ISSUE

Gregory concedes that the four-year statute of limitations for oral contracts, Idaho
Code § 5-217, governs the parties' interactions in this case. 6 He argues that all of the
funds from the sale of the parties' Property were not paid to the Stallings on December
21, 2012, but were paid in installments over the course of several draws in 2013. 7
Gregory argues that the oral contract was not breached until on or about August 27, 2013,
when the Stallings received the last draw. 8

The Stallings respond that the parties'

agreement did not include a requirement that Gregory was to be paid out of the last draw,
that Gregory knew of the December 21, 2012 sale, and that he waited too long to file his
lawsuit. 9
The parties' arguments raise the following issue in light of the relevant
authorities: Has Gregory shown that the Summary Judgment Order should be
reconsidered?

5

Stipulation to Submit on Briefing, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed
December 12, 2018).
6
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no.
CV-2017-1651 (filed October 29, 2018) (hereinafter "Gregory's Memorandum"), at p. 1.
7
Gregory's Memorandum, at p. 2.
8
Id.
9
Stallings' Objection, at pp. 1-3.
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III.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Gregory purchased two (2) acres of a four (4) acre parcel of land in

Rexburg, Idaho because he wanted to develop the property into student housing or a
similar commercial venture. 10 (The entire four-acre parcel is hereinafter referred to as the
"Property.")
2.

On September 27, 2007, Gregory sold an approximately two (2) acre

parcel of land to the Stallings. 11 The two-acre parcel purchased by the Stallings was
contiguous to the two-acre parcel owned by Gregory. 12

According to Gregory, this

purchase represented the other two acres of the four-acre Property in Rexburg. 13
3.

On February 2, 2009, Gregory transferred his interest in his two-acre

portion of the Property to Pioneer Point LLC. 14 Gregory asserts that Pioneer Point LLC
was to develop the Property, put in roads, parking lots, sewer, and water, and to begin
construction on at least two buildings. 15
4.

On December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings entered into a

construction loan with Century Mortgage Company
. . . to finance a part of the cost of construction of certain improvements
upon the described premises in accordance with plans and specifications
that have been or will be deposited by [Pioneer Point, LLC and the
Stallings] with [Century Mortgage Company]. 16

10

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 15.
Affidavit of Richard Stallings in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Gregory v. Stallings,
Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings Affidavit"), at p.
1, 1 2; and at Exhibit A.
12
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 1, 13.
13
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2,116, 7.
14
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 4; and at Exhibit B.
15
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 18.
16
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit A.
11
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5.

On the same date, December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings

signed a promissory note, in the amount of $945,000, to various lenders, with the promise
to pay the note within six (6) months, or by June 10, 2009, with an option to extend for
another six (6) months. 17
6.

On May 2, 2012, Pioneer Point LLC transferred what had been Gregory's

portion of the Property to Richard Stallings. 18
7.

On December 21, 2012, the Stallings sold both parcels of the Property to

Rockwell Court Limited Partnership for the sum of $1,086,438.89. 19

According to

Gregory, following the sale of the Property, all of the mortgage investors were paid back
their initial investments. 20
8.

Prior to the sale, on November 14, 2012, Richard Stallings informed

Gregory, through attorney Garrett Sandow, that he "plan[ned] on taking the following
amounts and then giv[ e] the balance of each draw to Garret Sandow for Johns [sic]
disperse! [sic]. First draw 106,000 second draw 150,000."21
9.

On September 9, 2013, an e-mail from Richard Stallings (originally dated

August 27, 2013) was forwarded to attorney Garrett Sandow. 22 In his e-mail, Richard
Stallings wrote, inter alia: "In conclusion I feel in order for me to get a return on my
investment there is no money owed to John from the current sell." 23

17

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit B.
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, ,r 5.
19
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
20
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4, ,r 19; and at Exhibit D, p. 1.
21
Affidavit of Garrett Sandow, Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV -201 7-1651 (filed July
19, 2018) (hereinafter the "Sandow Affidavit"), at Exhibit M.
22
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
23 Id.
18
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10.

Gregory sued the Stallings for breach of contract on September 6, 2017. 24

IV.
A.

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Standard of Review - Motion for Reconsideration.
1.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b)(1) provides:

A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final
judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the
entry of a final judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after
the entry of final judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the
order.
2.

A party requesting reconsideration of an interlocutory order is permitted to

present new evidence, but is not required to do so. 25 The burden of proof on a motion for
reconsideration is upon the requesting party (in this matter, Gregory). 26
3.

When deciding a motion for reconsideration, the same standard of review

relevant to the original order is applied to the order under reconsideration. 27

In other

words, if the original order was a matter within this Court's discretion, then the same
standard applies to the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. 28 (If the
original order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the
motion for reconsideration. )29
4.

This Court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for

reconsideration under Rule 11.2(b). 30

24

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 1.
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472-3, 147 P.3d 100, 104-5 (Ct. App. 2006).
26
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho at 472, 147 P.3d at 104.
27
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
28
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho at 276,281 P.3d at 113.
29 Id.
30
Id [decided under former Rule l l(a)(2)(b)].
25
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B.

Standard of Review - Motion for Summary Judgment.
1.

If the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any

affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be granted. 31
Disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party.32
2.

The party moving for summary judgment (in this case, the Stallings) has

the burden of presenting admissible evidence showing that there is an absence of any
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issues raised by the summary judgment
motion. 33
3.

If the moving party demonstrates the absence of a question of material

fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate an issue of material fact that
will preclude summary judgment. 34
4.

The non-moving party (in this case, Gregory) cannot merely rest on its

pleadings. 35 When faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing party
must show material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. 36

5.

While the moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, 37 the opposing party cannot simply speculate. 38 A mere scintilla of evidence is

31 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a); Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d
694,698 (2009); G &M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-7, 808 P.2d 851, 853-4 (1991).
32 Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho
State Tax Commission, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006).
33 Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932,938,265 P.3d 1144, 1150 (2011).
34 Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308,317,246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010).
35 Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 688, 183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008); R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho
409,410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990).
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not enough to create a genuine factual issue. 39 Summary judgment is appropriate when the
non-moving party cannot establish the essential elements of the claim. 40
6.

If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on material issues, or

draw conflicting inferences therefrom, then the motion for summary judgment must be
denied. 41

V.

DISCUSSION

Gregory premises his Motion largely on the timing of the payouts from Rockwell
Court Limited Partnership. 42 Initially, Gregory argues "there was no reason for [Gregory]
to be at the [December 21, 2012 closing] sale, since he did not anticipate receiving funds
for several months thereafter.

. .. [T]he payments were to be made to both parties in

several draws, over a period of time following the actual closing. " 43 In his Complaint,
Gregory alleged that the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Property to Rockwell
Court Limited Partnership was to be divided between the original investors, Gregory, and
the Stallings. 44 In August of 2013, the Stallings advised Gregory that they were keeping
the proceeds from the sale and that Gregory would receive nothing. 45
Regardless of when Gregory anticipated receiving funds, the oral contract of
which he complains began on December 21, 2012 when the Stallings sold the Property to

36

Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008).
Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210, 214 (2008); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho
792, 798, 41 P.3d 220,226 (2001).
38
Cantwell v. City ofBoise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205,211 (2008).
39
Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009); West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho
133, 138, 968 P.2d 228,233 (1998).
40
Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004);
Dekker v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332, 333, 766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989).
41
Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,
873,204 P.3d 508,513 (2009).
42
Gregory's Motion, at pp. 1-2; Gregory's Memorandum, at p. 3.
43
Gregory's Motion, at p. 1.
44
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4,120.
37
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Rockwell Court Limited Partnership. On that date, the subject of the oral contract (the
Stallings' sale of the Property) took place, for a set price of $1,086,438.89. 46 Gregory
knew on that date that a certain amount was due to him, regardless of when the Stallings
promised to remit that amount to him. Indeed, Gregory knew before December 21, 2012
that he was due some portion of the sale proceeds. 47 Gregory had four years from
December 21, 2012 (or until December 21, 2016) in which to file his lawsuit. He took no
action until September 6, 2017, some eight and one-half months past the deadline set for
suits on oral contracts under Idaho Code§ 5-217.
Gregory contends that "payouts to Stallings and Gregory were to continue
through 'January or first part of February 2013."' 48 Gregory relies upon Exhibit N,
attached to his Motion and to the Gregory Affidavit. 49 Exhibit N evinces a statement
dated December 27, 2012 from Richard Stallings, showing a "First Payment (Kept by
Richard)" in the amount of $93,697.01. 50 At the bottom of the statement is an annotation:
Next Pay out end of January or first of February 2013
Total
Paid to John
Paid to Richard

300,000.00
155,482.28
144,517.72

Although unclear, if Exhibit N is an accounting of monies received from the
December 21, 2012 Property sale, then Gregory was certainly put on notice as of
December 27, 2012 that the Stallings did not intend to pay a dividend to Gregory with

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4, ,r 24; Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
47
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
48
Gregory's Motion, at p. 2.
49
Gregory's Motion, at Exhibit N; Affidavit of Jon Gregory in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,
Gregory v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed October 29, 2018), at Exhibit N.
50 Id.
45

46

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Page 247

8

each draw. Gregory had the ability to bring the matter to the court at that time, but chose
not to do so.
Gregory also contends there was never any specification as to when draws would
be received. 51 Thus, Gregory concedes that fixed dates for payments were not agreed
upon or required. The parties' contract did not include a schedule for payments, only a
mercurial understanding that payments would be made in the future.

Nevertheless,

Gregory knew he was owed money as of December 12, 2012 and that he received nothing
on that date. He knew as of December 27, 2012 that he would receive nothing from the
first pay out. Clearly, Gregory had a cause of action against the Stallings on December
12, 2012, and no later than December 27, 2012.
A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for limitation
purposes. 52 Regardless of whether or not future payments were anticipated, Gregory's
ability to sue the Stallings on the oral contract arose on December 12, 2012 when
Gregory received no proceeds of the Property sale. For these reasons, Gregory has not
shown a valid reason to reconsider summary judgment in the Stallings favor.
On a final note, Gregory infers that the Stallings refused to fully and completely
answer Gregory's discovery requests. 53 The Stallings argue that the parties agreed that
the Stallings' discovery responses would not be due until after this Court rendered a
decision on the Stallings' summary judgment motion. 54 Regardless of the reasons why
discovery was not completed, Gregory bore the responsibility of either filing a motion to

51

Gregory's Motion, at p. 2.
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511,517,198 P.3d 740,746 (Ct. App. 2008).
53
Gregory's Motion, at p. 2.
54
Affidavit of Jared M. Harris in Support [of] Objection and Response to Motion to Reconsider, Gregory v.
Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed November 16, 2018).
52
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compel, or requesting additional time to respond to the Stallings' summary judgment
motion in order to complete discovery. 55

Since Gregory did not move to compel

complete responses, and did not request additional time to complete discovery, he has
waived his contention regarding discovery responses. 56
VI.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusion is
appropriate: Gregory has not shown that the Summary Judgment Order should be
reconsidered.
VII.

ORDER

Accordingly, Gregory's Motion for reconsideration is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of January 2019.

~~~
District Judge

Signed: 1/18/2019 04:26 PM

55

Stallings' Objection, at pp. 3-4 [citing: Stapleton v. Cushman Drilling & Pump Company, 153 Idaho 735,
742,291 P.3d 418,425 (2012)]; Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37.
56
Stapleton v. Cushman Drilling & Pump Company, 153 Idaho at 742, 291 P.3d at 425.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration was sent by e-mail, !Court e-mail, or
facsimile, this 18th day of January 2019, to:
David N. Parmenter, Esq.
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
53 S. Shilling
P.O. Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Jared M. Harris, Esq.
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

□

E-Mail

0

ICourt E-Mail

□

E-Mail

0

ICourt E-Mail

D Facsimile

D Facsimile

PAMELA W. ECKHARDT, Clerk of the Court

By~
Deputy Clerk
Signed: 1/18/2019 04:40 PM
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Electronically Filed
1/25/2019 3:56 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Brandee Cammack, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@bakerharrislaw .corn
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651
Plaintiffs,
V.

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

AMENDED MOTION FOR
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, (hereinafter
"Defendants") by and through their attorney of record, Jared M. Harris of the law firm of BAKER
& HARRIS, and hereby moves this Court for an order awarding attorney's fees and costs incurred
in defending this matter.
Plaintiff asserted a breach of contract claim and sought attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho
Code§§ 12-120(1) and (3). As set forth in their Complaint, this action was a commercial transaction
between the parties and that was the gravamen of the relationship between the parties. Therefore,
Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code § § 12-120( 1) and
(3). Further, Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.

AMENDED MOTION FOR AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - 1
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This Motion is supported by an Amended Memorandum and Affidavit of Costs and Fees.
:·~

DATED this ,'_1.,.5 -day of January, 2019.
BAKER & HARRIS
,-:f

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-<-<..

I certify that on this <7 5~ -day of January, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the
following-described document on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

AMENDED MOTION FOR AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
parlaw@gmail.com

( ) Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( )Q !Court Email

I

J;lfed M. Harris
l

,/
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Electronically Filed
1/25/2019 3:56 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Brandee Cammack, Deputy Clerk

Jared M. Harris
BAK ER & HARRIS
266 Wes t Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785 -231 0
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jhar ris@ bak erha rrisl aw. com
Idaho State Bar No. 448 8
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DIS TRI CT COU RT OF THE SEV
ENT H JUDICIAL DIS TRI CT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AN D FOR THE
COU NTY OF BIN GH AM
JON GRE GO RY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651

Plaintiffs,
V.

AM END ED ME MO RA ND UM
AN D AFF IDA VIT OF
ATT OR NEY 'S FEE S AN D COSTS

RIC HA RD STALLINGS, an individual,
and
EIL EEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
Jare d M. Harris, deposes and says:
1.

Tha t he is an attorney licensed to practice
law in the State of Idaho, and is the attorney
for
Plai ntif f in the above-entitled action, and
has personal know ledge of the costs and atto
rney 's
fees enumerated.
COS TS AS A MA TTE R OF RIG HT

2.

Tha t the following enumerated costs have

been necessarily incurred in the representatio

n of

Plaintiffs in said action and are clai med
as a matter ofri ght pursuant to IRCP 54(d
)(l)( C):
a.

Filing Fees for Ans wer (IRCP 54(d)( 1)(C)
(i))
TOT AL COS TS

$ 136.00
$ 136.00

AM EN DE D ME MO RA ND UM AN D
AFF IDA VIT OF ATT OR NEY 'S FEE
S AND COSTS
-1
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AT TO RN EY FEES
3.

Tha t your I hav bee n engaged in the
active practice of law since 1992 and
is currently a
partner in the law firm of BA KE R & HA
RRIS, Blackfoot, Idaho.

4.

Tha t the hourly rates charged during
the time period of representation of
the Plai ntif f
betw een February 14, 2018 and Oct obe
r 18, 2018 were as follows:
a.

Jare d M. Harris - $250.00 per hour.

5.

Tha t the hourly rate set forth in the
foregoing paragraph is consistent with
comparable
services and rates in southeastern Idah
o during the time period involved.

6.

Tha t the total amount of attorneys' fees
is reasonable in consideration of the

factors set forth

in IRC P 54(e)(3).
Date

2/14/18

1

1

-

2/27/18

-·-·---------,--

-------··----··-

j

'

----·--·---t----

Telephone conference with R. Stalling
s; Extended
office conference with R. Stallings rega
rding

I

·-~---t-------·

1.5

I

$

----

375.00

2-.0 -~i- $ --~oo~o~i
1

I

-

1---

I Res earc h rega rdin
g service of complaint; Draft
I
1.6
$
400.00
: notice of appearance; begin drafting
answer.
'
- - - -- t-- -~ -- -,- - --· ---I Revise Answer; Research rega
rding statute of
I
.6
:$
150.00
frauds.
/
I
--- --- --- --- -I - ~ -+- --- --- --- -Extended office conference with R. Stal
lings;
!
1.0
$
250.00
. e d'1scovery requ
Rev1s
est.
-+--------I
j

2/27/18

Am oun t

i

:

~~swer; Draft discovery request; Teleph
one calls to :
T. Cobb; review legal descriptions. _
_
---

I

( Hours

+~: : : : : : :n~;~~~~~;~~in; ~ate -- iI

2/16118 ..

I

Description

I

-~--,-----+---

1

1

'

3/5/18

J

1

3/7/18

- - - - ---------- ---·------

1,

--,----

Office conference with R. Stallings rega
rding legal /
description issues; Telephone conference
with R.
Stallings.
j

.5

1

,----f

$

125.00

f

1

I
1

AM EN DE D ME MO RA ND UM AND
AF FID AV IT OF AT TO RN EY 'S FEE
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_ _ "-T _____ ____ -

3/8/18

- - - ----- --- - - -

----- ---- - -- -

-- -

- - ---- - - ------- -- -- ------------- ------- --------- ,--

Rec eipt and revi ew of request for trial setti
ng; Draf t :
.9
$
I resp onse to requ
est for trial setting; Draf t lette r to
:
Cou rt; Rec eipt and revi ew of Noti ce of hear
ing;
' Draf t lette r to R. Stallings.
---- - ----------- --- - --- - - -- - -- - ---- -- - --- -7 - --- - ----- - I - -Tele phon e call to and with R. Stallings.
--t----------.4
$
--------

- - ----- ----- ----

1

225. 00

I

1

3/13/18

-

--------------

3/20/18

1

-- - - -

1 Rec eipt and revi ew of Exh ibits ; Draf t lette
r to R.
Stallings.

/

---+--

4/2/18

1

1

---------------- -

~-- ---- ---- -1- ---- ---- -~- --

4/6/ 18

I

1

4/16/18

-

- - - - - - - - - -- - - - -

Rec eipt and review of letter; Draft lette r to
attorney.

1

I

1

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

:
_

1.3

:

2.8

___ ___ ___ ----- - - - ---- ---- ---- --- ---t-

I Rec eipt and revi ew of disc over y resp
onses; Draft

I lette r to R. Stallings; Research; Draf t mot
ion for
sum mar y judg men t, mem oran dum and affid
avit.

5/10 /18

$

j

325. 00

l

--r-- -- --- -- -

---- --- -

I$

700. 00

i

-----r-- -- -- - --- :
.6
$
150.00
: ___ ___ _ _)_ ___

----- ----- ----- ----- --+- ---

-----

1

- - - - - - ----- --- ~ - - -

--------

i Rec eipt and revi ew of Order; Draf t lette
r to R.
1

-+- ---- ---- ---- -

1

\ Atte nd pre-trial; draft lette r to R. Stalling
s.
-r-----------------------

.6

I

Stal ling

Draf t lette r to attorney.
L ________s;____
____________ --- - - - -

75.0 0

i

i

1

$

f

____ _ ___j_ ___ __

•

4/24 /18

,_

--i- - - - - - - - - - -

.3

I

1

- - - --

---- -

1

Exte nded office conf eren ce with R. Stalling
s
rega
g status; Draf t lette r to attorney.
- - - - - - - - l - -rdin
- ___

4/23/18

75.0 0

,

---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -- ________)__

-------- -- -

100.

---- -+- - - - - - 7 - -- - - - - - - -$
0.00
I

Rec eipt and revi ew of answers to requ est form
adm issio ns; Draf t lette r to R. Stallings.

_ _ _j_ _ _ _ _ - - --------

I

!

1

4/20/18

1$

.3

.

!

5/2/ 18

:

-----------------~---

---r-: Tele
- phone conference with R. Stalling.
--- --

:$

- - - - - - + - - - ----- ----- -

.2

1 Rec eipt and revi ew of letter; Draf t notice;
Draf t
I
~e tte r to Court.

I

150.00

i

i $

.6

50.0 0
150. 00

1

_6_/_4-/1_8_

I Rese arch ; Rev ise mot ion for sum mar
y judg men t

I and mem oran dum ,
__ __ __ __
l__ __
----6/8/18

I
I Rev ise mot ion for sum mar y judg men
t and

Rev ise mem oran dum .
------a
---

I

j

3.0 -

----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - ----

!

•

i

:

6/6/18

6/11 /18

--

00
---! - ---- ---- -,-- ---- ----- ----1

-

----- -

!

mem oran dum ; Research; Exte nded offic e
conf eren ce with R. and E. Stallings.

!
!

I

$

-750 .0~-

1

---+ -- - - - - -

3
•

$

75.0 0

i $

625. 00

I
1

I

2.5

I

---+

- - - - ~ - - - ____
_ _

Rev iew docu men ts and inter play betw een
II$
6.0
docu men ts; Con fere nce with title com pany
to
j
revi ew legal descriptions and transactions;
Tele phon e conf eren ce with R. Stallings; Rev
ise
I
I mem oran dum ; Office conf eren ce with R.
Sta llin gs~_ _ _

1,500 .0 0

1

l_________ _
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6/12/ 18

1

Revis e mem orand um.

-~-- ----- ---+ ----- ----- -

6/26/ 18

----- -- ---- --- --- -

.3
$
---7 - - - ----+-- -

75.00

.3

75.00

1

------- ------

Rece ipt and revie w of disco very request; Draft
letter
to R. Stallings.
-------·------I

i

:$

1

-t--~

6/28/ 18

- -

-----

------ --·--· -----~ ------ ------ ---t--

I Exten ded office confe rence with R. Stallings;

-~--- --~-- -- ------ --1

2.00

Telep hone call to and with creditor; Exten ded
• telep hone confe rence with title company.

$

1

!

I

500.0 0

I

---,-

-

-

-

-

-

--

-

-

1

1

--

-

---

- I

6/29/ 18 _ ____j_ Draft letter to cr~d!_t_or_ ___ ___ ___
___ __ L- ~- - i --!_
7/2/18
1
Rece ipt and revie w of letter; Draft letter to R.
.6
$
Stalli ngs regar ding medi ation ; Revis e
I
mem orand um, affidavit regar ding motio n for
summ ary judgm ent.
j

_ _75.0()_
150.00

!

: Telep hone confe rence with R. Stalli
ngs; Office
.8
$
I confe rence with R. Stalli ngs to revie w and sign
I affida vit and discu ss status of case and argum ents
i to be prese nted.
,----- - ----- ----- ----- ----- -- -- ---- ---- ---- -t----- --r- 1 Research.
I
1.0
I$
----- ----- ---- ----- --- -- ----- ----- -----

7/3/18

7/6/18
7/9/18

250.0 0
----- T --- --- --7 ----- -- -----

i Telep hone confe rence with creditor.

~------------------------~-

7/10/ 18

Resea rch regar ding statut e of frauds.

I

I Revie w judic ial filings; Telep hone confe rence
with
I attorn ey's office; Telep hone confe rence with
R.
I Stallings.

7/16/ 18

1.

~~~-~~

Resea rch regar ding judgm ents.

$

50.00

1.0

1

•

$

250.00

$

300.0 0

.4

$

I-

-----------+------------~--

7/23/ 18

Draft disco very respo nses; Draft notice; Draft letter I
I to Cour t. - - ~ - - ----- ----- ---- - --

7/24/ 18

I

I

Rece ipt and revie w of motio ns; Draft letter to R.
Stallings; Research; Prepa re prelim inary draft of
~-----i_o_b_~_ec_t_io_n_; prepa re prelim inary draft of
reply brief.
I-

_71_2_7_11_8_ _ R_es_earch; Revis e brief.
+-:

8/8/18

I

___ ___ _

_____

I Research.

I
:

Research; Revis e brief.

$

2.0

I

$

j

I
1

I

1.8
.3

:--.8

-------+--1.

.9

100.00

- --------

225.00

-L- ~-- --t -~ ___ _

____J

Rece ipt and revie w of order; Draft letter to R.

_ _ _ _-'I Stallings.
8/13/ 18

1

1.2

-

8/10/ 18

.2

--,-------:--1

7/11/ 18

200.0 0

2.5

500.0 0
--~ ---- --

~!_
1.

$

450. 0~
75.00

1---------I$
200.0 0
i-------!

$

625.0 0

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
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~~---------,------

8/1 4/1 8

--------------

--------

---

-- -- ---------

---------,,---

: Rev ise brief; Draft letter to Court;
Tel eph one calls
; to and with R. Stallings.

:

---- ---- ---- ---- - - ----- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----

8/20/18

---- ---- -,

2.2

--T --

-

-

-

--

:$

--------

550 .00

----------1 --------------

: Con fere nce with R. Stallings; Pre
pare for hearing.
----------------1.8
:$
- - - - - - - --- - - - - - 450 .00
I
---+------------1
- - -- - - - - - - - - 8/21/18
: Pre par e for and attend hearing; Pre
I
sen t argument;
1.0
$
250.00
: Con fere nce with R. and E. Stallin
gs. ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _,___
___________
9/14/18
I
: Rec eip t and review of min ute ent
ry; Draft lett er to
.3
]$
75. 00
i R. Stallings.
---+------~------------,
----------------------r---------I
-1--------------10/9/18
[ Con fere nce with Cou rt Clerk; Dra
I
I$
ft pretrial
2.0
500 .00
: me mo ran dum ; Draft motion to ext
I
I
end discovery
: cutoffs.
-------r- --

- - - -- ----+----------

I

!

-----------------

10/ l 6/ l 8

1

1_

---------------,1

---- ---- ---- ---- ----

- ---- ---- ---- - -

Pre par e for and attend pretrial; Tel
eph one
conference with R. Stallings; Dra
ft mo tion for
~ attorney's fees and costs; Draft affidav
it.
Pre par e for and attend pretrial; Tel
eph one
conference with R. Stallings; Dra
ft mo tion for
', attorney's fees and costs; Draft affi
davit.
7
I

.4

I$
I
I

I

100.00

~

1

1

-----

I

I
I

I

10/18/18

1

1

-----------------

[ Rec eip t and review of decision;
Dra ft lett er to R.
l Sta llin gs.

10/17/18

1

1

II$

1.5

1

1

r

i

:

1 --

-

1

375 .00

1

I

$

.6

- 150.00 -

:
----------------+----------"--------------'
Dra ft lett er to R. Stallings regarding
I
atto rne y's fees i
.3
[
$
75.00
: and costs.
----r-------------------------:
~
----------------+---------'----------10/23/18
1 Rec eip t and
review of min ute entry; Dra ft lett
er to I
.3
i $
75. 00
R. Stallings.
----~----------

10/22/18

I

1

1

--~----------

10/30/18

--------------

I

-------+-----

1I Rec eip t and review of mo tion to
reconsider,
me mo ran dum and affidavit; Dra ft
letter to R.
. S ta1.
lmgs; Researc h .

]

f

10/31/18
11/2/18
11/6/ l 8

1

---

Research; Tel

one
- - - - - - + - - - - - eph
-1

I

I

1

1
1

--~

I

--- --- --+ 1

11/7/18

\ Draft notice of hearing.

11/13/18

I Research; Draft brief; Tel eph
one call to and with R.
I Stallings.

___________

___________

___

:

_)_

1

$

:$

50. 00

I $

75. 00

____
:

I

3.7

~I__ _

---

--- +- --- --- --- -

.3
.3

________

_ __

$

75. 00

\$

925 .00

I_

I
I

____ L_

AMENDED ME MO RA ND UM AN
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'S FEES AND COSTS
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-

175.00

----i------

I

i

I

.7

.2

Rec eip t and review of objection;
Dra ft lett er to R.
- - - - - - + I: Sta llin gs.
--------

250 .00

-------t---------

I

----

$

I

1

con fere nce wit h R. Stallings.
--- --- --

Tel eph one conference with R. Sta
llings.

1

I

1

-+ - - - - -

:

--------------

- - -------,- ---- -

----- - - - -

-- --------- -

- - - - - -- -

!

-------- --

-

--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- -------

11/14/18

, Extended office conference withR. Stal
lings; Research.

11/15/18

Research; Revise memorandum and obje
ction; Draft
' motion to strike; Draf t letter to R. Stallings
.

-

-

-

-

..

---·---------

---

---------- -

---

--

-- - -

'

1. 7

·----------~

$

---------1--

------------ --

425 .00

·-

!

- - - - --~- -~-- --··--- ---- -·--

!

11/26/18

3.4

----- ----- ----- ----· - ---- ------- ---- -·-~ ----

I Telephone conference with attorney; Tele
'
phone calls to '
I and with R. Stal ling
s; Draf t amended notice of hearing; :
Draft letter to R.
_)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - -Stal ling s.
- - - - - - - ----

:$

-- ·-- --- --+- I

I. 10

____ ____ ____ ____ ____

1

12/1/18

.4

;

, ___ - - ----- ----- ----

$

i

100.00

--- -- - - - - - - -----1--- -- ---

:$

.4

-- - - - - - - - - - -

100.00

I

--- --- --- --- --- -·--

,--- ---- ·-1- · ---- -~- ---- -

: Telephone conference with attorney.
---

I
--------------- -----------~---L--

12/3/18

275 .00

1

Telephone call to attorney; Telephone conf
erence with
R. Stallings.

~-- --- --- ,--- --- --- --- ---

$

1_

____ ___ j_ ____ ____ ___

: Telephone conferences with attorney rega
rding hearing :
' date.

11/30/18

----- -·--- ---

:

1

11/29/18

850.00

Telephone call to and with D. Parameter;
Telephone
conference with R. Stallings; Attend hear
ing; Receipt
and review of notice; Draf t letter to R. Stal
lings.
- ---1' .
.
. . . ..
.
- .
.

I

j

.2

$

50.0 0

:$

275 .00

i

------+ -------~---

I. 10

1

1

12/4/18

.

. ..

I_

Telephone conference with attorney rega
rding status of
.
' heann
g.

-----------·-·-

----

-------1----------

12/5/18

------------------

--------- --------

: Receipt and review of text; Draf t text mes
sage to
attorney.

.2

1

$

I

'

1

12/7/18

----·-----·---------

,--

---- ---- +-· ---- --~ ----

I

-------------------

.1

:$

1

I

Receipt and review of notice; Draft letter
to R.
Stallings.

-------+--

---

·------·---------

,

25 .00

· - · - 1 ---- ---- ---! ------- -

I Telephone conference with attorney; Draf
t stipulation;
: Draft letter to D. Parameter.
---- 1-- ------ -- ---- ---·- -·--· ---·- ·------

50.0 0

•

1

-~-

12/6/18

- - - - - - - - - - --

1

I

.9

~- -ir----I

:$

---- -i ·-··- -- ---- ·--- --

.3

\$

I

-~-----------·--

225 .00
75.00

·

---~-,-

-----·~--: Telephone conference with R. Stallings
regarding
\
.5
i $
125.00
I vaca ted hear ing;
Draft letter to R. Stallings; Draft order.
-------+.
\
---------~---------·--------7------7-----------12/17/18
i Receipt and review of order; Draf t lette
r to R. Stallings. I
.3
$
75.00

12/11/18

1

1

1/18/19

Receipt and review of decision; Draft lette
r to R.
Stallings; Tele pho ne conference with R.
Stallings;
i Draft supp lem enta l affidavit.
-----~
I

7 . 1.3

1

1/21/19

-~---

1 Exte nde d office conference with R. Stal
lings
regarding decision and possibility of appe
al.

.

Ts-

--;~ 5~0 ~-

:
1

--l----------t-

1.7

I

TO T AL ATT OR NEY 'S FEE S:

---------·-

i $

425 .00

I

70.6

$

18,400.00

AM END ED ME MO RA ND UM AN D
AFF IDA VIT OF ATT OR NEY 'S FEE
S AN D CO STS
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-

7.

To the best of my knowledge and beli ef the

above enumerated costs and fees are correct,
and

that the costs and fees claimed are in com
pliance with IRCP 54.
8.

Tha t I have read the foregoing affidavit,
and I hereby certify (or declare) under pen
alty of
perjury pursuant to the law of the State of
Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct.
FUR THE R your affiant saith not.
.-,,,z

DA TED this 1/ 5' ~day of January, 2019.

1/fe d M. Harris

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-~

I certify that on this J-.-~ · day of January,
2019, I served a true and correct copy of
the
following-described document on the pers
on(s) listed below by the method indicate
d.
Document Served:

Person(s) Served:

AMENDED ME MO RA ND UM AND AFF
IDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS
David N. Parmenter
PARMENTER & RIVERA, LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
parlaw@gmail.com

/

( ) Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
(1) iCourt Email

Jared M. Ham s

AMENDED ME MO RA ND UM AND AFF
IDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS
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Filed: 02/27/2019 13:48:11
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Cammack, Brandee

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: jharris@ bakerha rrislaw. com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRI CT COURT OF THE SEVEN TH JUDICIAL DISTRI CT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT Y OF BINGHAM
JON GREGO RY, an individual,
I

Case No. CV-2017-1651

Plaintiffs,
V.

RICHA RD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLIN GS, an individual,

ORDER GRANTING AMEN DED
MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Defendants.
THE UNDER SIGNED , having conside red the foregoing Amende d Motion for Award
of
Attorne y's Fees and Costs filed on January 25, 2019. and with no objection having been
filed, and
it appearin g that the Court being fully advised in the law and the premises and good cause

appearing

therefore;
IT IS HEREB Y ORDER ED that the Defenda nts' Amended Motion for Award of Attorne
y's
Fees and Costs and Defendants are granted costs in the sum of $136.00 and attorney 's
fees in the
sum of $18,400 .00 for total judgme nt in the sum of $18,536.00.
DATED _2-21-2019
_ _ _ __

Signed: 2/21/2019 09:28 AM

ORDER GRANTING AMENDED MOTIO N FOR A WARD OF ATTOR NEY'S FEES
AND
COSTS -1
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CLERK' S CERTIFI CATE OF SERVIC E
I certify that on this _
27th
_ day of February , 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the
following -describe d documen t on the person(s) listed below by the method indicated.
Documen t Served:

Person(s) Served:

ORDER GRANT ING AMEND ED MOTIO N FOR AW ARD OF
ATTOR NEY'S FEES AND COSTS
Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
efiling@ bakerharr islaw.com

(✓)

iCourt E-Mail

David N. Parmente r
PARMEN TER & RIVERA , LLP
53 South Shilling
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-4858
parlaw@ gmail.com

( ✓)

iCourt E-Mail

Pamela W. Eckhardt
CLERK OF THE COURT
By:
Deputy Clerk

Signed: 2/27/2019 01:48 PM
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Filed: 02/27/2019 13:48:47
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Cammack, Brandee
Filed: 02/27/2019 13:48:45
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Cammack, Brandee

Jared M. Harris
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Telephone: (208) 785-2310
Facsimile: (208) 785-6749
E-Mail: j harris@bakerharrisla w .com
Idaho State Bar No. 4488
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual,
Case No. CV-2017-1651

Plaintiffs,
V.

JUDGMENT

RICHARD ST ALLINGS , an individual, and
EILEEN ST ALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.
JUDGM ENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: IT IS HEREBY ORDE
RED AND
ADJUDGED that Defendants Richard Stallings and Eileen Stallings, have and recover

from Plaintiff

Jon Gregory, judgme nt as follows:
Costs
Attorney's Fees
TOTA L JUDGMENT

$
136.00
$18,40 0.00
$18,53 6.00

The total judgme nt shall accrue interest at the lawful rate of 7.375%; that executi
on may issue on
the foregoing instrument
DATED - 2-21-2019
----

Signed: 2/21/2019 09:31 AM

JUDG MENT -I
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CLERK 'S CERTI FICAT E OF SERVI CE
I certify that on this _
_ day of February, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the
27th
following-described docum ent on the person(s) listed below by the method
indicated.
Docum ent Served:

Person(s) Served:

JUDGMENT

Jared M. Harris

( ✓)

iCourt E-Mail

( ✓)

iCourt E-Mail

BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
efiling @bake rharris law.co m
David N. Parmen ter
PARM ENTER & RIVER A, LLP
53 South Shillin g
Blackfoot, ID 83221
Fax No. (208) 785-48 58
parlaw @gmai l.com

Pamela W. Eckhardt

By:
Signed: 2/27/2019 01:49 PM
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Electronically Filed
2/27/2019 3:03 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Brandee Cammack, Deputy Clerk

DAYID N. PARMENTER
NATHAND. RIVERA
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208)785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY,

Case. No. CV-2017-1651

Appellant,
vs.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
RICHARD STALLINGS, an
individual, and EILEEN
STALLINGS, an individual,
Respondents.

TO:
THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, RICHARD STALLINGS
AND EILEEN STALLINGS, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, JARED HARRIS, 266 W.
Bridge St., Blackfoot, Idaho 83221, AND THE CLERIC OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named appellant, JON GREGORY an individual, appeals against the
above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration, entered in the above entitled action on the 18th Day of January 2019, Honorable
Danen B. Simpson, presiding. A copy of the judgment or order being appealed is attached to this

Notice of Appeal
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notice, as well as a copy of the final judgment since this is an appeal form an order entered after
final judgment.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)
I.A.R. This appeal is taken upon matters of law and upon matters of fact.
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant
from asserting other issues on appeal. A preliminary statement of the issues is as follows:
Whether the District Court erred in denying appellant's motion for reconsideration?
Whether the statute of limitations for breach of contract runs from when the respondent
advised appellant that he decided not to pay his just obligations, or from some earlier time?
Whether a claim accrues for breach of contract before appellant is made aware that
respondent was determined not to pay him?
Whether the facts and circumstances would have put a reasonably prudent person on
notice of breach prior to the actual notice, or whether the evidence supports appellant's claim
that he was lulled into a false sense of security as to the time of the breach?
Whether the equitable doctrines of unjust emichment or equitable estopped prevent
respondent from raising a statue oflimitations defense prior to actually notifying appellant of his
intent not to pay appellant?
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

21Page
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5. The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the Reporter's
transcript in both hard copy and electronic fotmat:
Motion for Summary Judgment held on August 21, 2018 in its entirety.

6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
7. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a transcript has
been requested as named below at the address set out below:
There was no comt rep01ter; Motion for Summaty Judgment was only recorded.
(b) That the clerk of the district court will be paid the estimated fee for preparation of the
rep01ter's transcript upon receipt by the Appellant of the estimated costs.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record will be paid upon receipt by the
Appellant of the estimated cost.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 20.

f:-DATED this 2°day of

_-·-

&'73. , 2019.

DAVIDN. PARMENTER
Attorney for Appellant

3IPage
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Jon Gregory being sworn, deposes and says:
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this notice of
appeal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of

1-tt-lHM
1

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

DAVID N PARMENTER

N&".e...~019.

~.___--7

-t---eeril\M-N,.o. 220a

1y

l' 7 ctay of

Notary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, residing at

cnm~~/~~~g

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: JULY 23, 2020

$C,.lj<-<L,/f&:,r'tri_erein

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HERBY CERTIFY that on the Z-7'day of

~,/,e{o/019, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to the following parties in the manner noted below:

Attorney for the Respondents RJCHARD STALLINGS AND EILEEN STALLINGS
Jared Harris
Baker & HatTis
266 W. Bridge St.
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

[
[
[

]
]
]

[ ✓]

By pre-paid post
By hand delivety
By facsimile transmission
By iComi email

David N. Prnmenter
Attorney for Appellant
41Page
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Filed:10/15/2018 17:35:42
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual,

)

CASE NO. CV-2017-1651

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

RJCHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
and EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

)
)
)

Defendants.

I.

)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Jon Gregory (hereinafter "Gregory") filed the above-numbered lawsuit
against Defendants Richard Stallings, an individual, and Eileen Stallings, an individual
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Stallings") and claimed breach of contract,
breach of implied contract, and quantum meruit. 1 The Stallings now move for snnnnary
judgment as to all of Gregory's claims. 2 Gregory objects to the Stallings' Motion. 3

1

Verified Complaint, Grego1y v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed September 6,
2017) (hereinafter "Gregory's Complaint").
2
Motion for Summary Judgment, Grego1J> v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed
July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Motion").
3
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Grego,y v.
Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 19, 2018) (hereinafter "Gregory's
Opposition").
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1

A hearing was held on the Stallings' Motion on August 21, 2018. 4 Based upon
the record, the parties' arguments, and the relevant authorities, the Stallings' Motion shall
be granted.

II.

ISSUES

The Stallings contend that Gregory's three causes of action against them are
barred by the statute of limitations and by the Statute of Frauds. 5 Gregory responds that a
valid contract existed between him and the Stallings,' which does not fall within the
Statute of Frauds. 7 In the alternative, Gregmy maintains that an implied contract existed
between the parties.' At the very least, Gregory argues, a quasi-contract existed between
the parties.' If the Statute of Frauds bars enforcement of the alleged contract, Gregory
pleads equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel to prevent the Stallings from allegedly
receiving "unjust results.'' 10
The Stallings object to the affidavits of Garrett Sandow' 1 and Jon Gregory" on the
bases of hearsay, lack of foundation, relevance, the best evidence rule, stating a legal
conclusion, and speculation. 13
The parties' arguments raise the following issues in light of the relevant
authorities:

4

Minute Entry, Grego,y v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 21, 2018).
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Greg01y v. Stallings, Bingham County case
no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Memorandum"), at pp. 3-4.
6
Greg01y's Opposition, at pp. 2-3.
7
Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 5-7.
8
Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 3.
5

9

Gregorfs Opposition, at p. 4.
Gregory's Opposition, at pp. 7-10.

10

11
See; Affidavit ofGanett Sandow, Grego,y v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed
July 19, 2018) (hereinafter the "Sandow Affidavit").
12
See: Affidavit of Jon Gregory, Grego1J' v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July
19, 2018) (hereinafter the "G.-egory Affidavit").
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2

1.

Should portions of the Sandow Affidavit be stricken from consideration on

summary judgment?
2.

Should portions of the Gregory Affidavit be stricken from consideration

on summary judgment?
3.

Is Gregory's breach of contract action barred by the Idaho Statute of

Frauds?
4.

Is Gregory's breach of contract action barred by the applicable statute of

limitations?

III.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Gregory purchased two (2) acres of a four (4) acre parcel of land in

Rexburg, Idaho because he wanted to develop the property into student housing or a
similar commercial venture. 14
2.

On September 27, 2007, Gregory sold an approximately two (2) acre

parcel of land to the Stallings." The two-acre parcel purchased by the Stallings was
contiguous to the two-acre parcel owned by Gregory. 16 According to Gregory, this
purchase represented the other lwo acres of the four-acre parcel in Rexburg. 17
3.

On February 2, 2009, Gregory transferred his interest in his two-acre

parcel to Pioneer Point LLC. 18 Gregory asselis that Pioneer Point LLC was to develop

13

Objection to the Affidavits of Garrett Sandow and Jon Gregory, Greg01y v. Stallings, Bingham County
case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 14, 2018) (hereinafter tl1e "Stallings' Objections to Affidavits").
14
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 1 5.
15
Affidavit of Richard Stallings in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Greg01y v. Stallings,
Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings Affidavit"), at p.
1, 12; and at Exhibit A.
16
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 1, 13.
17
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2,116, 7.
18
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, 14; and at Exhibit B.
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the prope1ty, put in roads, parking lots, sewer, and water, and to begin constmction on at
least two buildings. 19
4.

On December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings entered into a

constmction loan with Century Mortgage Company
... to finance a part of the cost of constmction of certain improvements
upon the described premises in accordance with plans and specifications
that have been or will be deposited by [Pioneer Poiut, LLC and the
Stallings] with [Centu1y Mortgage Company]. 20
The constmction work was to be completed seven calendar months from December 8,
2010. 21
5.

On the same date, December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings

signed a promissory note, in the amount of $945,000, to va1ious lenders, with the promise
to pay the note within six (6) months, or by June 10, 2009, with an option to extend for
another six (6) months."
6.

On May 2, 2012, Pioneer Point LLC transferred what had been Gregory's

property to Richard Stallings. 23
7.

On December 21, 2012, the Stallings sold both parcels of property to

Rockwell Court Limited Partnership for the sum of $1,086,438.89. 24

According to

Gregory, following the sale of the property, all of the mortgage investors were paid back
their initial investments. 25

19
20

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, 18.
Gregory's Complaint, at Exllibit A.

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit A, p. 1, if 1.
Gregory's Complaintj at Exhibit B.
23
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 5.
24
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
25
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4, 119; and at Exhibit D, p. 1.
21

22
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8.

Prior to the sale, on November 14, 2012, Richard Stallings informed

Gregory, through attorney Garrett Sandow, that he "plan[ned] on taking the following
amounts and then giv[ e] the balance of each draw to Garret Sandow for Johns [sic]
disperse! [sic]. First draw 106,000 second draw 150,000."26
9.

On September 9, 2013, an e-mail from Richard Stallings (originally date

August 27, 2013) was forwarded to attorney Garrett Sandow. 27 In his e-mail, Richard
Stallings wrote, inter alia: "In conclusion I feel in order for me to get a return on my
investment there is no money owed to John from the current sell. " 28
10.

Gregoty sued the Stallings for breach of contract on September 6, 2017. 29
IV.

A.

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Standard of Review - Motion for Summary Judgment.
1.

If the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any

affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summaty judgment may be granted. 30
Disputed facts are constrned in favor of the non-moving party and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. 31
2.

The party moving for summaty judgment (in this case, the Stallings) has

the burden of presenting admissible evidence showing that there is an absence of any

26

Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
28
Id.
27

29

Gregorfs Complaint, at p. 1.

30

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a); Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d
694, 698 (2009); G & M Fanns v. F11nk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-7, 808 P.2d 851, 853-4 (1991).
31
B11shi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698; Lockheed Martin Co1p. v. Idaho
State TCL< Commission, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006).
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genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issues raised by the summaiy judgment
1notion. 32

3.

If the moving party demonsh·ates the absence of a question of material

fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate an issue of mate1ial fact that
will preclude summary judgment. 33
4.

The non-moving party (in this case, Gregory) cannot merely rest on its

pleadings. 34 When faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing party
must show material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of sununaiy judgment. 35
5.

While the moving paity must prove the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, 36 the opposing party cannot simply speculate. 37 A mere scintilla of evidence is
not enough to create a genuine factual issue. 38 Summaty judgment is approp1iate when the
non-moving party cannot establish the essential elements of the claim. 39
6.

If reasonable persons could reach diffeling conclnsions on material issues, or

draw conflicting inferences therefrom, then the motion for summaiy judgment mnst be
denied.40

32

Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932,938,265 P.3d 1144, 1150 (2011).
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 317, 246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010).
34
Partout v. Hmper, 145 Idaho 683, 688, 183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008); R. G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho
409,410, 797P.2d 117,118 (1990).
35
Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912,919, 188 P.3d 854,861 (2008).
36 Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210, 214 (2008); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho
792, 798, 41 P.3d 220,226 (2001).
37
Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205,211 (2008).
38 Van v. Portneiif Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009); West v. Sanke, 132 Idaho
133, 138,968 P.2d 228,233 (1998).
39
Snmme,~ v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004);
Dekker v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332,333, 766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989).
40 Van v. Porhie1if Medical Center, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,
873,204 P.3d 508,513 (2009).
33
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B.

Admissibility of Affidavit Testimony.
1.

Admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits in support of or in

opposition to a motion for summaiy judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed before
applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to dete1mine whether the
evidence creates a genuine issue of mate1ial fact for trial.41
2.

Affidavits may be used to suppmt or defend a motion for smnmaiy judgment

as long as they are "made on personal knowledge, set out facts which would be admissible
in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated. "42 These requirements "are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based
on hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge." 43
3.

Affidavits may be used to show a genuine issue of material fact where the

affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. 44
4.

"Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the

testimony of the witness."45 Thus, "an affidavit need not contain an explicit recital of
personal knowledge when it can be reasonably infeITed from its contents that the material
parts thereof are within the affiant's personal knowledge."46
5.

A trial coutt's determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in

connection with a motion for smmnary judgment is discretionary. 47

In exercising its

discretion, a trial court must: (a) correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion; (b) act

41

MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos, 163 Idaho 252,409 P.3d 832,835 (2018).
MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos) 163 Idaho at_, 409 P.3d at 836 [citing: Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c)(4)).
43
Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 369 P.3d 299 (2016) [citing: State v. Shama Resources Limited
Partnership, 127 Idaho 267,271,899 P.2d 977,981 (1995)).
44 Id.
45
Idaho Rule of Evidence 602.
46 Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho at 86,369 P.3d at 304 [citing: 2A .J.S. Affidavit§ 47).
42
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within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the consideration of the issue; (c) reach its decision by an exercise of

reason. 4 &
C.

Relevance of Evidence.
1.

When a trial comt is being asked to admit or to strike evidence, the initial

inquiry is whether the evidence is relevant. 49
2.

"Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the

action, and has any tendency to make the existence of a fact more probable than it would
be without the evidence, is relevant. "50
3.

All relevant evidence is admissible, while evidence which is not relevant

is not admissible. 51
4.

Relevant evidence can be excluded "if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues , ... waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 52

D.

The Best Evidence Rule.
1.

The best evidence rnle states that "to prove the content of a writing,

recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required,
except as othe1wise provided in these mies or by statute. " 53

47

Green v. Green, 161 Idaho 675,679, 389 P.3d 961,965 (2017).
Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
49 Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281,287,385 P.3d 459,465 (2016).
so !I.!; Idaho Rule of Evidence 40 I.
51
Id; Idaho Rule of Evidence 402.
52
Id; Idaho Rule of Evidence 403.
53
State v. Rodriguez, 161 Idaho 368, 370, 386 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2017) [citing: Idaho Rule of
Evidence 1002].
48
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2.

The purpose of the best evidence rule is to safeguard against inaccuracies

or fraud by requiring the production of original documents. 54
3.

The best evidence rule directs a party that to prove content, the party must

produce the original, a duplicate, or offer an adequate explanation why the party cannot
do so. 55
E.

Real Party in Interest.

I.

An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 56

2.

The Idaho Supreme Comt has clatified the phrase "real party in interest"

as follows:
The real party in interest is the one who has a real, actual, material or
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, the primary object
being to save a defendant from further suits covering the same demand or
subject matter, i.e., the real party in interest is the person who can
discharge the claim upon which the suit is brought and control the action
brought to enforce it, and who is entitled to the benefits of the action, if
successful, and can fully protect the one paying the claim or judgment
against subsequent suits covering the same subject matter, by other
persons. 57

3.

An assignee is the real party in interest to bring an action, and the assignor

is not the real party in interest and has no standing to prosecute an action on the chose in
action. 58

54

State v. Rodriguez, 161 Idaho at 370,386 P.3d at 511 [citing: Federal Rule of Evidence 1001, advisory

committee's note 1972].
55
State v. Rodriguez, 161 Idaho at 370, 386 P.3d at 511 [citing: Idaho Rule of Evidence 1002, 1003;

Federal Rule of evidence 1002, 1003].
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).
51
MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos, 163 Idaho at~' 409 P.3d at 835 [citing: Caughey v. George Jensen &
Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 134-5, 258 P.2d 357,359 (1953)].
58
MFG Financial, Inc. v. Vigos, 163 Idaho at~ 409 P.3d at 835 [citing: McCluskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho
472, 474-5, 511 P.2d 289, 291-2 (1973)].

56
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F.

Breach of Contract Actions.
The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the

1.

contract, (b) the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the
amount of those damages. 59
2.

A contract will be enforced if it is "complete, definite and ce1iain in all its

material terms, or contain[ s] provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced
to a ce1iainty. 60
3.
G.

The question as to the existence of an oral contract is one of fact. 61

Statute of Frauds.
1.

An interest in real property (other than leases not exceeding one year)

cannot be created without a written instrnment. 62
2.

An agreement that by its terms is not to be perf01med within a year from

the making of the agreement is invalid unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or his agent. 63
H.

Statute of Limitations.
1.

Generally, a cause of action accrues when one party may maintain a

lawsuit against another. 64
2.

A cause of action for breach of contract accrnes upon breach for limitation

purposes. 65

59

Franklin Building Supply Company, Inc. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632,637,339 P.3d 357, 362 (2014).
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,770,890 P.2d 714, 721 (1995).
61
Id.
62
Idaho Code§ 9-503.
63
Idaho Code§ 9-505.1.
64
Westen, Co1poration v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 151, 158 P.3d 313,314 (Ct. App. 2006).
65
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008).

60
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3.

The question of when the breach occurred is a factual one. 66 Courts must

look to the record for sufficient and competent evidence to support the findings. 67

V.
A.

DISCUSSION

The Sandow Affidavit.
The Stallings object to "any pmtion" of the Sandow Affidavit that references

statements made by Gregory or by Richard Stallings. 68 The Stallings argue that such
references are hearsay. 69 They also contend that the references lack foundation because
'[t]here is no indication when, where, or with whom the discussions occuned." 70 Gregory
did not respond to the Stallings' Objections to Affidavits.
The Stallings' broad objection to any references to statements by Gregory or
Richard Stallings does not provide appropriate identification of the specific statements
the Stallings seek to exclude. This Court should not be required to search the record for
error. 71

Next, the Stallings object to paragraph 5 of the Sandow Affidavit on the grounds
of relevance. 72 In paragraph 5, Sandow states:
Exhibit O is a letter I received from Teni Merkley relative to a loan made
to Richard and Eileen Stallings in the matter, directed to me. 73
Exhibit 0, attached to the Sandow Affidavit, evinces the December 6, 2012 letter from
Teni L. Merkley, owner/broker of Empire Funding, to Sandow. 74

66

Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho at 770,890 P.2d at 721.
Id.
68
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 1, 1[ 1.
69
Id.
70 Id.
11
Vulkv. Haley, 112 ldaho 855,857, 736 P.2d 1309, 131 I (1987).
72
Stallings' Objections to Affidavit, at p. I, ii 2.
73
Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 5
74
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit 0.
67
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Sandow may testify as to conespondence he received. As the Stallings point out,
however, nothing in Exhibit O appears to be relevant to Gregmy's claims in this lawsuit.
For these reasons, paragraph 5 of the Sandow Affidavit, together with Exhibit 0, shall be
stricken for purposes of the Stallings' Motion.
The Stallings then object to paragraph 6 of the Sandow Affidavit as hearsay and
lacking foundation." Paragraph 6 of the Sandow Affidavit reads:
I understand they had a joint, mutual interest because of their
separate, individual investments in the property in question. 76
This statement is conoborated by the affidavit of Richard Stallings, wherein
Richard Stallings states that both he and Gregory bought real property, the portions being
contiguous to each other, Gregory's property was transferred to Pioneer Point, LLC and
then to Richard Stallings, and that Richard Stallings sold both pieces of property. 77 The
Stallings Affidavit provides dates of the land sale purchases and sales. 78

Because

Sandow's statements in paragraph 6 of his Affidavit are cotrnborated by the Stalling
Affidavit, paragraph 6 of the Sandow Affidavit shall be admitted.
Next, the Stallings object to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Sandow's Affidavit as
violating the best evidence mle. 79 Paragraphs 8 and 9 read:
On November 14, 2012 I received an email from Richard Stallings
(Exhibit M). In that email, he advised of his proposed division of
Stallings and Gregory's mutual interest, by proposing to pay, through me,
Jon Gregory's share in their mutual interests upon sale of the property. 80 ·

Stallings' Objections to Affidavit, at p. 1, ~ 3.
Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 6.
77
Stallings Affidavit, at pp. 1-2.
7s Id.
79
Stallings, Objections to Affidavit, at p. 2, ,i 4.
80
Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 8.
75
76
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On or about December 27, 2012, I received a second email. A statement
from Richard Stallings, proposing that the amount to be paid to Jon
Gregoty was $155,482.28 (Exhibit N)."
Exhibit M to the Sandow Affidavit is an e-mail communication from Richard
Stallings to Ganett Sandow, dated November 14, 2012. 82
handwriting on it, which shall not be considered.

It contains nnidentified

Exhibit N reveals a statement to

Richard Stallings, showing an amount due of $144,517.72. 83
Sandow may testify as to what he received by e-mail, but Exhibits M and N are
the best evidence of the infonnation communicated in those e-mails. Exhibits M and N
shall be admitted for consideration of the Stallings' Motion, except for the nnidentified
handwriting on Exhibit M.
The first sentence of paragraph 8 to the Sandow Affidavit shall also be admitted.
The second sentence of paragraph 8 shall not be considered, since Exhibit M is the best
evidence of the November 14, 2012 e-mail's contents.
The portion of paragraph 9 to the Sandow Affidavit which reads "On or about
December 27, 2012, I received a second email, a statement from Richard Stallings .... "
The remainder of paragraph 9 shall not be considered.
Finally, the Stallings object to paragraph 11 of the Sandow Affidavit as hearsay,
lacking foundation, and in violation of the best evidence rnle. 84 Sandow's paragraph 11
states:
I did not hear much more on the matter from Mr. Stallings or Mr. Gregory,
until I received an email from Tim Cobb, another individual who is
involved in the matter peripherally. The email was dated September 9,

Sandow Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 9.
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
83
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit N.
84
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, 1 5.
81

82
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2013, and included au email from Richard Stallings essentially advising
me that he had decided that he was not going to pay Jon Gregory anything
for his mutual interests, and that according to him, there was no money
owed to Jon Gregory from the cunent sale. I passed that infonnation on to
Jon Gregory, as I had the other emails /Exhibit I). His decision not to pay
Jon Gregory was a breach of my understanding of their joint venture and
mutual interest in the property. 85
Sandow may testify as to his contacts with various persons, and the dates of those
contacts. The contents of Exhibit I should be interpreted pursuant to the best evidence
rule: that is, the communications in Exhibit I speak for themselves.

The underlined

p01tions of paragraph 11 shall be considered within the adjudication of the Stallings'
Motion, as shall be the contents of Exhibit I.

The remainder of the paragraph (the

portions that are not underlined), shall not be considered.

B.

The Gregory Affidavit.
The Stallings also object to paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the Gregory Affidavit on the

basis ofrelevance. 86 Those paragraphs read as follows:
Over the course of my working with Surmnit Mortgage on several
projects, including this one, it was common for me to purchase the 01iginal
prope1ty, and then transfer my interest to them or subordinate my interest
so they could complete their part of the development. I generally received
at the end of each project with Summit reimbursement for my
expenditures for the ground, and 50% of any profits or proceeds from the
development or sale thereof.
We also generally set up a limited liability company for each of the
several projects - and used the name Pioneer Point, LLC for this particular
project.
I may have transfened my interest to Smmnit on paper, but it was a
similar transaction and business operation that we had engaged in several
times before. 87

85

Sandow Affidavit, at p. 3, ~ 11 (emphasis added).

86

Stallings, Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2,

87

Gregmy Affidavit, at p. 2, ~~ 5, 6, 7.
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In his Complaint, Gregory alleges that Summit Development is also known as

Pioneer Point, LLC. 88 Whether or not Gregory engaged in a similar course of conduct
with regard to land development in the past is not relevant insofar as the statute of
limitations and the Statute of Frauds, which are ultimately dispositive of Gregory's
lawsuit, are concerned.

Therefore, any facts regarding former courses of dealings

between Gregory and Sunnnit Development, also known as Pioneer Point, LLC, shall not
be considered in the adjudication of the Stallings' Motion.
The Stallings object to paragraph 8 of the Gregory Affidavit on the grounds of
relevance and stating a legal conclusion. 89 In paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, Gregory
testified:
Further, in order to assist with the transition and sale of the property, I had
been required to subordinate my interest to that of Pioneer Point, given the
investments of some of the parties they were working with to come up
with the money. Nevertheless, that did not change mutual interests and
ownership that Richard and I had between ourselves. 90
That Gregory transfened his interest in the property to Pioneer Point is found
elsewhere in the record. 91 Ownership of property, on the other hand, is determined by the
law, rather than any tacit understanding between parties. Therefore, the second sentence
in paragraph 8 of the Gregory Affidavit shall not be considered herein.
The Stallings object to paragraph 9 of the Gregory Affidavit as hearsay and
lacking foundation. 92 Paragraph 9 states:
I was aware that Pioneer Point LLC had h·ansfened back their interest in
the property to us or Mr. Stallings because they had no funds to pay for

88

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, ,i 8.

Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ~ 7.
90
Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 8.
91
See: Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, 1[ 4.
92
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ~ 8.
89

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 282

constrnction funding, and wanted us to take the project back over by
quitclaim deed but we continued to work on sale together in order to try
and accomplish a liquidation of the property that would henefit our
interest mutually. 93
The reasons for the transfer of property ownership, and the continuing business
relations of the parties have no bearing upon the dispositive stah1te of limitations and
Statute of Frauds determinations. Accordingly, paragraph 9 of the Gregory Affidavit
shall not bear further consideration herein.
The Stallings object to paragraph 11 of the Gregory Affidavit "as lacking
foundat6ion as to what if anything Richard Stallings was using Garrett Sandow for." 94
Gregory may testify as to the reasons why he consulted attomey Garrett Sandow.
Gregory may not speak for Richard Stallings, however. That portion of paragraph 11
which refers to the reasons why Richard Stallings consulted Sandow shall not be
considered in this opinion.
The Stallings complain of Gregory's statements in paragraph 12 of his Affidavit
as hearsay and lacking foundation. 95 In paragraph 12 of his Affidavit, Gregory affies:
Mr. Stallings agreed to pay me the balance of any funds from the sale after
he received back his original investment amount. That was the reason he
f01warded the letter from Terry Merkley (Exhibit 0) from Empire Funding
to establish his original investment amount minus the $30,000.00 draw he
had already taken. He also received at least one extension fee to his credit
from the buyers, which was an additional several thousand dollars. 96
Richard Stallings' November 14, 2012 e-mail to Ga1Tett Sandow97 states:
I plan on taking the following amounts and then giving the balance of each
draw to Garret Sandow for Jobns disperse! [sic].

Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 9.
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ~ 9.
95
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ~ 10.
96
Greg01y Affidavit, at p. 3, ~ 12.
97
See: Sandow Affidavit, Exhibit M.
93

94
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First draw
second draw

106,000
150,00098

Such language may signify an intent to pay, but does not amount to a written agreement
to pay the balance of the draws to Gregory.
Although Exhibit M to the Sandow Affidavit shall be considered in adjudicating
the Stallings' Motion, Gregory's interpretation of Exhibit M shall not be considered.
Neither shall Gregory's opinion as to the reasons other people took ce1tain actions be
considered herein.
The Stallings object to paragraph 18 of the Greg01y Affidavit as a violation of the
best evidence rule. 99 Paragraph 18 reads:
On September 9, 2013, I was f01warded an email that I received from Mr.
Sandow, advising that Mr. Stallings felt he owed me nothing, and that he
was keeping all of the funds and money from the sale of the property
(Exhibit I). He also advised me that I had four years from the date of the
notice I received, September 9, 2013, to file legal action. 100
Gregory may testify as to the date he received an e-mail from Mr. Sandow. The
content of Richard Stallings' communication, contained in Exhibit I to the Sandow
Affidavit, speaks for itself. As for any legal advice Gregory received from Mr. Sandow,
that is hearsay and shall be excluded from fmther consideration.
C.

The Statute of Frauds does Not Apply to Gregory's Lawsuit against the
Stallings.
In support of their argument that the contract alleged by Gregory is ban·ed by the

Idaho Statute of Frauds, the Stallings simply aver: "There is no contract, memorandum or

98

Id.
Stallings' Objections to Affidavits, at p. 2, ~ 11.
100
Gregmy Affidavit, at p. 4, ~ 18.

99
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written docwnent signed by Defendants which reflect any alleged tenns of a contract.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs's [sic] Complaint should be dismissed." 101
In light of the evidence in the record, it appears an oral agreement between

Gregory and the Stallings was f01med. Gregory alleges that he wanted to develop a
parcel of land for commercial purposes. 102 He alleges that he pmchased two (2) of the
four (4) desired acres of land, but sought to acquire the other two acres to complete the
planned development. 103 He contends that Richard Stallings agreed to pmchase the other
two acres of land for the purpose of going into partnership with Gregory to commercially
develop the entire fom acres. 104
Richard Stallings concedes he did purchase the contiguous two-acre parcel. 105 In
his November 14, 2012 e-mail to Ga11'ett Sandow, Stallings wrote:
The entire project was under John [sic] watch. I totally left everything up
to his disgression [sic]. I am very disappointed that we sold this property
under his advisment [sic] to some one who bairnwed [sic] hard money on
it. This mined potential profits thst [sic] would have been good for both
ofus.
My mistake was putting this in Johns [sic] hands. I feal [sic] if he would
have been more ascertive [sic] we would not be in this position. For this
reason I feal [sic] that Ishould [sic] at least get the money that I invested
into this property back. 106
Gregory alleges that Summit Development, also known as Pioneer Point LLC
became involved as the developers for the commercial venture. 107 Gregory transferred his

101
102
103

Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 4.
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, "ii 4.
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, "ii 5.

Gregmy's Complaint, at p. 2, ~~ 6, 7.
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 1, ~ 2.
106
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
107
Gregorfs Complaint, at p. 2, ,i 8.
104
105
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interest in his two-acre parcel to Summit Development. '0' He asse1ts that the reason for
the transfer in interest was to allow Summit Mortgage to "complete their part of the
development."' 09
Gregory maintains that the real estate market crashed around 2007 and defeated
his (and Richard Stallings') mutual effmts to develop the properties, causing Gregory and
the Stallings to take efforts to sell the properties. llo They ultimately sold the prope1ties
for $1,086,438.89. ll' Gregory claims that the Stallings kept all of the proceeds of the
sale. 112 Richard Stallings' e-mails indicate that he initially planned to give some of the
prope1ty sale proceeds to Gregory, 113 but later dete1mined to retain all of the proceeds for
himself. 114

In his answers to inte1rngatories, Gregory defined the agreement as: "The patties
were partners/a joint venture to share profits equally after consideration and repayment of
their 01iginal respective investments." 115 Garrett Sandow understood that he was to assist
Gregory in reviewing contracts and other matters relative to a mutual interest Gregmy
and Richru·d Stallings had in ce1tain real property. l1 6
Thus, the record reflects that Gregory and the Stallings formed an understanding
with regard to the commercial development of prope1ty in Rexburg, and took action in

Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 7.
Gregory Affidavit, at p. 2, ,is.
llo Gregory's Complaint, atpp. 3-4, ~~ 14-18.
111
Gregory's Complaint) at Exhibit D.
112
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4, ,-J 25.
3
ll Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
114
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
115
Affidavit of Jared M. HatTis in Support of Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Grego1y v. Stallings, Bingham County ease no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 14, 2018)
(hereinafter the "Harris Affidavit"), at Exhibit A.
llG Sandow Affidavit, at p. I,~ 2.
108

109
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f\ntherance of that end.

The Stallings contend that the prope1ty "got improved." 117

Although nothing in the record show what improvements were ultimately completed on
the property, the Stallings' Reply infers that indeed the nature of the parties' relationship
with regard to the two two-acre parcels of land in Rexburg had to do with improving the
prope1ty.
Fmihermore, although the Stallings argue that any claim Grego1y may have to the
proceeds should be against Pioneer Point LLC, 118 to whom Gregory transferred his parcel
before the parcel was transfeITed to Richard Stallings,'" Richard Stallings specifically
stated that he planned to pay part of the proceeds from the property sale to Gregory. 120
Richard Stallings made no mention whatsoever of Pioneer Point LLC in his November
14, 2012 e-mail regarding the proceeds oftbe land sale. 121 Neither is Pioneer Point LLC
mentioned in Richard Stalliugs' August 27, 2013 e-mail (forwarded to Garrett Sandow on
September 9, 2013). 122 Richard Stallings never asserted, in either of his communications
regarding the payout from the land sale, that Gregory should look to Pioneer Point LLC
for his share of the sale proceeds. 123 Fmthennore, on the "Seller's Final Settlement
Statement," which show the sale of the property to Rockwell Court Limited Partnership,
the "seller" is listed as Richard and Eileen Stallings. 124 Richard and Eileen Stallings

117

Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Grego,y v. Stallings, Bingham
County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed August 14, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Reply").
118
Stallings' Reply, at p. 3.
119
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, 1 5; and at Exhibit C.
120
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.

Id.
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
123
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhlbits I, M.
124
Gregmy's Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 1.
121
122
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signed the "Seller's Final Settlement Statement." 125 No place is included on the statement
for a signature by Pioneer Point LLC.
Instead, the record infers that the "agreement" upon which Gregory sues was
between Gregory and the Stallings. It appears that a number of complex interactions took
place in order to promote the land development project, but Richard Stallings ultimately
looked to Gregory, not any of the other third-party players, as the person to whom final
proceeds might be due.

In summary, the oral contract in this case was not a contract for the sale of land.
It was an agreement for the development of commercial prope1ty. The commercial loan

for constrnction of the development expected completion within seven (7) months. Thus,
the project could arguably have been performed within one year. The sale of the prope1ty
after the venture failed (or perhaps after the venture ran out of funding before ultimate
completion) was incidental to the overall agreement. 126
For these reasons, the Statute of Frauds has no bearing on this lawsuit and does
not form a basis for granting the Stallings' Motion.
D.

The Statute of Limitations for Oral Contracts Bars Gregory's Lawsuit.

The statute of limitations applicable to an oral contact is fom (4) years. 127 The
Stallings argue, and the record reflects that if an agreement existed between the parties,
then the agreement was made orally. 128 Gregory counters that the parties had an express

125

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2.
See: Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho at 771, 890 P.2d at 722.
127
Idaho Code§ 5-217.
126
128

Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 3.
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agreement that the parties would develop connnercial and/or residential housing on the
two pieces of adjoining property purchased separately by the parties. 129
An express contract is defined as a "contract whose terms the parties have
explicitly set out." 130

On oral or parol contract, on the other hand, is defined as a

"contract or modification of a contract that is not in writing or is only partially in
writing. " 131
Under Idaho law, the statute of limitations for an action upon a contract in writing
is five years, 132 as opposed to the four-year limitation period on an oral contract. Since
the record does not reflect a written agreement between Gregory and the Stallings, the
four-year statute oflimitations for oral contracts shall apply in this lawsuit.
The Stallings argue that the four-yeal' statute of limitations upon an oral contract
would have begun to run on December 21, 2012, 133 the date both properties were sold to
Rockwell Court Limited Paitnership. 134 The Stallings offer no authority for assigning the
date of sale of the properties as the start of the limitations period. 135 Gregory counters
that the four-year statute began to run on September 9, 2013, the date Gregory was made
aware that the Stallings were not going to pay or reimburse Gregory for any of his
contributions to the project ont of the proceeds of the sale of the properties. 136
Assuming a contt·act existed between Gregory and Stallings, which is appropriate
for purposes of adjudicating the Stallings' Motion, Richard Stallings received the payout

129
130

131

pg. - .

Gregory ' s 0 ppos1·1·10n, at
23
Black's Law Dictionary, 8 ed., at pp. 344-5.
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., at p. 347.

132

Jdaho Code§ 5-216.
Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 3.
134
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
133

135

Stallings' Memorandum, at p. 3.

136

Gregory's Opposition, at p. 5.
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from the sale of the two prope1ties on or about December 21, 2012.1'7 On that date,
Gregory knew that the Stallings held funds, a portion of which Gregory expected to
recover.

He could have sued the Stallings on that date to recover the proceeds he

believed should have gone to him. That the Stallings might have paid Gregory in the
future would not toll or delay the mnning of the statute of limitations. 138
The record reflects Richard Stallings' e-mail of November 14, 2012, wherein
Stallings informed Garrett Sandow that some portion of the sale proceeds should be given
to Gregory. 139 If anything, this e-mail put Gregory on notice that, upon receipt of the
payout, Stallings should pay Gregory a portion of the proceeds.

Clearly, Richard

Stallings did not provide any pmtion of the proceeds to Gregory because, almost a year
later, on September 9, 2013, Mr. Sandow received notice that Stallings did not intend to
pay any part of the proceeds to Gregory. 140
As of September 9, 2013, Gregory still had over three (3) years in which to file
this lawsuit against the Stallings. He waited until September of 2017 to take action.
Unfortunately, given the fact that he could have filed suit against the Stallings as of
December 21, 2012, Gregory's failure to file his suit earlier ran afoul of the four-year
statute of limitations. His action is now barred as against the Stallings.
For these reasons, this lawsuit shall be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-217.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusions are
appropriate:

137

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.

1
"

Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582,586, 51 P.3d 396,400 (2002).
139
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.
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1.

Pmtions of the Sandow Affidavit should be stricken from consideration on

summaty judgment.
2.

Pmtions of the Gregory Affidavit should be stricken from consideration on

summaty judgment.
3.

Gregory's breach of contract action is not barred by the Idaho Statute of

4.

Greg01y's breach of contract action is batTed by the applicable statute of

Frauds.

limitations.
VII.

ORDER

Accordingly, the Stallings' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Gregory
shall take nothing by his lawsuit against the Stallings.
A separate judgment shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 15th day of October 2018.

District Judge

140

S!gned: 10/15/2018 03:30 PM

Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and cotTect copy of the foregoing Order
Granting Defendants' Motion for Snmmary Jndgment was mailed by first class mail with
prepaid postage and/or hand delivered and/or sent by e-mail this 15th day of October
2018, to:
David N. Parmenter, Esq.
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
53 S. Shilling
P.O. Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Jared M. Hanis, Esq.
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West B1idge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
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Filed:01/18/2019 16:39:29
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
and EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2017-1651
ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)

Defendants.

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Jon Gregory (hereinafter "Gregory") filed the above-numbered lawsuit
against Defendants Richard Stallings, an individual, and Eileen Stallings, an individual
(hereinafter collectively refened to as the "Stallings") and claimed breach of contract,
breach of implied contract, and quantum mendt. 1 The Stallings summarily prevailed
against Gregory based upon the applicable statute oflimitations. 2
Gregmy now moves for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.2(b)(l). 3 The Stallings object to Gregory's Motion. 4

1

Verified Complaint, Grego1y v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed September 6,
2017) (hereinafter "Gregory's Complaint").
2
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Greg01y v. Stallings, Bingham Cmmty case
no. CV-2017-1651 (filed October 15, 2018) (hereinafter the "Summa,,, Judgme11t Order").
3
Motion for Reconsideration, Grego,y v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed
October 29, 2018) (hereinafter "Gregory's Motion").
4
Objection and Response to Motion to Reconsider, Gregmy v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV2017-1651 (filed November 16, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings' Objection").
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L

The pal.ties stipulated to submit Greg01y's Motion on the briefing.' Based upon
the record, the parties' arguments, and the relevant authorities, Gregory's Motion shall be
denied.

II.

ISSUE

Gregory concedes that the four-year statute of limitations for oral contracts, Idaho
Code § 5-217, governs the pal.ties' interactions in this case. 6 He argues that all of the
funds from the sale of the patties' Propetty were not paid to the Stallings on December
21, 2012, but were paid in installments over the course of several draws in 2013. 7
Gregory argues that the oral contract was not breached until on or about August 27, 2013,
when the Stallings received the last draw. 8

The Stallings respond that the parties'

agreement did not include a requirement that Gregory was to be paid out of the last draw,
that Gregory knew of the December 21, 2012 sale, and that he waited too long to file his
lawsuit.'
The pal.ties' arguments raise the following issue in light of the relevant
authorities: Has Gregory shown that the Summa,y Judgment Order should be
reconsidered?

5

Stipulation to Submit on Briefing, Greg01y v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed
December 12, 2018).
6
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Greg01y v, Stallings, Bingham County case no.
CV-2017-1651 (filed October 29, 2018) (hereinafter "Gregory's Memorandum"), at p. I.
7
Gregory's Memorandum, at p. 2.
8
Id.
9
Stallings' Objection, at pp. 1-3.
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III.
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Gregory purchased two (2) acres of a four (4) acre parcel of land in

Rexburg, Idaho because he wanted to develop the property into student housing or a
similar commercial venture." (The entire four-acre parcel is hereinafter referred to as the
"Property.")
2.

On September 27, 2007, Gregory sold an approximately two (2) acre

parcel of land to the Stallings. 11 The two-acre parcel purchased by the Stallings was
contiguous to the two-acre parcel owned by Greg01y. 12 According to Gregory, this
purchase represented the other two acres of the four-acre Property in Rexburg. 13
3.

On Febmary 2, 2009, Gregory transferred his interest in his two-acre

portion of the Property to Pioneer Point LLC. 14 Gregory asserts that Pioneer Point LLC
was to develop the Property, put in roads, parldng lots, sewer, and water, and to begin
constmction on at least two buildings. 15
4.

On December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings entered into a

constmction loan with Century Mmigage Company
. . . to finance a part of the cost of constmction of certain improvements
upon the described premises in accordance with plans and specifications
that have been or will be deposited by [Pioneer Point, LLC and the
Stallings] with [Century Mortgage Company]. 16

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, ,r 5.
Affidavit of Richard Stallings in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Greg01y v. Stallings,
Bingham Connty case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July 5, 2018) (hereinafter the "Stallings Affidavit"), at p.
1, 1f 2; and at Exhibit A.
12
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 1, 1l 3.
13
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, ,r,r 6, 7.
14
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, ,r 4; and at Exhibit B.
15
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 2, ~ 8.
16
Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit A.
10

ll
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5.

On the same date, December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings

signed a promissory note, in the amount of $945,000, to various lenders, with the promise
to pay the note within six (6) months, or by June 10, 2009, with an option to extend for
another six (6) inonths. 17
6.

On May 2, 2012, Pioneer Point LLC transferred what had been Gregory's

portion of the Property to Richard Stallings. 18
7.

On December 21, 2012, the Stallings sold both parcels of the Property to

Rockwell Court Limited Partnership for the sum of $1,086,438.89. 19

According to

Gregory, following the sale of the Property, all of the mmtgage investors were paid back
their initial investments.'°
8.

Prior to the sale, on November 14, 2012, Richard Stallings informed

Gregory, through attorney Garrett Sandow, that he "plan[ned] on taking the following
amounts and then giv[ eJ the balance of each draw to Garret Sandow for Johns [sicJ
disperse! [sic]. Firs't draw 106,000 second draw 150,000."' 1
9.

On September 9, 2013, an e-mail from Richard Stallings (originally dated

Augnst 27, 2013) was forwarded to attorney Gairntt Sandow. 22 In his e-mail, Richard
Stallings wrote, inter alia: "In conclusion I feel in order for me to get a return on my
investment there is no money owed to Jolm from the current sell." 23

17

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit B.
Stallings Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 5.
19
Gregory's Complaint, at Exl1ibit D.
20
Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4, ,r 19; and at ExhibitD, p. 1.
21
Affidavit of Ganett Sandow, Gregmy v, Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed July
19, 2018) (hereinafter the "Sandow Affidavit"), at Exhibit M.
22
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
23
Id,
18
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10.

Gregory sued the Stallings for breach of contract on September 6, 2017. 24
IV.

A.

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Standard of Review - Motion for Reconsideration.
1.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l.2(b )(1) provides:

A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final
judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the
enhy of a final judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after
the entry of final judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the
order.
2.

A party requesting reconsideration of an interlocutory order is pennitted to

present new evidence, bnt is not required to do so. 25 The burden of proof on a motion for
reconsideration is upon the requesting party (in this matter, Gregory). 26
3.

When deciding a motion for reconsideration, the same standard of review

relevant to the original order is applied to the order under reconsideration. 27

In other

words, if the original order was a matter within this Court's discretion, then the same
standard applies to the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. 28 (If the
original order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the
.motion for reconsideration.)"
4.

This Court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for

reconsideration undei' Rule 1 l .2(b). 30

24

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 1.
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472-3, 147 P.3d 100, 104-5 (Ct. App. 2006).
26
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho at 472, 147 P.3d at 104.
27
Fragne/la v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103,113 (2012).
28
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho at 276,281 P.3d at 113.
29
Id.
30
]4 [decided under fmmer Rule 1l(a)(2)(b)].
25

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Page 297

5

B.

Standard of Review - Motion for Summary Jndgment.
l.

If the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any

affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any matetial. fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be granted. 31
Disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. 32
2.

The party moving for summary judgment (in this case, the Stallings) has

the burden of presenting admissible evidence showing that there is an absence of any
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issues raised by the summaty judgment
motion. 33
3.

If the moving party demonstrates the absence of a question of material

fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving patty to demonstrate an issue of matetial fact that
will preclude summary judgment. 34
4.

The non-moving party (in this case, Gregory) cannot merely rest on its

pleadings. 35 When faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing patty
must show matetial issues of fact which preclude the issuance of surnmmy judgment. 36
5.

While the moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issne of

material fact," the opposing pm·ty cannot simply speculate. 38 A mere sciotilla of evidence is

31

Idaho Rule of Civil,Procedure 56(a); Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d
694,698 (2009); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-7, 808 P.2d 851, 853-4 (1991).
32
Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho
Stole Tax Commission, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006).
33
Sadidv. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932,938,265 P.3d 1144, 1150 (2011).
34
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 317, 246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010).
35
Partoutv. Harper, 145 Idaho 683,688,183 P.3d 771,776 (2008); R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho
409,410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990).

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Page 298

6

not enough to create a genuine factual issue. 39 Summary judgment is appropriate when the
non-moving party cannot establish the essential elements of the claim.40
6.

If reasonable persons conld reach differing conclnsions on material issues, or

draw conflicting inferences therefrom, then the motion for summa1y jndgment must be
denied. 41

V.

DISCUSSION

Greg01y premises his Motion largely on the timing of the payouts from Rockwell
Court Limited Partnership. 42 Initially, Gregory argues "there was no reason for [Gregory]
to be at the [December 21, 2012 closing] sale, since he did not anticipate receiving funds
for several months thereafter. . . . [T]he payments were to be made to both parties in
several draws, over a period of time following the actual closing. " 43 In his Complaint,
Gregory alleged that the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Property to Rockwell
Court Limited Partnership was to be divided between the original investors, Gregory, and
the Stallings. 44 In August of 2013, the Stallings advised Gregory that they were keeping
the proceeds from the sale and that Gregory would receive nothing. 45
Regardless of when Gregory anticipated receiving funds, the oral contract of
which he complains began on December 21, 2012 when the Stallings sold the Property to

36

Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912,919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008).
Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210, 214 (2008); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho
792, 798, 41 P.3d 220,226 (2001).
38
Cantwell v. City ofBoise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205,211 (2008).
39
Van v. Porh1e1if Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009); West v. Sanke, 132 Idaho .
133, 138,968 P.2d 228,233 (1998).
40
Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004);
Dekker v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332, 333, 766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989).
41
Van v. Portne1if Medical Center, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,
873, 204 P.3d 508,513 (2009).
31

42
43
44

Gregory's Motion, at pp. 1-2; Gregory's Memorandum, at p. 3.
Gregory's Motion, at p. 1.

Gregory's Complaint, at p. 4, i 20.
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Rockwell Court Limited Partnership. On that date, the subject of the oral contract (the
Stallings' sale of the Prope1ty) took place, for a set price of $1,086,438.89. 46 Gregory
knew on that date that a certain amount was due to him, regardless of when the Stallings
promised to remit that amount to him. Indeed, Gregory knew before December 21, 2012
that he was due some p01tion of the sale proceeds. 47

Gregory had four years from

December 21, 2012 (or until December 21, 2016) in which to file his lawsuit. He took no
action until September 6, 2017, some eight and one-half months past the deadline set for
suits on oral contracts under Idaho Code§ 5-217.
Gregory contends that "payouts to Stallings and Gregory were to continue
through 'January or first part of Febrnary 2013."'48 Greg01y relies upon Exhibit N,
attached to his Motion and to the Gregory Affidavit. 49 Exhibit N evinces a statement
dated December 27, 2012 from Richard Stallings, showing a "First Payment (Kept by
Richard)" in the amount of $93,697.01. 50 At the bottom of the statement is an annotation:
Next Pay out end of Janumy or first ofFebrnary 2013
Total
Paid to John
Paid to Richard

300,000.00
155,482.28
144,517.72

Although unclem-, if Exhibit N is an accounting of monies received from the
December 21, 2012 Property sale, then Grego1y was certainly put on notice as of
December 27, 2012 that the Stallings did not intend to pay a dividend to Gregory with

45

Gregory's Complaint, at p, 4, ,i 24; Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit L

46

Gregory's Complaint, at Exhibit D.
Sandow Affidavit, at Exhibit M.

47
48

Gregory's Motion, at p. 2.

49

Gregory's Motion, at Exhibit N; Affidavit of Jon Greg01y in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,
Grego,y v. Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed October 29, 2018), at Exhibit N.
50 Id.
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each draw. Gregory had the ability to bring the matter to the comt at that time, but chose
not to do so.
Gregory also contends there was never any specification as to when draws would
be received. 51 Thus, Gregory concedes that fixed dates for payments were not agreed
upon or required. The patties' contract did not include a schedule for payments, only a
mercurial understanding that payments would be made in the futnre.

Nevertheless,

Gregory !mew he was owed money as of December 12, 2012 and that he received nothing
on that date. He knew as of December 27, 2012 that he would receive nothing from the
first pay out. Clearly, Gregory had a cause of action against the Stallings on December
12, 2012, and no later than December 27, 2012.
A cause of action for breach of contract accrnes upon breach for limitation
purposes." Regardless of whether or not future payments were anticipated, Gregory's
ability to sue the Stallings on the oral contract at·ose on December 12, 2012 when
Gregory received no proceeds of the Prope1ty sale. For these reasons, Gregory has not
shown a valid reason to reconsider summary judgment in the Stallings favor.
On a final note, Gregory infers that the Stallings refused to fully and completely
answer Gregory's discovery requests. 53 The Stallings argue that the patties agreed that
the Stallings' discove1y responses would not be due until after this Court rendered a
decision on the Stallings' sunnnaty judgment motion. 54 Regardless of the reasons why
discovery was not completed, Gregory bore the respGnsibility of either filing a motion to

51

Gregory's Motion, at p. 2.
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008).
53
Gregory's Motion, at p. 2.
54
Affidavit of Jared M. Hanis in Support [of] Objection and Response to Motion to Reconsider, Greg01y v.
Stallings, Bingham County case no. CV-2017-1651 (filed November 16, 2018).

52
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compel, or requesting additional time to respond to the Stallings' smnmary judgment
motion in order to complete discovery. 55

Since Gregory did not move to compel

complete responses, and did not request additional time to complete discovery, he has
waived his contention regarding discovery responses. 56
VI.

CONCLUSIONOFLAW

Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusion is
appropriate: Gregory has not shown that the Summa,y Judgment Order should be
reconsidered.
VII.

ORDER

Accordingly, Gregory's Motion for reconsideration is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 18th day of January 2019.

~~
District Judge

Signed: 1/18/2019 04:26 PM

55 Stallings' Objection, at pp. 3-4 [citing: Stapleton v. Cushman Drilling & Pump Company, 153 Idaho 735,
742,291 P.3d 418,425 (2012)]; Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37.
56
Stapleton v. Cushman Drilling &Pump Company, 153 Idaho at 742, 291 P.3d at 425.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, tme and con-ect copy of the foregoing Order
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration was sent by e-mail, ICourt e-mail, or
facsimile, this 18th day of Jannaty 2019, to:
David N. Parmenter, Esq.
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
53 S. Shilling
P.O. Box700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Jared M. Harris, Esq.
BAIZER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Street
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

□

E-Mail

0

ICourt E-Mail

□

E-Mail

0

rcourt E-Mail

D Facsimile

□ Facsimile

PAMELA W. ECKHARDT, Clerk of the Corut

By~
Deputy Clerk
Slgfled: 1/18/2019 04:40 PM
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Filed:10/16/2018 09:48:55
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual,

)

CASE NO. CV-2017-1651

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
RlCHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
aud EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff Jon Gregory shall take nothing by his lawsuit against Defendants Richard
Stallings, an individual, and Eileen Stallings, an individual.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATEDthis15th dayofOctober2018.

~~
District Judge

,JUDGMENT
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Signed: 10/15/2018 03:33 PM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, tme and con-eel copy of the foregoing Judgment
was mailed by first class mail with prepaid postage and/or hand delivered and/or sent by
e-mail this ..16.th_ day of October 2018, to:
David N. Pannenter, Esq.
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
53 S. Shilling
P.O.Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
Jared M. Harris, Esq.
BAKER & HARRIS
266 West Bridge Stt·eet
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

□

U.S.Mail

D Courthouse Box

✓ E-Mail

□

U.S.Mai!

D Courthouse Box

✓

E-Mail

PAMELA W. ECKHARDT, Clerk of the Comt
Sig11ed: 10116/2018 09:49 AM

JUDGMENT

2
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Electronically Filed
2/27/2019 2:51 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Brandee Cammack, Deputy Clerk

DAVID N. PARMENTER
NATHAN D. RIVERA
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208)785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-1651

)

vs.

)
)

RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual and )
EILEEN STALLING, an individual
)
Defendants.
)

OBJECTION TO AMENDED MOTION
FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS & MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

Comes now plaintiff, Jon Gregory, and objects to defendant's request for attorney's fees
pending the matter for the following reasons and on the following grounds:
Plaintiff objects for the same reasons as he did in his original objection to the request~
that the request for attorney's fees is excessive, and unreasonable, under the circumstances and
time spent in the case. Further, he originally objected to attorney's fees on the basis ofldaho
Code Section 12-120 and 12-121.
Plaintiff further objects to an award of fees and pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121,
as the case was not brought, or pursued frivolously, umeasonably or without foundation. While
the Court denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, there were still arguable matters of
law and issues that ce1tainly were anything but frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.
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Furthermore, Idaho Code Section 12-120 (1) does not apply, since the amount pied was
more than $25,000. Idaho Code Section 12 - 120 (3) could arguably apply as a commercial
transaction, but there are legitimate questions about the application of that subsection as well. In
conclusion, there is no basis for an award of fees, unless the Court detennines that the foregoing
was a commercial transaction within the defrnition ofldaho Code Section 12-120(3)-something
that is questionable at best.
Fmiher, plaintiff requests an enlargement of time for filing this objection-in part
because he had previously filed an objection to defendant's original motion for attorney's fees,
and second, did not actually see defendant's affidavit and memorandmn for additional fees until
February 15, 2019. See attached affidavit.
For these reasons and others, plaintiff objects to defendant's motion for attorneys fees.
DATED this 24fay of

~o/, 2019
DAVID N. PARMENTER
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on this Zb
day of
~ , 2019 upon the following:
_..-Mail
Fax
_ _ Hand Delivery

Jared M. Han·is
Baker & Harris
266 W. Bridge St.
Blackfoot, ID 83221

~
DAVID N. PARMENTER
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Electronically Filed
2/27/2019 2:51 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W. Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Brandee Cammack, Deputy Clerk

DAVID N. PARMENTER
NATHAN D. RIVERA
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208)785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY, an individual

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RICHARD STALLINGS, an individual and )
EILEEN STALLING, an individual
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV-2017-1651
AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER GODINEZ

Jennifer Godinez being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1. I am one of Mr. Parmenter' s assistants.
2. On Febrnary 19, 2019, Mr. Parmenter asked me to contact the court to get the suppo1iing
documents that were mentioned in the Amended Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees
and Costs, because he had not seen them and they were not attached to the motion that
was printed for him.
3. I am not familiar with iCourt e-filing, so when I saw the filing I did not see an
attachment.
4. Marybel C01tez is who assists Mr. Parmenter in his civil and criminal cases. I waited a
few minutes for her to get in the office, shortly after I spoke to Mr. Parmenter, to follow
up with her. I asked her ifwe had received the supporting documents refened to in the
motion. She stated that we had and reprinted them.
5. Marybel put them in Mr. Parmenter's box for his review.
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Datedthis~dayof

fe/y~

,2019.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of'bi1t.5lttt"' )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~ a y of

r;,/,/•r

otary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, residing at
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, 2019.

Jack L. Fuller, CSR
Official Court Reporter
Seventh Judicial District
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital Ave
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 529-1350 Ext. 1138
E-Mail: jfuller@co.bonneville.id.us
*****************************************************************

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
*****************************************************************

DATE:
TO:

April 9, 2019
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court/ Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO:
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO:

46818-2019
CV-2017-1651 (Bingham County)

CAPTION OF CASE:
Jonathon Clyde Gregory vs. Richard R.
Stallings, an individual, and Eileen Stallings, an individual
You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate
transcript in the above-entitled and numbered case has been
lodged with the Appeals Clerk of the County of Bingham in the
Seventh Judicial District.
Said transcript consists of the
following proceedings, totaling 22 pages:
1. Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(August 21, 2018)

Resp~_ ctfully,

.......
'

i

4

·

\..

I
........

.,,..

-·.

.::'.le!

r.L-

JACK L. FULLER
:B.daho CSR #762

cc:

Bingham County Appeals Clerk
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Filed: 04/11/2019 15:17:15
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Cammack, Brandee
Filed: 04/11/2019 15:17:13
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
-vsRICHARD STALLINGS, an individual,
and EILEEN STALLINGS, an
individual,
Defendants / Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.: 46818-2019
District Court No.: CV-2017-1651

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF EXHIBITS

----------)
I, Brandee Cammack, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham, do hereby certify:

1:8] There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during
the course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
April
11, 2019
court at Blackfoot, Idaho, this --------PAMELA W. ECKHARDT,
CLERK OF THE COURT

Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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Signed: 4/11/2019 03:16 PM
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Filed: 04/11/2019 15:14:46
Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Cammack, Brandee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
JON GREGORY,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
-vsRICHARD STALLINGS, an individual, and
EILEEN STALLINGS, an individual,
Defendants / Respondents.
__________

On

April 11, 2019

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.: 46818-2019
District Court No.: CV-2017-1651

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE ON APPEAL

, I, Brandee Cammack, Deputy Clerk of the District

Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of Bingham, do hereby certify that the
electronic Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was electronically compiled, and is a true, full
and correct electronic Clerk's Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the following:

[gl Clerk's Record;
[gl Reporter's Transcript; and
[gl No Exhibits were submitted.
to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:
David N. Parmenter, Esq.,
Appellant's counsel

[gl iCourt Email - parlaw@gmail.com

Jared M. Harris, Esq.,
Respondents' counsel

[gl iCourt Email- efiling@bakerharrislaw.com

D U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
D U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ON APPEAL
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Signed: 4/11/2019 03:15 PM
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